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Abstract
There are reasons for us to act in certain ways and think certain things. We can recognise
those reasons for what they are and respond to them accordingly. This thesis is an inves-
tigation of that phenomenon. In particular, it constitutes an attempt to resist certain ways
in which our understanding of it can be distorted by letting our account of it be informed
by bad cases of responding to reasons: cases in which one takes something to be a reason
and responds accordingly by acting or thinking in the way it seems to one to recommend,
even though one fails (blamelessly) to act or think for a genuine reason. I examine and
reject three ways in which the possibility of bad cases might distort our thinking about
the phenomenon at issue. First, we should reject the thought that the subject is able to act
or think for the reason that p in both bad cases and good, so that acting or believing for
a reason cannot simply be identical to the success condition of responding to a genuine
reason. Second, we should reject the thought that the reasons for which we act and think
are psychological features of ourselves, because that must be so in bad cases, and what
goes for bad cases goes across the board. Finally, we should reject the thought that act-
ing in response to a genuine reason involves only a rationalising explanation of the same
type as that which is present in the bad case. The result is a vindication of the position
promoted by Raz (2011): responding to reasons is a matter of acting or thinking in a way
than manifests one’s knowledge of the reasons there are for one to so act or think, so that
the reasons in question, which are usually facts about the external world, explain why one
does so qua reasons. Bad cases are a diﬀerent kind of thing entirely.
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Introduction
One kind of feature of the normative landscape which has received a good deal of philo-
sophical attention in recent times is that of a reason. By this, I mean what are usually
called normative reasons: what I take here to be facts, typically about the external world,
which count for or against our performing a certain action or adopting a certain attitude.
That the charity does eﬀective work in developing countries is a reason to donate to them,
that lighting the candle will cause a fire, given the presence of gas in the room, is a reason
not to light it, that my football team have a new manager is a reason to hope that they will
be promoted this season, that the weathervane is pointing north is a reason to believe that
the wind is blowing in that direction, and so on.
There are many debates that it is possible to have about normative reasons. The de-
bate to be focused on here could properly be described as a debate at the intersection of
normative philosophy and the philosophy of mind: what our account should be of what it
is to respond to normative reasons by acting or thinking in the way they favour. The sort
of phenomenon here is commonplace: one recognises that a certain fact favours doing or
thinking something and one thereby acts or thinks accordingly, in a way that manifests
one’s recognition of the facts which favours it. Recognising that the car has a flat tyre and
hence that I ought to pull over in order to replace it, I do so and I do so in a way that man-
ifests my knowledge of the normatively significant fact in question: I respond to a reason,
in this case a reason for action.
We can contrast the phenomenon of responding to a normative reason with cases of
acting or holding an attitude irrationally and a-rationally. Dancing around in jubilation
in response to one’s team scoring the winning goal, intending to repaint the fence even
though one knows one doesn’t have any means of doing it, believing that drinking three
glasses of red wine a night is healthy out of wishful thinking, and so on, are all cases of
either irrational or a-rational activity, which we can contrast with activity that counts as a
response to normative reasons.
But we can also contrast the phenomenon of responding to normative reasons with
what I call bad cases of responding to reasons. A bad case is a case in which the subject
takes something to be a reason for action or thought and acts or thinks accordingly, in a way
that manifests their taking a fact to be a normative reason for them to so respond, but they
blamelessly fail to count as responding to a normative reason nevertheless. This sort of
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case contrasts both with the success phenomenon of responding to a normative reason and
the non-rational phenomena just described. It contrasts with the latter because unlike the
latter, and like the former, the agent is acting or holding an attitude in a way that manifests
their taking something to be a normative reason for them to do so. It contrasts with the
former however because the agent blamelessly fails to respond to a genuine reason. The
most straightforward way in which this can be is if the agent blamelessly gets what reasons
there are for action or thought wrong.
Here is how I think we should understand the success phenomenon. Responding to a
reason is a matter of engaging in an action or holding an attitude in a way that is subject
to a special sort of explanation. The explanation is an explanation why one is performing
the action or holding the attitude in question which makes the action or attitude intelligible
by appeal to the very facts which speak in favour it – the normative reasons to which one
is responding. The act or attitude is not only made intelligible by those facts but is made
intelligible by them in so far as they have the normative dimension they do, and the sort
of explanation at issue essentially requires the subject to know the fact in question as well
as to recognise its normative dimension. Here now is how I think we should understand
what’s going on in the bad case. In the bad case, the subject acts or holds an attitude in a
way that is to be explained by appeal to the fact that they believe that p, where p is what
they take to be a reason in favour of their so responding. Their action or attitude manifests
their taking p to be a reason in favour of their doing it or holding it. That explanation in
terms of the subject’s belief holds in the good case too, it’s just that also, there is a kind of
explanation that essentially appeals to the normative reasons present as well. Moreover, I
think there is a certain sense in which the explanation in terms of belief is parasitic on the
explanation in terms of the normative reason. Throughout, it is taken to be the case that
normative reasons are normally facts about the external world. And it is taken that our
ordinary talk of acting or believing for reasons can be interpreted as talk which reports the
success condition as conceived above, or else as talk which tracks explanations in terms
of belief.
The conception of responding to normative reasons just broached is, in a certain way,
minimalist. It is minimalist in so far as it operates with at most two notions of a reason: the
notion of a normative reason and the notion of an explanatory reason. Normative reasons
are facts which exemplify a certain sort of normative dimension; explanatory reasons are
items which explain why something is the case. The story just broached says that in cases
of responding to genuine reasons we should think of the reason why the agent acts or holds
the relevant attitude as identical to the normative reason to which they are responding,
where the normative reason explains qua normative and the explanation is enabled by the
agent’s knowledge. Of the bad case we should say that the reason why the agent acts or
holds the relevant attitude is identical to the fact that they believe that p, where p is the
(apparent) normative reason for their action or attitude.
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Perhaps surprisingly, the standard way of conceiving of the phenomena at issue here,
which I call the Motivating Reasons View, rejects the picture just oﬀered. According to
the Motivating Reasons View, we need to allow that the subject can act, believe, desire,
intend, judge. . . for the reason that p in both good cases and bad. So even if I get it wrong
that the car has a flat tyre and act to change it merely because I believe it to have a flat
tyre, the proponent of the Motivating Reasons View will say, I still count as acting for the
reason that the car has a flat tyre. Since I do not respond to a normative reason in such a
case, it cannot be that the concept of a reason in operation is the concept of a normative
reason. Rather, it must be a fresh concept of a reason, a concept of something that plays a
certain motivating role: a motivating reason.
If the Motivating Reasons View is correct, then a number of interesting consequences
follow:
(i) We would have to allow that we have a concept of a reason which is distinct from
the concept of a normative reason and the concept of an explanatory reason.
(ii) Wewould have to say that the condition of acting or holding an attitude for the reason
that p is not simply identical to the success condition of responding to the normative
reason that p.
(iii) We would have to allow that we have a condition which is generic to the good case
and bad: the condition for acting or holding an attitude for the reason that p. We
would then have to account for what it is to achieve success – what it is to respond
to a genuine reason – by saying that it is a matter of having a motivating reason,
but where, also, there is a genuine normative reason on the scene which is suitably
connected to one’s motivating reason. Further, we would have to account for the
bad case by appeal to the idea that it is a case in which the subject has a motivating
reason, but is missing at least some of the additional factors required for success.
(iv) The Motivating Reasons View puts pressure on us to subscribe to a psychologistic
conception of the reasons for which we act or hold attitudes. That’s because, what-
ever motivating reasons are, they are present in the bad case. But also: they explain
why the agent acts or holds the relevant attitude. However, what explains must be a
fact. The only fact on the scene in bad cases which could do the explanatory work
is the fact that the subject believes that p. So the reasons for which one acts or holds
attitudes must always be that one believes that p.
As should be apparent, none of (i)-(iv) are consequences of the more minimalist alter-
native I favour.
This essay is a rejection of theMotivating ReasonsView in favour of themoreminimal-
ist alternative. I begin, in Chapter One, with an attempt get clear on the basic phenomena
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in play here: normative reasons, responding to normative reasons, bad cases of respond-
ing to normative reasons, explanatory reasons, rationalising explanations, and so on. In
Chapter Two I introduce the Motivating Reasons View as well as the views of Davidson,
Dancy, and the Neo-Davidsonians, which are diﬀering versions of the Motivating Reasons
View. In Chapter Three I attempt to refute the Motivating Reasons View by showing that
there are no such things as motivating reasons in the special sense at issue. Subjects do
not act, believe, desire, intend. . . for reasons in bad cases at all. In Chapter Four I address
a well-worn dialectic in this area: whether we should go psychologistic about the reasons
which motivate us. In light of my rejection of the Motivating Reasons View, I argue that
we should not. Finally, in Chapter Five, I argue for the conception of act and attitude ex-
planation which is at the heart of my more minimal alternative to the Motivating Reasons
View.
There is a preliminary point which needs to be made before the enquiry begins. Many
of the authors I discuss in what follows focus on the case of acting and omitting for reasons
in particular, and ignore what it is to hold an attitude for a reason. Moreover, some authors
focus on holding beliefs for reasons and ignore acts, omissions, and non-doxastic attitudes.
In contrast, my focus here is general: I assume that there is something which can be said
about what it is to respond to reasons in general, whether the response takes the form of
an act, omission, or the holding of an attitude, whether doxastic or not. I assume that
responding to a reason exemplifies a generic structure common to all the diﬀerent kinds of
response there are. Thus, whenever I quote from an author who focuses solely on action
or on belief, I assume that what they say can be generalised to anything that can count as
a reaction to reasons and proceed on the basis of that assumption.
I do not attempt substantive defence of the assumption that things can be generalised
in this way here, but I think it has initial plausibility. However, it should be noted, by way
of demonstrating that the assumption is more innocuous than it might at first appear, that
I am not claiming that there are simply no philosophically interesting diﬀerences between
acting and believing for reasons or between holding doxastic attitudes and non-doxastic
attitudes for reasons. One diﬀerence between acting and believing for reasons, for example,
is that the former, at least sometimes, involves acting in the pursuit of a goal supplied by
a state of mind which either is, or at least mimics, a state of desire. The latter involves no
such conative input. That is entirely consistent with the generality assumption operated
with here, which is simply that there is a generic structure common to all instances of
responding to reasons. The work which follows is an investigation of that structure.
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Chapter 1
Responding to Reasons
In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant draws a famous distinction. The
distinction is between acting in accordance with duty and acting for the sake of duty.1
One acts in accordance with duty if, and only if one’s action is prescribed by some moral
principle which specifies a duty that applies to one. One acts for the sake of duty, however,
only if one performs one’s action in the light of its being one’s duty to do so.
Kant’s distinction is cast in terms of the notion of duty, but an analogous distinction
can be drawn with respect to reasons. Just as there are actions that are in accordance with
the duties that apply to one, so there are actions that are in accordance with the reasons
there for one to do it. And just as there are actions performed out of duty, so there are
actions which are done for the sake of the reasons for one to act. Acting in accordance
with reasons just requires that one’s action is favoured by the reasons there are for one to
do it. Acting for the sake of reasons requires that one acts in the light of those reasons.
Kant’s focus is only on the case of bodily acts and omissions. But the distinction, trans-
posed to the domain of reasons, can be drawn with respect to mental acts and omissions
that can be done for reasons as well, such as watching, judging, deciding, reasoning, de-
liberating and concentrating. It can also be drawn with respect to attitudes that can be held
for reasons such as, for example, believing that p, doubting that p, desiring that p, hoping
that p, intending to  , regretting that p and fearing that p.
Following Scanlon (1998), let’s call any act, omission, or attitude that can constitute a
response to reasons judgement sensitive.2 Let’s say that a judgement sensitive expression
is any expression that picks out some type of judgement sensitive act, omission or attitude.
And let’s use ‘’ as a variable for any judgement sensitive expression. Thus, it is possible in
general to distinguish -ing in accordance with reasons from -ing for the sake of reasons.
-ing in accordance with reasons is a matter of -ing in a way that is favoured by the
1See Kant (1996:4:397-4:398).
2Strictly speaking, Scanlon thinks that the only items which are judgement sensitive are attitudes. Actions
are derivatively judgement sensitive: actions can count as responses to reasons only in so far as intentions
to act can do so. See Scanlon (1998:21).
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reasons there are for one to . -ing for the sake of reasons is a matter of -ing on the
basis of reasons.
My concern in this essay is a certain way of thinking about -ing for reasons which,
I think it is fair to say, permeates the contemporary analytic literature. I call the view
the Motivating Reasons View, for reasons that will become clear in a moment. I lay out
the Motivating Reasons View, as well as the versions of it defended by Davidson (1963),
Dancy (2000) and others, in the next chapter. But, in broad outline, it is this. The view
starts with the thought that we can distinguish normative reasons from a perfectly ordinary
notion of what motivates the agent to  captured by talk such as: ‘S is -ing for the reason
that p’, and cognate expressions. Normative reasons are facts, typically about the external
world, which make it the case that we ought to . But the View, as I shall put it, identifies
the ordinary notion of what motivates with the special notion of a motivating reason. Mo-
tivating reasons are said to be all and only the entities which have each of the following
properties: (i) they are explanatory in the following sense: for there to be a motivating
reason for S to  is for S’s -ing to be subject to a rationalising explanation; (ii) they are
reasons; (iii) the rationalising explanation in question is constitutively independent of the
existence of genuine normative reasons for S to , even though it requires the presence of
apparent normative reasons for S to ; (iv) hence motivating reasons and normative rea-
sons are reasons in diﬀerent senses. The notion of a motivating reason, so understood, is
then put to work in providing a reductive analysis of what it is to  in response to genuine
normative reasons.
The Motivating Reasons View is a generic thesis which comes in many diﬀerent vari-
eties. Some proponents of the View hold that motivating reasons are psychological states
which cause the agent’s -ing. Others deny that that’s so, and there are other dimensions of
diﬀerence between competing versions of the View, as we will see. My aim in this essay is
to undermine Motivating Reasons Views across the board. With the Motivating Reasons
View rejected, this helps to clear the way for a solution to the issue of whether we should
think of the reasons for which the subject s as psychological items. It also enables a more
clear minded discussion of the issue of what we should say about success cases of -ing
for reasons. Those two issues are taken up in turn, after the Motivating Reasons View is
rejected.
In this chapter I introduce some machinery in the theory of reasons the purpose of
which is to enable me to unpack the Motivating Reasons View in the next chapter. By the
end of this chapter, the meaning of the theses attributed to the Motivating Reasons View
should already have come into clearer focus. I intend my setting up of the terrain here
to be non-controversial. Inevitably, some of what I say will be controversial, however,
and I flag it up if that’s so. In particular, I make some controversial metaphysical and
psychological assumptions. The assumptions are, I hope, both prima facie plausible and
ultimately defensible, but I don’t undertake a defence of them here: because of limits of
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space, that is a project best undertaken on a diﬀerent occasion.
I proceed in this chapter as follows. In §1.1 I introduce the important phenomenon
of a normative reason. In §1.2 I try to pinpoint the phenomenon of -ing in response
to normative reasons. I contrast that phenomenon with a number of other phenomena in
order to bring it into clear focus and I describe some of the psychological properties of the
subject which are necessary for responding to normative reasons in the sense at issue. In
§1.3 I describe the important distinction between good cases and bad cases of -ing for
reasons. Finally, in §1.4 I bring onto the scene the notion of rationalising explanation and
relate it to the other notions already on the table.
1.1 Normative Reasons
When we reason with a view to answering the question: ‘Should I ?’ we typically ask
ourselves the further question: ‘What reasons are there for me to ?’ When we ask this
question, we want to know what can be said for and against our -ing. We want to know
what considerations there are in favour of our -ing and what considerations there are
which disfavour our -ing. Once we have amassed all the considerations we can, we then
go on to determine whether or not we should , all-things-considered, where this typically
involves weighing up the considerations for and against. If we decide that the considera-
tions in favour outweigh those against then we , or else form an intention to do so in the
future, if -ing is the sort of thing with respect to which one can form intentions in the first
place.
Considerations which favour and which disfavour one’s -ing are normative reasons.
Those are the items we attempt to muster and typically weigh up when we are deciding
whether or not to . They are considerations that stand in a certain normative relation –
that of favouring, or disfavouring – to a certain act, omission, or attitude open to one. For
reasons of simplicity, in what follows I focus on normative reasons in favour of one’s -ing
and leave out normative reasons with the opposing valency.
That the cat is meowing forlornly at feeding time is a reason in favour of my feeding
her, and indeed a reason to think that she wants food. That my football team has reached
the play-oﬀs is a reason in favour of my watching the match and if they go on to win,
that would be a reason in favour of my celebrating in some way. If however, they lost,
then I’d have reason to grumble about it to friends and relatives. Typically, we specify
normative reasons using phrases of the form ‘that p is a reason for S to ’, instead of the
more cumbersome ‘that p is a reason in favour of S’s -ing’, and I will sometimes follow
the common usage in what follows.
I’ve said that reasons stand in the normative relation of favouring to one’s -ing. To
say that they do so is to say little more than that they are reasons in favour of one’s -
ing. That isn’t a problem for me because it is not incumbent on me to give a non-circular
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analysis of what it is for a normative reason to be a normative reason here.3 But even
though I do not oﬀer a non-circular analysis of the notion of a normative reason, I do want
to oﬀer an informative characterisation of it in what follows. I do not oﬀer a complete
characterisation of the notion, but I hope to say enough to make it clear enough for my
purposes.
Favouring is a normative relation, as I have said. When a certain consideration stands in
favour of one’s -ing, we can apply certain normative predicates to one’s -ing, or at least
to the prospect of one’s -ing, if one has not already engaged in -ing yet.4 We can say that
onewould be justified in -ing – that onewould be justified in adopting the relevant attitude
or performing the relevant action.5 We can say that one ought to  – that one ought to adopt
the attitude, or perform the action.6 And we can say that it would be sensible, appropriate,
and reasonable for one to .7 In what follows I restrict my attention to the status of its
being the case that one ought to . I do so only for the sake of simplicity, it would make
little diﬀerence were I to focus on any of the other normative statuses mentioned instead.
Most normative reasons provide defeasible support for one’s -ing. They make it the
case that one pro tanto ought to : they make it so that one ought to , as far as the
relevant consideration holds. Whether those reasons make it so that one ought to  all-
things-considered or overall depends on what counterveiling reasons there are and what
the strength of those counterveiling reasons are. When there is a set of reasons against
-ing which are stronger when taken together that the set of reasons for -ing, -ing is
not something one ought to do, all-things-considered. One’s reasons for -ing have been
defeated by one’s reasons against -ing. Nevertheless, one’s reasons for -ing continue to
make it so that one ought to  pro tanto. They continue, even when defeated by stronger
counterveiling reasons, to favour one’s -ing: it continues to be the case that those con-
siderations constitute something to be said in favour of -ing. We can call those types of
normative reasons pro tanto reasons.
Most, if not all, reasons for mental and bodily action are pro tanto. That it’s raining
outside is a reason for me to take my umbrella, but that reason can be outweighed by
counterveiling reasons – for example, that my umbrella is cumbersome and that it is prone
to fold in the wind – such that all-things-considered I ought not take my umbrella. In
3For the record, I don’t I think it is possible to oﬀer such a non-circular analysis. The notion of a reason in
favour is best treated as primitive. For a defence of that idea see, for example, Scanlon (1998:Ch.1) and
Dancy (2004a).
4What follows is not an exhaustive list.
5The notion of justification in operation here needn’t be thought of as the only notion of justification there is.
For example, it might be that there is a further notion of justification we possess which a particular -ing
can instantiate only when one has ed, or is in the process of -ing, for a normative reason. That second
type of justification isn’t guaranteed to be present just by dint of a normative reason being present.
6This will only be plausible if it’s correct that ‘ought’ needn’t always mean, and perhaps never means ‘is
obligated to’ and if it’s correct that ‘ought’ needn’t always mean, and perhaps never means ‘morally ought’.
For these points see Alvarez (2010:11) and Broome (2004). I assume here that each of those claims about
the meaning of ‘ought’ is correct.
7Those seem to me to be diﬀerent ways of saying the same thing.
4
those circumstances, the fact that it is raining still means that there’s something to be said
in favour of performing the action which, overall, I ought not perform. Similarly, that the
music is beautiful is a reason for me to attend to it. But that reason might be outweighed
by counterveiling reasons – for example, that I need to concentrate on something more
pressing – such that I ought not do it all-things-considered. Some reasons for belief are
pro tanto too. That there are fresh tyre tracks impressed into the mud on the drive-way
is a reason to believe that someone has just left in the car. But it can be outweighed by
counterveiling reasons for belief – for example, that the car is currently out of service –
such that it is not the case that all-things-considered I ought believe that someone has just
left in the car. Still, in those circumstance, the fact about the fresh tyre tracks continues to
count in favour of my believing that someone has just left in the car.
By contrast, some normative reasons provide indefeasible support for one’s -ing, at
least in the sense that it is not possible for them to make it the case that one ought to
 at all, and yet it not be the case that all-things-considered one ought to . We can
call those types of normative reasons indefeasible reasons. A good deal of reasons for
belief are indefeasible. That the man in the room is playing a middle C on the piano is an
indefeasible reason for me to believe that he’s not playing a G. That there is a pig in the
field I’m looking at is an indefeasible reason for me to believe that there is a mammal in
the field. That my friend Stephen is married is an indefeasible reason for me to believe
that he isn’t a bachelor. In each case, we have a consideration that can obtain only if p.
Because of that, it is not possible for that fact to make it the case that one ought to  at all,
and yet be outweighed by counterveiling epistemic reasons.8
When a certain normative reason makes it the case that one ought to  all-things-
considered, we can say that that reason decides the issue of whether one ought to . Thus,
we can label reasons which have that status decisive reasons. Given what’s been said,
decisive reasons come in two forms: they can come in the form of pro-tanto reasons which
are not, relative to a particular context, outweighed by counterveiling considerations and
they can come in the form of indefeasible reasons. All facts that constitute indefeasible
reasons are decisive reasons, in whatever context; indefeasible reasons simply guarantee
that one ought to  all-things-considered, if they make it the case that one ought to  at all.
But a pro-tanto reason can be a decisive reason in one context, when there are no stronger
counterveiling reasons on the scene, and not a decisive reason in others, when there are
such stronger counterveiling reasons present.9
8It might be the case that moral reasons in general are indefeasible in contexts where there are no counterveil-
ing moral reasons present, because the presence of a moral reason ‘silences’ all counterveiling non-moral
reasons in the sense that the presence of the moral reason is suﬃcient to extinguish the normative force of
the counterveiling non-moral reasons. That claim is, of course, highly contentious. For a defence of it, see
McDowell (1979).
9I’ve been talking as if whenever we have a case of pro-tanto reasons having the status of decisive reasons
that that is a matter of here being a single consideration that constitutes a pro-tanto reason for one to  and
which is not outweighed by counterveiling considerations. I will continue to talk as if that’s so, in order to
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I’ve said enough about normative reasons, I hope, to have pinpointed the phenomenon
adequately enough. Now I turn to the following question: what are normative reasons?
That it’s going to rain is a reason in favour of my taking an umbrella with me when I go
outside. That the exit-poll predicts a Labour victory at the by-election is a reason in favour
of my believing that Labour will win. But to which category should we assign normative
reasons? My answer to this question is, I think, the orthodox one: reasons in favour of
one’s -ing are best thought of as facts. It is the fact that it’s going to rain which is my
practical reason and it is the fact about the exit-poll which is my epistemic reason. This is
one of the controversial assumptions I make. It is worth codifying:
(NR=F) All normative reasons are facts.
(NR=F) says that for anything that’s a normative reason, that thing is a fact. It does not
imply that all facts are normative reasons, although that might well be so.10
What are facts? One option is that they are states of aﬀairs understood as coarsely
individuated entities composed of particulars and properties which constitute the unifica-
tion of those particulars and properties.11 A second option is they are obtaining states of
aﬀairs understood as coarsely individuated abstract entities that can exist whilst failing to
obtain.12 A third option is that they are truths: true propositions understood as finely indi-
viduated entities composed of Fregean senses that constitute the content of thoughts and
which are ways of thinking about concrete reality.13 On any of those options, it looks as
if facts, and hence, given (NR=F), normative reasons, are not concrete objects, events or
property instances. Is that a correct thing to say about facts? I assume so here – I assume
that reasons are facts, that facts are either states of aﬀairs (on some conception thereof) or
truths, and that this rules it out that facts are concrete particulars.14
Given (NR=F), normative reasons aremind-independent in the sense that they are facts,
and whether or not a certain fact obtains is a mind-independent aﬀair. That is not to say all
or even some facts that constitute normative reasons have their normative status in a mind-
independent way – it is not to say that the normativity of normative reasons is ‘part of the
fabric of the world’, to borrow the influential phrase from Mackie (1977). Consistently
with (NR=F), it could be that normative reasons for action have their normative status
keep matters simple. But it should be noted that perhaps the typical case involves not a single consideration
having the status of a decisive reason but a set of considerations where together those considerations are
decisive, though taken individually they are not.
10It would be so, for example, if all facts were reasons to believe themselves.
11See Amrstrong (1997) for a defence of that conception of facts.
12See Textor (2012) for an exploration of states of aﬀairs on that conception.
13See Dodd (2008) for a defence of that third conception of facts.
14Because there is more than one normative reason, given (NR=F) I’m committed to thinking that there
is more than one fact. That is yet another claim I take for granted, contentious though it is. Davidson
(1969) oﬀers a Slingshot Argument for the claim that if there are such things as facts, then there is only
numerically one fact. Part of what I’m taking for granted is that there is an adequate way to respond to
Davidson’s Slingshot.
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because of what one does or would take a pro-attitude towards, in ideal conditions of in-
formation and reasoning, for example.15 The thought is only that given (NR=F), normative
reasons are mind-independent in the sense that the entities which are normative reasons
enjoy a mind-independent existence. That implies nothing about the mind-independence
of the normative status of normative reasons.
As well as displaying that minimal level of mind-independence, there is a minimal
sense in which normative reasons display objectivity. That is, there is a minimal sense in
which subjects can be wrong about what normative reasons there are. That can happen
in either of two ways. First, a subject might make a mistake about what facts there are.
They might believe that p, and take p to be a normative reason for them to , even though
it is not the case that p. I might take it that the road up ahead is closed and regard that as
a reason to travel in a diﬀerent direction, even though I am mistaken about what reason
I have because I’m mistaken about the road being closed. Second, a subject might get it
right that p is a fact, but make a mistake about the normative status of the fact that p. They
correctly believe that p, but incorrectly take p to be a reason in favour of their -ing. I
might correctly take it that the exit-poll predicts a Labour victory at the by-election, but
mistakenly think that the particular exit-poll is reliable and so mistakenly take the fact that
the exit-poll predicts a Labour victory as a reason in favour my believing that Labour will
win.
Not only can a subject be wrong about what reasons there are in these two ways, they
can be ignorant of what reasons there are in analogous ways too. A subject might be
ignorant of the existence of a reason in favour of their -ing because they are ignorant of
the obtaining of the fact that constitutes the normative reason. And a subject might be
ignorant of the existence of a normative reason because they are ignorant of the normative
status of the fact in question.
We can say, whenever an agent takes p to be a fact and a reason in favour of their -ing,
that is appears to them as if p is a reason in favour of their -ing. It is important to note
that all that’s meant by talk of the appearance of reasons here is that the subject takes p
to be a fact and takes it to have the relevant sort of normative significance, whatever those
conditions, in turn, amount to. To say that it appears to the agent as if p is a reason, in
the relevant sense, is not to say that the subject is in some phenomenally conscious state
or is undergoing some phenomenally conscious event, the phenomenal character of which
involves p being present to consciousness as a reason. It is rather to say that the subject is
in a state, or set of states, which constitutes them taking p to be a fact and to be a reason
in favour of their -ing. Those states needn’t involve the presence of any phenomenally
conscious mental entity.
When an agent correctly takes p to be a normative reason for their -ing, we can say
15See Williams (1980) for the classic contemporary defence of that ‘internalist’ position about normative
reasons for action.
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that it appears to them as if p is a reason in favour of their -ing and does so correctly: p
does have the status of a normative reason for them to . But when an agent mistakenly
takes p to be a normative reason for their -ing we can say that p is a merely apparent
reason for them to . Merely apparent normative reasons are not normative reasons, they
just appear to subjects to be so even though they are not. Merely apparent normative
reasons are common in everyday life, because it is common for people in everyday life to
make mistakes about the existence of facts and their normative statuses. But they are also
common in the outlandish cases discussed by philosophers. The subject who is a brain-in-
a-vat suﬀering a series of hallucinatory experiences they cannot tell apart by introspection
from genuine perceptions is a subject who thinks that there are many normative reasons
applicable to them on the scene, even though they are systematically mistaken. Most, if not
all considerations taken to be be normative reasons by brains-in-vats are merely apparent
normative reasons.
A final point about normative reasons is in order. Later on, we’ll be encountering the
proponent of Psychologism, who says, of the considerations on the basis of which the agent
s, that those considerations are all psychological items, for example psychological states
of the agent. I take it be obvious that a Psychologistic position about normative reasons is
not an option. Normative reasons, if there are any at all, are often facts about the mind-
independent environment. It is the fact that the exit-poll predicts a Labour victory – not
in any relevant sense a mental or psychological fact – that’s a reason for me to believe
that Labour will win. It’s the fact that it’s going to rain – a fact about the weather – that’s
a reason for me to take my umbrella, and so on. Along with many others writing about
these issues, I’m going to take it for granted that normative reasons needn’t be, and often
aren’t, psychological items, but are often facts about the external world. As should be
clear from the caveats included in the formulation of that last point, I am not denying
that normative reasons are sometimes psychological items – specifically facts about the
subject’s psychological states. That I believe I’ve been abducted by aliens is a reason to
visit a psychiatrist, for example. The thought is just that this needn’t be the case, and
typically isn’t.16
1.2 Responding to Normative Reasons
Let us suppose that an agent decides that there is suﬃcient normative reason for them to
. For example, let us suppose that an agent determines that there is a certain normative
16It should be noted that what has been said here is consistent with the thought that there might be certain
psychological conditions which need to be fulfilled for a certain fact to count as a reason, whether epistemic
or practical. It might be that I need to have certain pro-attitudes in order for the fact about the weather to
be a practical reason for me. It might be that I need to know the fact about the exit-poll in order for it to
make it the case that I ought to believe that Labour will win and hence be a normative reason for me to
believe so. That’s entirely consistent with saying that the things which are practical and epistemic reasons
needn’t be, and typically aren’t, psychological items.
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reason for them to , p, and a certain normative reason against them -ing, q, and they
decide that p is decisive. The agent might then  in response to the decisive normative
reason in question.17 Thus, the agent would count as -ing on the basis of, on the grounds
that, or in the light of the normative reason that p. The fact that p would be the reason for
which the agent s.
The sense in which we  in response to normative reasons at issue here is that we  in
a way that is a manifestation of our recognition that the relevant facts are reasons in favour
of our -ing. The sort of link that holds between one’s -ing and the fact which favours
one’s -ing is a special sort of link which holds only when one’s -ing is a response to
normative reasons as such.
I intend the phenomenon at issue here to be the analogue of the Kantian notion of acting
for the sake of duty, transposed to the domain of reasons and generalised to judgement
sensitive phenomena across the board. One way of getting a grip on the notion -ing in
response to normative reasons, then, is to compare it to the Kantian notion of acting in
the light of duty. Acting in the light of duty, for Kant, should be contrasted with acting
merely in accordance with duty. The latter amounts to acting in a way that is in-keeping
with the duties that apply to one in the particular context. The action might be in-keeping
with duty, but that might well be an accidental feature of the action. Actions performed for
the sake of duty, by contrast, are actions which are not only performed in-line with duty
but are performed in a way that manifests the agent’s awareness of the duty conferring
factor as such, so that the action is non-accidentally in-line with duty. The notion of -
ing in response to normative reasons as such should be understood analogously. -ing in
response to normative reasons is a matter, not just of -ing in accordance with the reasons
there are for one to , but is also a matter of -ing in a way that manifests one’s awareness
of the normative reasons as such, so that one’s -ing is non-accidentally in-line with what
the reasons recommend.
In order to bring the phenomenon into clearer focus, I now want to contrast it with a
number of distinct phenomena which can be described using similar language.
First, we can contrast the sense in which one s in response to the normative facts
which I’m focusing on here with the sense in which the movement of the leaves on a tree
can be said to be a response to the gust of wind, the sense in which the perspiration of
the man can be said to be a response to the high temperature, and the sense in which the
death of the zebra can be said to be a response to dehydration. In each case, what we
have is one non-agential natural event being caused by a second event fitting the same
description. These are clearly not cases of -ing in response to reasons as such – they do
not even qualify as -ings in the first place, given that ‘’ ranges over judgement sensitive
phenomena.
Second, we can contrast the sense in which one s in response to the normative facts
17I stick to a case where there is only one reason on either side purely for the sake of simplicity.
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at issue here with the sense in which a neurotically held desire to harm one’s friend can be
said to be a response to the repressed emotion of jealously it is controlled by, the sense in
which a belief that the Conservatives are competent on economic matters could be said to
be a response to the subject’s upbringing, and the sense in which jumping around for joy
can be said to be a response to the feeling of elation it is controlled by. In each case, what
we have is a judgement sensitive phenomenon: a desire, a belief, and an action respectively,
but which is in some sense controlled by a condition which is not itself a reason for them
to them to respond in the relevant way. As a result, the agents in question cannot be said to
be responding to reasons in the sense at issue here, for there are no reasons on the scene to
which they could be said to be responding, and in any case the sort of link between their
-ing and the relevant condition is not of the right sort – it is more akin to the sort of mere
causal relation holding in the non-agential cases already mentioned.18
Third, we can contrast the sense in which one s in response to normative reasons at
issue with the sense in which a non-rational occurrent desire to get oﬀ the aeroplane can
be said to be a response to the moderate turbulence being suﬀered on board, the sense in
which the chicken-sexer’s belief that the chick is male can be said to be a response to the
fact, sub-personally detected by the subject, that the chick is emitting a type of pheromone
that only male chicks emit, and the sense in which one’s non-rationally omitting to follow
one’s friends on their climb up a steep mountain can be said to be a response to one’s
feeling nervous about the climb. In each case, what we have is a judgement sensitive
phenomenon: a desire, a belief and an omission respectively, which is again controlled
in some sense by a certain condition, but where this time the condition happens to be a
reason in favour of the agent responding in the way they do. As a result, their -ing is in
conformity with the reasons there are for them to , but they do not  in response to those
reasons as such. The connection between their -ing and the consideration which happens
to be a reason in favour of it is not of the right sort.
There’s a final contrast worth drawing: a contrast with cases ofweakness of will. As I’ll
understand them, these are cases in which the subject recognises that all-things-considered
they ought not , but they  anyway. As such, I understand weakness of will in an unde-
manding way, so that it doesn’t just extend to practical judgement sensitive phenomena
like actions, omissions, desires, intentions, hopes and wishes, but extends also to cases of
cognitive judgement sensitive phenomena such as believing, judging, doubting and sus-
pension of judgement. The cases of wanton agency discussed by Frankfurt (1971), in
which the unwilling addict goes against his better judgement and takes a hit anyway, pro-
vide us with an example of the former sort of weakness of will case. The case of the
woman who judges, in response to evidence recognised by her to be decisive, that degrees
18It is controversial, but I think true, that jumping around for joy in a way that’s controlled by a feeling
of elation one is undergoing is not a case of -ing in responses to reasons. See Hursthouse (1991) for a
compelling defence of that claim.
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from foreign institutions are of equal value to degrees awarded by home institutions but
who nevertheless goes on to prejudicially believe that foreign degrees are inferior anyway
discussed by Peacocke (1998) provide us with an example of the latter sort of weakness of
will case.
It might seem as if one could  in a weak-willed way where one’s -ing is also an
instance of -ing in response to normative reasons as such. For consider, in closer detail,
some of the features of Frankfurt’s case of wanton agency. The unwilling addict recognises
full well that they ought, all things considered, to refrain from taking the drug. Neverthe-
less, they continue to take the fact that taking the drug will bring them pleasure as a reason
to take it, just a defeated one. They take the drug anyway and in so doing they ‘give in’ to
their desire for the pleasure of their drug use. Isn’t the correct description of this case that
the agent takes the drug for the reason that doing so will bring them pleasure? And hence,
shouldn’t we conclude that cases of weakness of will can at least sometimes involve -ing
in response to normative reasons?
In fact, I think it’s amistake to think of the agent in Frankfurt’s case as taking the drug in
response to a normative reason as such. For the agent recognises that the normative force
of the fact that taking the drug will give them pleasure is overridden by counterveiling
considerations – for example, that it will continue to do damage to their health and that it
will enable their addiction to persist, with all of its undesirable ramifications. How, then,
could it be that the agent counts as taking the drug in so far as the fact that it will give him
pleasure favours his doing it? The normative force of the fact which he in some sense or
other responds to seems irrelevant to his decision to do it, given that he recognises it to
be defeated. The correct thing to say is rather that a non-rational occurrent desire for the
drug motivates him to take the drug, in a way analogous to the way in which jumping for
joy is non-rationally controlled by one’s feeling of joy. Weakness of will, understood as a
phenomenon which can extend to judgement sensitive phenomena generally, provides us
with a further contrast case with the phenomenon of responding to reasons.19
I’ve said enough now to have brought the phenomenon at issue in this section into
focus. I take it for granted that we can  in response to facts which favour our -ing, in
the sense at issue. I can believe that labour will win the by-election in response to the fact
that the exit-poll predicts a Labour victory. I can take my umbrella in response to the fact
that it’s going to rain. I can celebrate in response to the fact that my team won, and so
on. In each case we have an instance of rationally responding to the facts: an instance of
-ing in response to the relevant fact qua normative reason. Subjects who  in response
to normative reasons are subjects who  for good reasons, in at least one sense of that
phrase. In the remainder of this section I want to bring into focus some of what is going on
with the subject at the psychological level when they  in response to a normative reason.
In particular, there are two psychological features of agents when they  in response to
19It should be acknowledges that what I have said about the case of wanton agency is, of course, contentious.
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normative reasons to which I want to draw attention.
First, one can  in response to the normative reason that p only if the fact that p is
present to one’s mind in some way. By ‘present to mind’ I don’t mean that p is the object
or content of some phenomenally conscious mental state or occurrence. It is consistent
with p being present to mind in the sense at issue that p is the object or content of some
standing state one is in. Rather, the thought is that -ing in response to the normative
reason that p requires that there is some suitable psychological link between oneself and
p. One cannot  for the reason that p if the fact that p is in existence and yet one has no
idea about it.
I am going to be operating here with the assumption that the psychological state that
constitutes the presence to mind of one’s reason when one responds to a reason is a state
of belief. Responding to the normative reason that p, that is, requires believing that p, and
it is that belief which constitutes the relevant psychological link between oneself and and
one’s reason. We can label this the Doxastic Thesis:
(DT) The psychological state that constitutes the presence to mind of p in the way required
for -ing in response to the normative reason that p is belief that p.
(DT) is a controversial thesis because it rules it out that non-doxastic and more gen-
erally non-representational states of mind can do the work of constituting the presence
to mind of reasons. It rules it out, for example, that perceptual experiences, thought of
as contentful states or not, can constitute the presence to mind of reasons for perceptual
belief. (DT) has the status of a simplifying assumption I make throughout this essay. It
doesn’t do any work in any of the arguments I develop later on. If one is sympathetic to the
idea that non-doxastic or non-representational states can do the relevant work then (DT)
may be substituted for the preferred, more liberal principle.
(DT) doesn’t say that the only property of the relevant representational state which
enables it to play the role of constituting the presence tomind of reasons in theway required
for responding to reasons as such is the property of its being a belief that p. It could be that
the relevant belief needs to have further epistemic properties, such as being rationally held,
justifiably held or being an instance of knowledge, if it is to play the role at issue. This is
significant, because in Chapter Five I will be arguing that nothing short of knowledge is
indeed required for responding to normative reasons as such.20
There is a second claim about the psychology of -ing in response to normative reasons
which it will be useful to have on the table. I call it the Normative Thesis:
20It is also worth noting that (DT) is consistent with the thought that the state which constitutes the presence
to mind of normative reasons when one s in response to them is the state of knowing, but where the state
of knowing is conceived of as a primitive, factive state which cannot be partly reduced to believing. That
is the influential conception of knowledge one finds developed by Williamson (2000). (DT) simply says
that the relevant state of mind falls under the kind belief. It is consistent with that that it also falls under
the kind knowledge, and we are not to conceive of the latter kind as partly reducing to the former.
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(NT) Whenever a subject s in response to the normative reason that p, the subject takes
p to favour their -ing.
(NT) says, in other words, that a subject can count as -ing in response to the normative
reason that p only if p counts, from the point of view of the subject, as a reason in favour
of their -ing. I can count as believing that the Labour Party will win the by-election in
response to the normative reason that the exit-poll predicts a Labour victory only if I take
the exit-poll prediction as a reason in favour of believing that Labour will win, for example.
I take (NT) to be highly plausible, once it is recognised that what’s at issue here is
an analogue of the Kantian notion of -ing for the sake of duty. Just as one can count
as -ing for the sake of duty only if one takes the consideration which provides one with
one’s duty – for example, that I promised to  – as providing one with a duty to , so one
can  in response to a normative reason only if one takes the consideration that constitutes
the normative reason in favour of one’s -ing to have that normative dimension. -ing
for the sake of duty requires taking the duty providing consideration as a duty providing
consideration, and that once we transpose things to the realm of reasons, that fact carries
over. That point is especially plausible once it’s recalled that -ing for the sake of duty
requires -ing in the light of the duty conferring factor qua duty conferring factor – it
requires -ing for the sake of a duty conferring factor as such. That implies that one can 
for the sake of duty only if one takes the duty conferring factor as a duty conferring factor.
Transposing to the case of reasons, an analogous point holds.
It should ne noted, for the purposes ofmaking sure that themeaning of (NT) is precisely
in view, that the sort of psychological property at issue should be distinguished from that
of merely supposing that p is a reason in favour of one’s -ing. When oﬀering someone
advice about how to go about achieving some goal that they think p is a reason for, one
might doubt whether p is really a reason for them, or anyone, to pursue the goal in question,
but nevertheless suppose that it is for the purposes of the conversation, so that one can then
go on to oﬀer one’s interlocutor advice about how to achieve the end they have in view. In
such cases one isn’t committed to the normative status of p, but there is a sense in which
one treats p as having the normative status in question and there might even be a sense
in which one takes p to have that status. The sense in which one takes or treats p to be a
normative reason in such cases should be distinguished from the sense in which p is taken
to be normative when one s in response to the normative reason that p, according to (NT).
According to (NT), what’s required is not merely that one supposes p to be normative, but
that one is, in some sense, committed to the normative status of p.
It might be thought that the only way to read (NT) is as requiring the presence of a
further representational mental state, in addition to the state of believing that constitutes the
presence to mind of p, which represents the normative dimension of p. Indeed, it might be
thought further, given what was said in the preceding paragraph, that the representational
state in question must be a further belief in the truth of the proposition that p is a reason
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in favour of one -ing. And one might now worry that (NT) is implausible because it
places too much of a demanding restriction on -ing in response to the reason that p. One
reason for thinking the restriction too demanding is because the sort of normative concepts
that form part of the content of the representational state in question are concepts that not
everyone who is capable of -ing for reasons possesses – the concept of favouring or of
making it the case that one ought to . But perhaps we can avoid this worry, if indeed it is
a real worry, by interpreting what it is to take a certain item as a normative reason in terms
of the subject having a certain set of dispositions to respond to that item in certain ways
– for example, dispositions to  or be motivated to  when one recognises that p and one
doesn’t recognise any stronger reason against -ing, being disposed to cite p as a reason
when asked why one should think -ing a reasonable thing to do, and so on – and then
suggesting further that one’s having that set of dispositions is insuﬃcient for one to be in
a state which represents the normative dimension of p.
There is, then, an issue about whether to interpret (NT) as requiring the presence of a
further representational mental state, in addition to the belief that p present when one s
in response to the normative reason that p, or not. I’m going to leave aside that issue here.
I will not be saying much about how to interpret (NT) in what follows. I take it for granted
that there is some reading of it such that it comes out as a plausible thesis. I leave a further
exploration of (NT) and the issues it generates for another occasion.
Given (NT), whenever one responds to a normative reason as such by -ing, one takes
the reason as a normative reason for one’s -ing. But one can take something to be a
normative reason without responding to it as such. One does that when one decides that
a pro-tanto reason one has in view is outweighed by a reason with the opposing valency.
The psychological condition specified by (NT), then, is required for responding to reasons
but it doesn’t suﬃce for it.
1.3 The Good Case/Bad Case Distinction
So far, we have on the table the thought that there are such things as facts which favour our
-ing and the idea that we can  in response to such facts, in a sense of ‘in response to’
which diﬀers the sense in which events in nature are responses to their causes, the sense
in which non-rational -ings are responses to the mental states and events which bring
them about, and the sense in which non-rational -ings are responses to factors which just
so happen to be normative reasons in favour of the subject -ing. We’ve also looked at
some of the psychological features which are on the scene whenever one s in response to
normative reasons too: (DT) and (NT) are the salient theses in that regard.
What I have been focusing on so far, however, is what I will now start calling the good
case of -ing for reasons. Good cases are cases in which the agent ascertains the existence
of a certain normatively significant fact and rationally responds to it by -ing, so that their
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-ing can be said to be a manifestation of the awareness of the normative reason as such.
But there are also what I will call bad cases of -ing for reasons, which the philosopher
interested in this sort of phenomenon should pay attention to, which are relevant to the
formulation of the Motivating Reason View in the next chapter, and which I therefore now
want to explore.21
A bad case of -ing for reasons, as I’ll be understanding it here, is a case in which
the psychological features – (DT) and (NT) – associated with good cases hold, so that the
subject takes there to be a reason in favour of their -ing, and in which the subject’s -ing
can be said to be a manifestation of their taking p to be a reason in favour of their -ing,
but where they nevertheless blamelessly fail to count as responding to normative reasons
as such. Such a subject would, were they to reflect as carefully and as honestly as possible,
come to the conclusion that they are -ing in response to a normative reason, even though
they are not. In that sense, their situation -ing-for-reasons-wise is indistinguishable from
their own point of view from the situation of the subject in a corresponding good case, but
they do not count as -ing in response to the normatively significant facts nevertheless.
The most common sort of bad case discussed in the literature is the type of bad case in
which the agent blamelessly gets what normative reasons there are for them to  wrong,
but s in a way that manifests their taking p to be a normative reason anyway. This in
turn can happen in either, or both, of two ways. First, the subject might blamelessly but
falsely believe that p, so that they get what facts there are wrong. Second, the subject might
blamelessly but incorrectly take p to favour their -ing (even though p might be a reason
for something else), so that they get the normative status of the relevant facts wrong.
Suppose I decide to water the neighbours’ plants in response to the fact that I promised
to whilst they’re away. But let’s suppose, furthermore, that I’ve blamelessly misremem-
bered: I didn’t promise to water the neighbours’ plants, but the plants of the couple living
across the road fromme. So it’s false that I promised to water the neighbours’ plants whilst
they’re away. But I go to water the neighbour’s plants anyway, under the influence of the
blamelessly false belief that I promised to do so for them. That would be an instance of a
bad case in which I incorrectly but blamelessly take p to be a reason in favour of my -ing
by dint of blamelessly but falsely believing that p. Now consider a case in which I know
that the exit-poll predicts a Labour victory. I might believe that Labour will win because I
believe that the exit-poll predicts a Labour victory. But, unknowable to me, the exit-poll in
question is entirely unreliable and hence the fact about the exit-poll prediction isn’t really
a reason for me to believe that Labour will win at all. That would be an instance of a bad
case in which I incorrectly but blamelessly take p to be a reason in favour of my -ing by
dint of blamelessly but incorrectly taking the fact that p to favour my -ing.
21The good case/bad case terminology if borrowed from Williamson (2000), who applies the labels to the
normal epistemic case and the case of the subject who is a victim of a sceptical scenario respectively. The
labels have since become common currency in epistemology and the philosophy of perception.
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But there are other sorts of bad cases possible. These are cases in which the agent gets
their normative reason right, but nevertheless blamelessly fails to  in a way that is linked
to the relevant reason in the right sort of way to count as responding to normative reasons
as such. The sorts of bad cases at issue include cases in which the subject blamelessly
finds themselves in a position where their belief that p fails to have the sort of epistemic
credentials necessary for -ing in response to a normative reason.
Since the subject in the bad case satisfies both (DT) and (NT), we can say that it appears
to them as if p is a reason in favour of their -ing, and that p has, relative to the subject in
question, the status of an apparent normative reason. In the first sort of bad case p has the
status of a merely apparent normative reason. In the second sort of bad case the apparent
normative reason is a genuine normative reason, but one doesn’t count as responding to it
because one isn’t hooked-up to the reason in the right sort of way.
In the previous section I contrasted -ing in response to the normative reason that p
with various sorts of cases which can be described using similar language as well as with
weakness of will cases. Bad cases of -ing for reasons also contrast with all of those cases
whilst contrasting with cases of genuinely -ing for normative reasons as well. We can
assimilate them to cases of -ing in response to normative reasons with respect to being
cases where the subject ends up -ing in a way that manifests their taking something to
be a reason for them to . As a result, bad cases diﬀer from the contrast cases discussed
above. However, unlike in good cases, the subject fails to genuinely respond to the reasons
there are. So bad cases also contrast with good cases.
A final comment is in order before moving on. The psychological features laid down
by (DT) and (NT) as being required for responding to reasons are features present in both
the good case and the bad case. As such, in both the good case and the bad case it appears
to the subject as if p is a reason in favour of their -ing. It’s just that in the good case the
appearance is genuine and the subject succeeds in responding to reasons as such, whereas
in the bad case either the appearance happens to be genuine or it doesn’t, but either way
the subject blamelessly fails to  in response to the normative facts. So what we should
say is that there is a generic condition: -ing in response to an apparent normative reason,
where that condition admits of a successful realisation: -ing in response to a normative
reason – the phenomenon discussed at length above – and a defective realisation: taking
something to be a normative reason and -ing accordingly but blamelessly failing to  in
response to normative reasons.22
22Of course, there’s no suggestion here that those are the most fundamental ways of describing the generic,
success and failure notions in this area. It might be that a positive theory of each sort of case is possible.
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1.4 Rationalising Explanation
Now I want to bring into the picture the notion of an explanation why an event occurred or
a fact obtains. The discussion of that phenomenon will enable me, in turn, to introduce a
certain type of explanation why to which judgement sensitive entities are uniquely subject:
rationalising explanation. I shall have much more to say about rationalising explanations
in Chapter Five, but some introductory remarks need to be made at this stage because the
Motivating Reasons View to be introduced in the next chapter involves theses about the
nature of rationalising explanation.
The practice of providing explanations is familiar. We can explain to others how to do
something – for example how to ride a unicycle; we can explain to others what something
is – for example what a computer is; and we can explain why certain phenomena occur or
why certain facts obtain. In what follows I restrict my attention to explanations why.
There is a phenomenon in this area which we also use the language of reasons to talk
about but which should be distinguished from the phenomenon of a normative reason:
the reason why a certain event occurs or fact obtains. These items we can call explana-
tory reasons and they are the items that constitute the explanantia of explanations why
certain phenomena occur or certain facts obtain. Those sorts of entities count as reasons
not because of a normative relation that they stand in to anything, but by standing in an
explanatory relation – whatever that amounts to exactly – to what they explain.
Paradigmatically, we oﬀer explanations why by engaging in distinctive illocutionary
acts of explaining, using sentences of the following mutually translatable forms:
(i) p because q
(ii) What explains why p is that q
(iii) The reason why p is that q
For example: ‘the man disappeared because he was kidnapped’, ‘what explains why
the man disappeared is that he was kidnapped’, and ‘the reason why the man disappeared
is that he was kidnapped’. What ‘p’ picks out in each of the above sentences is what is
getting explained: the explanandum of the explanation being provided. The phrase that
we replace ‘p’ with is the explanandum phrase. What ‘q’ picks out in each of the above
sentences is what does the explaining: the explanans of the explanation being provided.
The phrase which replaces ‘q’ is the explanans phrase. Explanatory reasons are what get
referred to by explanans phrases in true explanatory sentences.
We’ve already seen that the phrase ‘reason for’ can sometimes pick out the normative
relation that normative reasons stand in to -ings, as in the sentence: ‘a reason for him to
take his umbrella is that it is raining’. To this we can now add a second use. Sometimes it
singles out the relation of explanation, the relation that links explanatory reasons with the
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items that they explain, as in the sentence: ‘the reason for the man’s disappearance is that
he has been kidnapped’. When I use the phrase ‘reason for’ in what follows it should be
clear which use I’m relying on.
It seems clear that we can only provide true explanations of why a certain event occurs
or why a certain fact obtains if the event really has occurred or if the fact really does
obtain. Thus, it is true that he has blue eyes because both his parents have blue eyes only
if it is in turn true that he has blue eyes. Genuine explanandamust have occurred or be the
case. It has often been thought plausible that the following analogous claim is true about
explanantia:
The Factivity of Explanation. If p functions as an explanans then p is true.
The Factivity of Explanation says that p can explain why a certain event has occurred,
or why something is the case, only if p is true. Only when it is a fact that p can we have a
genuine, that is: true, explanation on our hands. Again, this looks like a plausible principle
and I will be operating with it throughout this essay. As we will see, Dancy (2000) denies
it, but he doesn’t say anything in favour of its denial other than that it follows from his own
theory, and, as we shall see again, his own theory is objectionable anyway. I should note
in passing, however, that it is consistent with denying the Factivity of Explanation that
one accepts that some ways of providing explanations require the truth of the explanans
phrase. It’s consistent with denying Factivity, for example, that the ‘because p’ form and
its cognates require the truth of p, even though that is only a contingent linguistic feature
of that form, and is not a reflection of the nature of explanation why in general. As we will
see, that is the position of Dancy (ibid.) himself.
I now want to introduce an important species of explanation why: rationalising expla-
nation. We can provide explanations of natural phenomena. We can explain why the apple
fell from the tree at the velocity at which it did by appeal to the fact that it has a certain
weight and that it fell from a certain height. We can also provide explanations why of cer-
tain agential phenomena, that is: judgement-sensitive phenomena, and there are various
ways we can do so. We can explain why someone is holding their knee and whimpering
by appeal to the fact that they are experiencing terrible cramp in their knee. That would be
to explain a certain action by appeal to a bodily sensation which is functioning as a mere
cause of their behaviour. We can explain why the woman is disposed to treat people with
kindness by appeal to the fact that she was brought up that way, or by appeal to the fact
that she belongs to a culture which places special importance on that virtuous character
trait. The first would be to provide an explanation of the trait by appeal to the person’s his-
tory. The second would be to explain the trait sociologically. We can explain why the man
believes he is being stalked by appeal to the fact that he suﬀers from paranoid schizophre-
nia. That would be to oﬀer a medical explanation of the agential phenomena – the man’s
belief – in question. And supposing there is some neural process underpinning the para-
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noid schizophrenic subject’s delusion we might explain why they have it by appeal to the
relevant neural process. That would be to provide a neural explanation of the subject’s
belief.
One important way in which we can give explanations of judgement-sensitive phenom-
ena, distinct from those sorts of explanation just considered, is to explain why the agent
ed by appealing to what was, from the agent’s point of view, a normative reason for -ing.
This is the sort of explanation Davidson (1963) introduces here:
What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains
the action by giving the agent’s reason for doing what he did? We may call
such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the
action. (Ibid.:3)
The explanations in question I will call rationalising explanations and they are what
Davidson refers to here as ‘rationalizations’. The explanantia of rationalising explanations
I will sometimes call, following Davidson, rationalisers. Rationalising explanations pur-
port to render the agent’s -ing intelligible by appealing, in some way or other, to what
was, from the agent’s own point of view, a reason in favour of their -ing:
A reason rationalizes an action only if it leads us to see something the agent
saw, or thought he saw, in his action – some feature, consequence, or aspect
of the action the agent wanted, desired, prized, held dear, thought dutiful,
beneficial, obligatory, or agreeable. We cannot explain why someone did what
he did simply by saying the particular action appealed to him; wemust indicate
what it was about the action which so appealed. (Ibid.)
Quite how these rationalising explanations work, in particular: with what we should
identify rationalisers, and how many kinds of rationalising explanation there are, is a mat-
ter of controversy, as we’ll see. But I want to make a few remarks about rationalising
explanation and the connection between that concept and good cases and bad cases of -
ing for reasons now, so that the Motivating Reasons View can be brought into focus in the
next chapter.
One thing to note is that rationalising explanations are a species of explanations why.
As such, whatever properties are exemplified by explanations why generally must be ex-
emplified by rationalising explanations in particular. Thus, if the Factivity of Explanation
applies to explanation why generally, then it applies to rationalising explanations too. Sim-
ilarly, if all explanations why are causal explanations, then rationalising explanations are
too.
An agent’s -ing is subject to a rationalising explanation just in case there is some-
thing which counts in favour of -ing from the agent’s point of view and the agent is -ing
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accordingly. Indeed, that last claim is trivially true, once it’s recognised that ‘-ing ac-
cordingly’ is an explanatory notion. There is something which counts in favour of -ing
from the agent’s point of view and the agent s accordingly in both the good case and
the bad case: they satisfy the psychological features laid down by (DT) and (NT) and 
accordingly across both cases, after all. So an agent’s -ing is subject to a rationalising
explanation in both the bad case and the good case, which is not to say that S’s -ing is
subject to a rationalising explanation of only a single form across both cases.
Although both sorts of case involve the presence of rationalising explanations, there
are some diﬀerences between the good case and bad case which need to be flagged up,
rationalising explanation-wise, nevertheless.
When the agent responds to a normative reason – when they are in the good case –
their -ing is subject to a rationalising explanation which we can report using a phrase of
the form: ‘S ed, or is -ing, because p’. There is, as we can put it, a non-psychologistic
rationalising statement that’s applicable to them. In the bad case, the agent’s -ing is
subject to a rationalising explanation which we can report using a phrase of the form: ‘S
ed because they believe that p’. There is, as we can put it, a psychologistic rationalising
statement that’s applicable to them.
In the bad case, we cannot use a non-psychologistic rationalising statement to provide
a rationalising explanation of the agent’s -ing. That’s because that sort of phrase can be
true only if p is true, given the factivity the ‘because’ idiom, only if p is a reason in favour
of the agent’s -ing and only if S is related to p in the right sort of way, but bad cases are
cases in which at least one of those conditions fails, even though it seems otherwise to the
subject. In the good case, however, we can use a psychologistic rationalising statement
to provide a rationalising explanation of the agent’s -ing, it’s just that we can do so also
using a non-psychologistic rationalising statement too. So the correct thing to say is that
psychologistic rationalising statements are generic. In the good case we can also use non-
psychologistic rationalising statements. In the bad case we can only use psychologistic
rationalising explanatory statements.
To draw this distinction between two ways of stating rationalising explanations is not,
it should be noted, to imply that there are two forms rationalising explanation can take,
so that an explanation reported non-psychologistically is non-identical to an explanation
reported psychologistically. On the contrary, it is consistent with what I’ve said here that
there is only one sort of rationalising explanation, and that sort of explanation is reported
using each type of sentence, so that whatever diﬀerences there are between asserting and
endorsing each sentence is extra to the sentences status as reporting a rationalising expla-
nation of that type.
Labelling the sort of explanatory statements we can make only in the good case ‘non-
psychologistic’ is potentially misleading in a way that’s worth flagging-up. I noted in §1.1
that although normative reasons are typically facts about the external world, sometimes
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normative reasons are facts about one’s own psychological states, and in particular facts
about what beliefs one has. For example, the fact that one believes that one has been ab-
ducted by aliens is a reason in favour of visiting a psychiatrist. One can respond to such
psychology-involving normative reasons in the sense at issue. If one does so, we can oﬀer
a rationalising explanation of why one s by saying: ‘S s because they believe that p’. By
my lights, that would, contrary to appearances, count as a non-psychologistic rationalising
statement. It counts as such because non-psychologistic rationalising statements, as they
are to be understood here, contain, at least on the surface, explanans phrases which pick
out the facts which are the normative reasons to which the subject is responding. Psy-
chologistic rationalising statements by contrast contain, at least on the surface, explanans
phrases which pick out the psychological state of believing which constitutes the presence
to mind of the normative reason to which the subject is responding. So when the subject’s
normative reason is a psychology-involving fact, the correct form of the relevant psychol-
ogistic rationalising statement is: ‘S s because they believe that they believe that p’. In
sum, then, non-psychologistic rationalising statements can be statements which, on the
surface, include an explanans phrase that pick out a psychological fact about the subject
who s, just so long as the fact is the normative reason the subject is responding to, and
not the state of belief which constitutes the presence to mind of the relevant normative
reason.
Normally, practical judgement sensitive phenomena such as actions, omissions, inten-
tions, and desires are thought to be subject to rationalising explanations stateable in the
psychologistic form which cite not just the agent’s belief that p but also some pro-attitude
the agent has. If that’s right, then psychologistic rationalising statements shouldn’t say:
‘S is -ing because they believe that p’, but: ‘S is -ing because they believe that p and
have [e.g.] a desire to  ’, where ‘’ is restricted to practical judgement sensitive phenom-
ena. An alternative to this view is that such psychologistic rationalising statements can
make reference not to some conative pro-attitude the subject has, but to a further belief
the subject has, to the eﬀect that p is a reason in favour of their -ing. Whatever the truth
is in this area I ignore the supposed extra components of psychologistically stateable ra-
tionalising explanations in this essay and focus solely on the contribution made to such
explanations by the agent’s believing that p. To that extent, the psychologistically state-
able rationalising explanations I focus on here are always to be understood as incomplete
explanations, strictly speaking. An analogous point holds for the non-psychologistically
stateable rationalising explanations too: insofar as there is an element of them correspond-
ing to a relevant pro-attitude belonging to the subject, that element will be bracketed oﬀ
throughout this discussion so that only the element corresponding to the subject’s belief
will be focused on.
The thought that we have in mind, in the good case, when we think of an agent as -ing
because p, is a way of thinking about the phenomenon of -ing in response to a normative
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reason as such. That is to say: recognising a normative reason and responding accordingly
just is the state of aﬀairs we have in mind when we think whatever thought it is that gets
expressed by a statement of the form ‘S ed/is -ing because p’. Studying what we have
in mind when we oﬀer rationalising explanations in the non-psychologistic form is, then,
a way of getting at the phenomenon of responding to normative reasons as such. What
this brings it out is that -ing in response to the normative reason that p constitutively
involves -ing in a way that is subject to a rationalising explanation reportable using a
non-psychologistic rationalising statement.
Likewise, a way of getting at what’s generic to the good case and bad case – taking
p to be a normative reason for one to  and -ing accordingly – is by studying what we
have in mind when we oﬀer rationalising explanations in the psychologistic form, for the
thought expressed there is a way of thinking about that generic condition. What this brings
out is that that generic condition constitutively involves -ing in a way that is subject to a
rationalising explanation reportable using a psychologistic rationalising statement.
We can of course use the phrase ‘S s because p’ to oﬀer explanations which are not
rationalising. We do so when we say, for example, of a paranoid subject S, that S believes
that the he is being spied on by the man across the road because the man across the road
made eye-contact with him. In order to make it clear that what I have in mind when I use
one of those phrases is a rationalising explanation I shall sometimes say that I’m using the
rationalising sense of ‘because’. This way of talking should be taken with a pinch of salt. I
intend it merely to flag-up that the sort of explanation at issue is a rationalising explanation.
I do not intend the way of talking in question to commit me to the substantive thesis that
the English word ‘because’ expresses diﬀerent concepts depending on whether it is used
in the context of providing a rationalising explanation or in the context of providing a
non-rationalising explanation.
This concludes my discussion of the preliminary material we need to have on the ta-
ble. The next chapter is dedicated to a presentation of the view I want to undermine: the
Motivating Reasons View.
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Chapter 2
The Motivating Reasons View
In his seminal paper Actions, Reasons, and Causes Donald Davidson, it is typically thou-
ght, put on the map a theory of -ing for reasons which, I don’t think it is overstating things
to say, constituted the norm amongst Philosophers of Action, Philosophers of Mind, Meta-
ethicists, and Epistemologists for a generation. I will be following the standard interpre-
tation of Davidson’s view here. According to it, the reason for which the subject s is to
be identified with the rationaliser of the their -ing. Rationalisers are in turn to be identi-
fied with certain environment-independent psychological states of the subject which cause
their -ing: suitable pairs of pro-attitudes and beliefs which constitute -ing being cast in
a positive light for the agent. In a word, one’s reasons for -ing are certain psychological
states which cause one’s -ing.
In response to what he thought to be the overly psychologistic tendency of that David-
sonian view, Jonathan Dancy, in his book Practical Reality, defended an alternative view.
According the alternative, the reasons for which the subject s are to be identified with
what the agent takes to be the normative reason for their -ing, so that, in the good case,
the reason for which the subject s is their normative reason. It was then agreed by Dancy
that the reasons which motivate the agent to  are to be identified with the agent’s ratio-
nalisers and it was concluded, given that the reason for which they  is that p even in the
bad case, that rationalising explanations needn’t have true explanantia and hence aren’t
causal.
Attempting to preserve what they saw to be a correct emphasis on the non-psycholog-
ical character of the reasons for which the agent s, but wishing to preserve the factiv-
ity and perhaps also the causal character of rationalising explanation as the Davidsonian
View does, there were then a raft of Neo-Davidsonian theories defended in response to
Dancy, recommended by philosophers such as Smith (2003), Davis (2003, 2005), Olson
and Svensson (2005), Setiya (2011), and Hieronymi (2011). What the Neo-Davidsonians
have in common is the thought that we should reject an assumption which both David-
son and Dancy share: that the reasons for which the agent s are the agent’s rationalisers.
With that assumption rejected, we can coherently agree with Dancy about the reasons
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which motivate the agent whilst agreeing with Davidson about the agent’s rationalisers.1
Despite their diﬀerences, there is a style of thinking about -ing for reasons which is
common to Davidson, Dancy and the Neo-Davidsonians. All three theories are instances
of a generic conception of -ing for reasons which is presupposed but developed in diﬀer-
ent ways by each of them. The generic view in question is the Motivating Reasons View,
which we’ve already briefly encountered. It can be introduced in the following way. We
have a perfectly ordinary notion of the reason which motivates the agent to . It is that
ordinary notion which gets exercised in thought expressible using sentences such as: ‘S is
-ing for the reason that p’ and cognate sentences. The Motivating Reasons View begins
with an innocuous distinction between the notion of a normative reason and the ordinary
notion just pointed to. The View then, quite controversially, goes on to impose a certain
theoretical interpretation on that latter notion. It introduces the special notion of a moti-
vating reason, which is defined in terms of four distinctive characteristics, most notably of
which is that the items in question are present, counting as reasons and doing their moti-
vating work across both the good and bad cases. It identifies the ordinary notion gestured
to with the notion of a motivating reason, and goes on to oﬀer a Reductive account of what
it is to respond to normative reasons by appeal to it.
This essay argues for a rejection of the Motivating Reasons View. In the next chapter I
aim to show that the ordinary notion of a reason which motivates should not be identified
with the special notion of a motivating reason because the latter notion is empty: there are
no entities which exemplify each of the properties in terms of which the notion is defined.
On top of that, it is argued, in Chapter Five, that we ought not provide a Reductive account
of what is going on in the good case by appeal to what is common to good and bad cases.
The result is that the Motivating Reasons View is rejected root and branch. All of that is
yet to come. The purpose of this chapter is merely to introduce the Motivating Reasons
View, as well as the central versions of it already mentioned, so that the reader has an
initial conception of my target at the outset of the enquiry.2
I will proceed as follows. In §2.1 I introduce the Motivating Reasons View. In §2.2 I
present the views ofDavidson, Dancy, and theNeo-Davidsonians, byway of illustrating the
Motivating Reasons View and by way of demonstrating that my target is real. Introducing
1There was also a less interesting response to Dancy which consisted in defending a more thorough-going
Davidsonianism. See, for example, Wallace (2003), in the case of action, and Turri (2009, 2011) in the case
of belief.
2It should be made explicit, as has already been intimated, that I am very much not alone in my rejection
of the Motivating Reasons View. So-called Disjunctivists about -ing for reasons, like Hornsby (2007a,
2007b, 2008), McDowell (2013a) and Roessler (2014) should be read as rejecting the Motivating Reasons
View as should Hyman (1999, 2006, 2010, 2011), Stout (2004, 2009), Alvarez (2010), Raz (2011), and
Marcus (2012). None of those mentioned explicitly use the phrase ‘the Motivating Reasons View’ for a
claim they want to attack, and nor domany of themmake it explicit that a target they have in mind is the view
for which I’m electing to use that label, but I think they should be read as rejecting the view in question,
nevertheless. For at least some of those authors, I make explicit as I go along how I think the claims and
arguments to be defended here by way of rejecting the Motivating Reasons View improve on their own.
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those views also serves to introduce a familiar dialectic in this area to which Chapter Four
is dedicated. Finally, in §2.3 I provide an overview of what is to follow, with the intention
of helping to orientate the reader.
2.1 Introducing the Motivating Reasons View
We can begin with a familiar and perfectly correct point. It can be true that the fact that
p is a reason in favour of S -ing, even though each of the following sentences, which we
can safely assume to have the same meaning, is false of S:
(1a) S ed/is -ing for the reason that p
(1b) The reason for which S ed/is -ing is that p
(2a) S ed/is -ing on the basis of p
(2b) The basis on which S ed/is -ing is that p
(3a) S ed/is -ing on the grounds that p
(3b) The grounds on which S ed/is -ing is that p
The contrast here is real: the fact that p might be a normative reason for one to 
without it being the case that one s for the reason that p, on the basis of p, or on the
grounds that p. That the cat is hungry is a reason for me to feed her, but because I haven’t
realised that she’s hungry I fail to act at all and hence fail to act for the reason that she’s
hungry, for example. There being a normative reason for one to  can come apart from
-ing in a way that is motivated by the reason that p.
What this brings out is that there is a perfectly innocuous distinction to be drawn be-
tween two notions. On the one hand, there is the notion of a normative reason, which I’ve
already introduced. When we think that p is a normative reason in favour of S -ing, we’re
thinking of p as a fact which has a certain normative dimension. On the other hand, there is
the notion of -ing for the reason that p. When we think that S is -ing for the reason that,
on the basis of, or on the grounds that p, what we’re thinking is that S is -ing in a way that
is motivated by something else to which we’re applying a concept of a reason. To apply
that notion just is to think of the relevant entity as a reason which plays the sort of moti-
vational role at issue. That second notion, of a reason that motivates, is paradigmatically
exercised in thoughts that have the content expressed by sentences (1)-(3). What’s been
brought out is that we can have the first thought without having the second, and coherently
so. We can think of something as a normative reason without thinking of the agent as
being motivated to  by anything, including the very thing to which we’re applying the
concept of a normative reason.
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There is a quite natural way of interpreting sentences (1)-(3) which, ultimately, I think
is correct. The natural way of reading them says that for S to  for the reason that p is
just for there to be a normative reason which favours S’s -ing, to which S has responded
or is responding by -ing. So understood, (1)-(3) pick out the success condition of -ing
in response to normative reasons which was introduced in the last chapter. The truth of
(1)-(3) would then require whatever is required for S to count as responding to a normative
reason – for example, that p is true.3 And understood in that way, the concept of a reason
which figures in (1a/b) – and which I think is also expressed by the phrases ‘basis’ and
‘grounds’ in (2a/b) and (3a/b) respectively – is identical to the concept of a normative
reason. The sense in which S is said to have ed or be in the process of -ing for the
reason that p by (1a/b), and by the cognate expressions in (2a/b) and (3a/b), is that they
have ed or are -ing in response to a reason in favour of their -ing.
If we interpret (1)-(3) in that supposedly natural way, then we will have to say that
there being a normative reason for S to  can come apart from -ing motivated by the
reason that p, picked out by (1)-(3), just because a normative reason could exist and have
its normative status without the agent responding to it qua normative reason. We shall also
have to conceive of the relation between the notion of a normative reason and the notion
of a reason which motivates the agent in the following way. The notion of a normative
reason is the notion of a fact that favours one’s -ing, whereas the notion of a reason that
motivates one to  is the notion of such a normatively significant fact playing a certain
sort of role: that of being the normative reason to which one’s -ing is a response, in the
sense introduced in the last chapter.
The Motivating Reasons View does not interpret sentences (1)-(3) in that supposedly
natural way. It is argued, by the proponent of the View, that the notion of a reason which
motivates the agent to  is the notion of an entity which can be present, and playing the
sort of motivating role at issue, across good and bad cases: the subject s for the reason
that p in both good cases and bad. It follows that the item in question is not a normative
reason, and that the motivational role at issue doesn’t require it to be. Instead, the pro-
ponent of the Motivating Reasons View says that the item to which a concept of a reason
is applied by sentences (1)-(3) really is a reason, to be sure, yet the sense in which it’s a
reason is not that it’s normative, but that it’s motivating: the relevant sort of motivating
role individuates the notion of reason-hood which is in play when we think of the agent
as -ing motivated by a reason. The item in question is thus said to be a motivating rea-
son. Interpreted in that way, the truth of (1)-(3) would not require the subject to count
as responding to a normative reason. (1)-(3) could be true in the bad case as well as the
good case. Moreover, such expressions deploy a distinctive sense of the word ‘reason’.
The proponent of the Motivating Reasons View will then go on to give a positive account
3This is how Alvarez (2010), Stout (2004, 2009), Raz (2011) and Roessler (2014) would read (1)-(3), for
example.
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of what motivating reasons in that special sense are, part of which will be an account of
what the motivating role amounts to, and they will oﬀer a Reductive account of the suc-
cess condition of responding to a normative reason which appeals to the special notion of
a motivating reason.
On the Motivating Reasons View we shall have to say that there being a normative
reason for S to  can come apart from the phenomenon captured by (1)-(3) because the
fact that p could be a normative reason without the agent having the motivating reason that
p and because one could have the motivating reason that p without the fact that p being a
normative reason. On the supposedly natural way of interpreting (1)-(3), by contrast, only
the first conjunct corresponds to a real possibility. Moreover, we shall have to interpret the
contrast drawn between the notion of a normative reason and the notion of a reason which
motivates the agent to  in terms of a contrast between two notions of a reason: those
items which have a status of a reason individuated by the normative role they play and
those items which have a status of a reason individuated by the motivating role they play.
On the supposedly natural way of drawing the contrast, only the first individuates a genuine
notion of a reason for us: the latter items are reasons, but they are reasons only in the sense
of being normative reasons which, extra to their status as reasons, play a motivating role.
What’s just been oﬀered is a relatively inchoate specification of what the Motivating
Reasons View amounts to. To sharpen our conception of the View I want to begin by
connecting the phenomenon of -ing in a way that’s motivated by the reason that p with
the notion of rationalising explanation, introduced in the last chapter. To  in a way that’s
motivated by the reason that p is a matter of -ing subject to a rationalising explanation
which appeals, in some way, to the reason for which the agent s. In other words, to  in
a way that’s motivated by the reason that p consists in -ing in a way that is subject to an
explanationwhich can be expressed using a sentence containing a rationalising ‘because’, a
sort of explanation which requires that one satisfies the psychological conditions laid down
by (DT) and (NT), explored in the last chapter, but where the explanans of that explanation
either is, or in some way involves, the item which is characterised as the reason for which
one s.
That we should cash out the notion of a reason which motivates in terms of the notion
of a rationalising explanation is clear once it is recognised that sentences (1)-(3) are ways
of reporting rationalising explanations. In uttering a sentence such as (1), for example, one
will have thereby provided one’s interlocutor with a rationalising explanation of why S has
ed or is -ing. They are ways of reporting rationalising explanations which diﬀer, at least
at the surface level, from rationalising explanatory statements which use the ‘because’ id-
iom, such as the psychologistic and non-psychologistic rationalising statements discussed
at the end of the last chapter, but they do report rationalising explanations nevertheless –
rationalising explanations which could just as easily be stated using a ‘because’ idiom.
With that connection between the notion of a reason that motivates and the notion
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of a rationalising explanation in the background, we can now get a sharper grip on what
the Motivating Reasons View amounts to. As has already been intimated, the Motivating
Reasons View involves a commitment to the following two theses:
The Motivating Reasons Postulate. The notion of a reason which motivates the agent
to  is to be identified with the notion of a motivating reason. The notion of a
motivating reason is the notion of an entity which has the following properties: (i)
it plays a rationalising role, where its playing that role is identical to its playing the
sort of motivational role at issue; (ii) it is a reason: we have a concept of a reason
which applies to it; (iii) the rationalising explanation to which S’s -ing is subject
just in case S s motivated by the reason that p obtains across both the good and bad
cases, so that the items which are motivating reasons can exist, counting as reasons,
with the rationalising role being played, even if p is not a normative reason for S
to ; (iv) motivating reasons are reasons in the sense of being items that play the
relevant sort of motivating role.
The Primacy of Motivating Reasons. -ing in response to the normative reason that p
reduces to having the motivating reason that p, understood in the way described
by the Motivating Reasons Postulate, in addition to further factors present in the
good case which are individually necessary and, together with having the motivating
reason that p, jointly suﬃcient for -ing in response to the normative reason that p.
The Motivating Reasons Postulate identifies our ordinary notion of a reason that mo-
tivates with the special notion of a motivating reason. It then defines that special notion
for us by appeal to four features.
First, the notion of a motivating reason is the notion of a reason which plays the ratio-
nalising role already described: it is the notion of an item which is, or is in some sense a
part of, the explanans of the rationalising explanation to which S’s -ing is subject when
they  for a reason. It has already been agreed that that is a correct thing to say about the
items which we think of as reasons which motivate.
Second, motivating reasons really do count as reasons. That is to say: for any item we
think of as a reason which motivates the agent to , there is a concept of a reason which
is applicable to it. This, I think, is surely a trivial claim about the items which we think of
as reasons which motivate.
Third, the rationalising explanation in terms of which we individuate what it is for S to
motivated by the reason that p is an explanation that holds in both good and bad cases: it
requires merely that the agent takes p to be a normative reason and is blamelessly respond-
ing to it accordingly, not that p actually is a normative reason to which S is responding. It
follows that the items which are the reasons that motivate one to  are present in the bad
case and motivating one to  in the bad case too: one s for the reason that p in both the
good case and bad.
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In the last chapter I noted that there is a way of providing a rationalising explanation
which is common to good and bad cases. It is to use a psychologistic rationalising ex-
planatory statement: ‘S ed/is -ing because S believes that p’. Whatever rationalising
explanation is provided by the assertion of that sentence on a particular occasion, it is
one which holds whether the subject is responding to a normative reason, or else merely
purporting but blamelessly failing to do so. There is no reason to believe that there is
more than one good case/bad case neutral rationalising explanation applicable to the sub-
ject’s -ing on any given occasion, and the proponent of the Motivating Reasons Postulate
says that rationalising explanations associated with (1)-(3) are good case/bad case neutral.
Thus, the proponent of the Postulate is committed to saying that the rationalising expla-
nation reported by a relevant instance of (1)-(3) in terms of which they’ve individuated
what it is to  motivated by the reason that p, is identical to the rationalising explanation
reported by a corresponding psychologistic rationalising sentence. In so far as an instance
of ‘S is -ing for the reason that p’ reports a rationalising explanation, it reports the ex-
planation reported by the corresponding instance of ‘S is -ing because they believe that
p’. The proponent of the Motivating Reasons Postulate adds to this the distinctive claim
that such rationalising explanations appeal to items which count as reasons – the reasons
which motivate the agent to .
It follows from feature (iii) that motivating reasons needn’t be, and perhaps never are,
normative reasons, for they are present in the bad case in which the agent doesn’t count as
-ing in response to a normative reason. It also follows, given feature (ii), that motivating
reasons are not reasons in the same sense in which normative reasons are. For if such items
are present and count as reasons in whatever sense they do in bad cases, where the agent
doesn’t count as -ing for a normative reason, then the sense in which the relevant item
is a reason cannot be that it is a normative reason. It looks like the only option to which
to appeal in order to account for the item’s status as a reason, then, is its standing in the
motivating relation to the agent’s -ing. Since that is identified by (i) with its playing a
certain rationalising role, it follows that motivating reasons are reasons in a distinct sense
from the sense in which normative reasons are reasons, and that they count as reasons
by dint of the rationalising-explanatory role they play. That’s just feature (iv). What this
brings out is that if motivating reasons have features (i), (ii) and (iii), then it follows that
they have feature (iv).
The Primacy ofMotivating Reasons presupposes theMotivating Reasons Postulate and
then goes on to assign a certain theoretical role to motivating reasons, so understood: we’re
to appeal to them as part of a Reductive account of the good case. To oﬀer a Reductive
account of the good case is to say that we should think of the phenomenon of responding
to a normative reason as partly reducing to the phenomenon of -ing in a way that is
subject to the sort of good case/bad case neutral rationalising explanation reported using
the phrase ‘S ed/is -ing because S believes that p’. We then add to that phenomenon the
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factors which need to be added to it in order to ensure that S counts as -ing in response
to a genuine reason. For example, we add the truth of p and that p favours S’s -ing, as
well as perhaps the fact that S knows that p, and so on.
The Primacy of Motivating Reasons says that we should run this Reductionist story
about the good case, but adds that the story needs to be run in terms of the notion of a
motivating reason, as understood by the Motivating Reasons Postulate. That’s because it
is those sorts of items which either are, or are a part of, the sorts of good case/bad case
neutral rationalising explanations in terms of which the good case is being understood.
So the proponent of Primacy says that -ing in response to a normative reason is a matter
of having a motivating reason, so that one’s -ing is subject to a neutral explanation of
why one s, plus, for example, the truth and normative status of one’s apparent normative
reason as well, perhaps, as one’s knowledge of the normative reason.
There is a point worth bringing out about Reductionist models of -ing in response
to normative reasons of the sort embodied by the Primacy of Motivating Reasons thesis.
Let’s suppose that there is more than one type of rationalising explanation: more than one
sort of way of explaining why an agent ed or is -ing that appeals to what can be said
in favour of S’s -ing from S’s own point of view. The only reason for thinking so would
be that responding to a normative reason involves a distinctive sort of rationalising expla-
nation, one which is not good case/bad case neutral. But the proponent of a Reductionist
model of the good case, as is the Primacy thesis being considered here, says that the only
sort of rationalising explanation involved in the good case is a good case/bad case neutral
explanation – one which involves the presence of Motivating Reasons, according to the
Primacy thesis. So any Reductionist about the good case, including the proponent of the
Primacy of Motivating Reasons, is committed to thinking that there is only one sort of
rationalising explanation: the good case/bad case neutral one.
Moreover, we can add to this that if one is already convinced that there is only one sort
of rationalising explanation: a good case/bad case neutral one, then one will also have to
be Reductionist about the good case. For responding to a genuine reason constitutively
involves one’s -ing being subject to a rationalising explanation, and if that rationalising
explanation must be of a neutral type, then we need to add factors also present in the good
case in order to get us to the phenomenon of responding to a genuine reason. If one is
operating with the Motivating Reasons Postulate, then the form of Reductionism will be
the form encapsulated by the Primacy of Motivating Reasons.
So the correct thing to say is this. The claim that there is only one sort of rationalising
explanation, the good case/bad case neutral one, is logically equivalent to a Reductionist
account of the good case. The Primacy of Motivating Reasons is a Reductionist model
of the good case. So if one adopts it, then one is committed to a monism about ratio-
nalising explanation. Moreover, if one commits oneself to a monism about rationalising
explanation with an additional commitment to the Motivating Reasons Postulate in the
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background, then one will thereby be committed to the Primacy of Motivating Reasons:
the version of Reductionism subscribed to by the proponent of the Motivating Reasons
View.
A comment on the logical relationship between the two theses which compose the
Motivating Reasons View is in order. The Primacy of Motivating Reasons entails the
Motivating Reasons Postulate. It is written in to the former that the latter is true, after
all. However, it is possible to subscribe to the Motivating Reasons Postulate without sub-
scribing to the Primacy of Motivating Reasons. That would involve accepting that being
motivated by a reason is not simply a matter of responding to a normative reason but of
there being a special sort of reason – a motivating reason – playing a motivating role for
one, whilst denying that we should give an account of the good case in terms of what’s
common to both good cases and bad, so that there is only one fundamental sort of ratio-
nalising explanation, which is neutral on good cases and bad. At times, this seems to be
the position which Hornsby wishes to occupy, for example:
It is certainly easy to put pressure on the idea of subjective reasons. But the
pressure has to be resisted. Consider an example that Bernard Williams intro-
duced: a man made a mixture of petrol and tonic because he wanted to drink
gin and tonic and he believed that the petrol was gin. We may well think that
there was no reason for the man to make the mixture. This is surely right if it
means that there was no objective [that is: normative] reason for him to do so.
But that does not mean that the man had no reason. (Hornsby, 2007a:90-91)
Here Hornsby seems to want to defend the thought that in bad cases in which it merely
seems to the subject as if they have a normative reason to , there is something worth
calling a reason on the scene nevertheless, which is a part of the rationalising explanation
of their -ing. So Hornsby can be read as endorsing the existence of motivating reasons,
as defined by the Motivating Reasons Postulate. But she would not want to endorse the
Primacy of Motivating Reasons, for she thinks that in the good case, the rationalising
explanation to which S’s -ing is subject requires that S knows that p and hence isn’t a
type of explanation present in the bad case.
Hornsby’s position is, however, equivocal, for sometimes she opts for factive readings
of (1)-(3). So what should be said is that even though the Motivating Reasons Postulate
doesn’t entail the Primacy of Motivating Reasons, it at least isn’t clear that there has been
anyone wishing to occupy that position.4 In any case, it will be made clear later in the
chapter that although the two claims which compose the Motivating Reasons View are not
equivalent, they typically come together. I shall be suggesting that we reject both in the
next chapter, nevertheless.
4Having said that, it’s clear that Marcus (2012) accepts the Motivating Reasons Postulate whilst rejecting
the Primacy of Motivating Reasons.
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2.2 The Dialectic of Psychologism
I’ve introduced the Motivating Reasons View, but does anyone actually subscribe to it? If
not, then the next chapter, in which I reject the View, might be said to lack significant philo-
sophical interest. In this section I lay out a well known dialectic which arises in this area
which I label the Dialectic of Psychologism. In particular, I lay out three major positions
one might wish to occupy with respect to that dialectic: the Davidsonian View, Dancy’s
View and the Neo-Davidsonian View, each of which was briefly explored in the introduc-
tion. I aim to show that the Dialectic of Psychologism is permeated with the assumption
that the Motivating Reasons View is correct. I aim to show this by demonstrating that
the three views mentioned are actually distinct versions of the Motivating Reasons View.5
That suﬃces to prove that my target is real, whilst also serving to bring onto the scene
a debate which I aim to resolve later. I describe the theory associated with Davidson in
§2.2.1, the theory associated with Dancy in §2.2.2, and the Neo-Davidsonian Theory in
§2.2.3.6
2.2.1 Davidson’s View
This section provides a statement of Davidson’s position, as it is standardly understood,
and aims to show that, so understood, it is an instance of the Motivating Reasons View.7
Davidson’s famous paper starts with the following question, which begins a passage
I’ve already cited:
What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains
the action by giving the agent’s reason for doing what he did? We may call
such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the
action. (Davidson, 1963:3)
The question amounts to this: what is the relation that holds between the agent’s action
and the explanans of the rationalising explanation of the agent’s action? Davidson’s answer
is that the relation is causal:
In this paper I want to defend the ancient – and commonsense – position that
rationalization is a species of causal explanation. (Ibid.)
5This raises the issue of what becomes of the Dialectic of Psychologism once the Motivating Reasons View
is rejected, and I aim to explore that question at the end of Chapter Three and throughout Chapter Four. For
now, all I want to do is lay-out the dialectic in question and demonstrate that each of the three major parties
to it subscribe to the Motivating Reason View.
6It should be noted that these three options aren’t exhaustive. Sandis (2011, 2013) presents us with a further
option, for example, which is similar but importantly diﬀerent from the third. I don’t say much about that
option in this essay, but it seems to be motivated partly by the truth of the Motivating Reasons Postulate,
which I aim to refute in the next chapter.
7For the record, I think Davidson’s actual view is not quite the view standardly ascribed to him. I ignore that
important point in what follows.
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Davidson thinks that the causal relation at issue links the agent’s action with a set
of psychological states of the agent which constitute the agent’s seeing their action as
something which is supported by what normative reasons there are. These psychological
states are in turn identified with pairs of pro-attitudes and beliefs, which Davidson calls
the agent’s ‘primary reasons’, to the eﬀect that there is some feature of the action by dint
of which the performance of it promotes a goal to which the pro-attitude is directed:
Whenever someone does something for a reason, therefore, he can be char-
acterized as (a) having some sort of pro attitude towards actions of a certain
kind and (b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that
his action is of that kind. (Davidson, 1963:3)
Generalising to judgement sensitive phenomena across the board, the picture David-
son oﬀers us of rationalising explanation is this. When the agent’s -ing is subject to a
rationalising explanation – as it is whenever they purport to  in response to a normative
reason – the rationalising explanation always takes on the form of an explanation which
takes as explanans the concatenation of a sate of believing that p and a pro-attitude state
which together constitute the subject taking p to be a normative reason in favour of their
-ing. Those states together cause the agent’s -ing, and it is that relation of causation,
linking the agent’s -ing with their belief/pro-attitude pair, which underwrites the truth of
a rationalising explanation of the agent’s -ing.
Restricting my attention to the cognitive side of things, as I have been doing already,
Davidson’s view is that rationalising explanations are always to be given in terms of the
agent’s state of believing that p – where p is the item the agent takes to be a reason in favour
of their -ing. For Davidson, then, the sense in which rationalising explanations appeal to
what can be said in favour of -ing from the agent’s own point of view is that they appeal
to the psychological states which constitute, or at least partly constitute, the agent’s taking
the relevant factor to be a reason in favour of their -ing.
On the standard reading of Davidson, the reason which motivates the subject to  is
to be identified with the rationaliser of the subject’s -ing. Davidson’s talk of primary
reasons is supposed to indicate that the beliefs which constitute the agent’s rationalisers
are the reasons which motivate the agent to . So, what goes for rationalisers also goes
for the reasons that motivate the subject to , and vice-versa. Hence the reason which
motivates the agent to  are, for Davidson, to be identified with states of believing that p
which cause the agent’s -ing.
So far I’ve merely provided an exegesis of Davidson’s position, as standardly under-
stood, or at least the salient elements of it. What’s important to note for my purposes,
however, is that Davidson subscribes to the Motivating Reasons Postulate and to the Pri-
macy of Motivating Reasons.
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Take the former first. As I’ve already noted, it’s quite natural to think that (i) is true
of reasons which motivate, and I see no reason to think that Davidson, on the standard
reading, would deny that the reasons which motivate exemplify such a feature. (ii) is
trivially true of such items. (iv) follows from the conjunction of (i), (ii), and (iii), so now
the question is: does Davidson think that (iii) holds true of the reasons which motivate?
Davidson identifies the reasons which motivate the agent to  with beliefs the agent
has directed towards the items which constitute what seem, from the agent’s own point of
view, to be reasons in favour of their -ing. Since such states of mind can be present and
doing their causal work across the good case and bad, it follows that Davidson is com-
mitted to thinking that reasons which motivate can be present and doing the rationalising-
explanatory work constitutive of the motivating role they play across good cases and bad.
Thus, Davidson is committed to ascribing feature (iii) to the reasons which motivate too.
Now take the Primacy ofMotivating Reasons. It’s clear that Davidson thinks that ratio-
nalising explanation only ever takes the form of his good case/bad case neutral explanations
which appeal to the relevant causally active states of mind. As I noted earlier, this com-
mits one to a Reductive account of the phenomenon of responding to normative reasons
anyway, and the shape of the Reductionism will have to be that specified by the Primacy
of Motivating Reasons, given Davidson’s prior commitment to the Motivating Reasons
Postulate. In conclusion, then, Davidson, as standardly read, is indeed committed to the
Motivating Reasons View.
2.2.2 Dancy’s View
This section outlines the view Dancy defends primarily in his book Practical Reality.8
Dancy’s View takes as its starting point the thought that Davidson is quite wrong to think
that the reason which motivates the subject to  is to be identified with the subject’s belief
that p. In general, Dancy rejects the thought that we should think of the reasons which
motivate the subject to  as being psychological states at all, whether states of believing
that p, states of knowing that p, states of desiring to  , or whatever.9
But Dancy’s rejection of the psychologistic tendency at the heart of the Davidsonian
tradition goes even deeper. That’s because we can, it seems, distinguish between the state
of believing that p from the fact that the subject is in the state of believing that p. More
generally: we can distinguish between states and facts which record the presence of those
8He also defends the view in Dancy (2003, 2004b, 2008, 2011). It should be noted, however, that Dancy
(2014) modifies the original position substantially, so that it is more in-line with the view of Sandis (2011,
2013). I do not focus on Dancy’s new position in his essay although, as I have already said, I think it
is undermined by dint of the failure of the Motivating Reasons Postulate. In this section, I focus on the
position defended in Practical Reality and I label it, somewhat misleadingly given what has just been said,
‘Dancy’s View’.
9Notice here that what Dancy is rejecting is not the claim that the reasons which motivate are narrowly
supervening psychological states, but the more general thought that they are psychological states of some
kind.
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states.10 Thus, it is possible to deny that the reasons which motivate are psychological
states whilst still suggesting that they are all psychological facts that record the existence
of such states. Let us reserve the label ‘Psychologism’ for the view that the reasons which
motivate the agent to  are to be identified with psychological items of the subject, whether
psychological states or facts.11 Suppose I dial the number of my uncle for the reason that
it’s his birthday. On the state version of Psychologism, the reason for which I dial is my
believing that it is my uncle’s birthday. On the fact version of Psychologism, the reason
for which I dial is that I believe that it is my uncle’s birthday. Dancy wishes to reject the
fact version of Psychologism too: he wishes to reject Psychologism across the board.12
On Dancy’s alternative, we should think of reasons which motivate the agent to  as
what the agent takes to be the normative reason in favour of their -ing: that p. So the
reason for which I dial my uncle’s number is not my believing, nor the fact that I believe,
but rather what I believe: that it is my uncle’s birthday. Similarly, when I believe that
Labour will win the by-election for the reason that the exit-poll predicts so, my reason is
what’s designated by the that-clause: it is that the exit poll predicts so, not my believing it
or the fact that I believe it. As Dancy says:
. . . I argue that we should not accept any form of Psychologism anyway. We
should attempt to understand the reasons that motivate us as features of the
situation rather than as features of ourselves. (Dancy, 2000:20)
I’ll call the claim that reasons which motivate the subject are not psychological items,
either states or facts, but rather what the agent believes Anti-Psychologism. Dancy is the
foremost proponent of Anti-Psychologism.
It should be flagged up that the Anti-Psychologist needn’t deny that sometimes the
reason which motivates one to  will be that one believes that p. They will just say that it
gets to be so in so far as that one believes that p is the content of a (second order) belief
that constitutes the presence to mind of what one takes to be a normative reason – that
one believes that p. In such cases, the proponent of Psychologism will say that the reason
10Although the distinction between states and facts is contentious, it is prima facie plausible, and I will go
along with it here. States are the sorts of things which objects and organisms can be in, and, on the face
of it, they occupy certain stretches of time over which they, like the objects and organisms they are states
of, persist. Facts, on the other hand, are not the sorts of things which objects and organisms can be in, but
rather are the sorts of things which involve or are about objects and organisms, and it is not obvious that
facts are the sorts of things which occupy stretches of time at all, let alone persist through the stretches of
time that they occupy. Thus, it seems plausible, for example, that we should distinguish the state of being
red the post-box is in from the fact that the post box is red. And we should distinguish the state of believing
that p a subject who s for the reason that p is in from the fact that the subject believes that p. It might be
that those facts obtain if, and only if the relevant state is one which the corresponding object or subject is
in. But the two sorts of entities should be distinguished nevertheless.
11Dancy reserves that label just for the state version of the view and reserves the label ‘the New Theory’ for
the fact version.
12See Dancy (2000:Ch.6) for his rejection of the fact version of Psychologism.
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which motivates one is one’s second order state of believing, or else a fact which records
the presence of such a second order state.13
For example, one might find oneself believing, quite irrationally, that it’s likely that
the aeroplane one is going to fly in is going to crash. One recognises that the belief is
quite irrational, but one cannot shake it. Thinking about flying in the plane causes one
to feel great panic and fear and whenever one thinks about it one finds oneself avowing,
against one’s better judgement, that the plane will crash. One decides to go and see a
hypnotherapist in order to rid oneself of the irrational belief. The reason for which one
visits the hypnotherapist is that one believes that the plane is likely to crash. That fact
about oneself is present to mind in the way required for performing one’s action on the
basis of it because one has a (second order) belief that one believes that the plane is going
to crash. The proponent of Anti-Psychologism can perfectly well accept the coherence
of the case: they will identify the reason which motivates one with what one believes
– that one believes that the plane is going to crash, not that the plane is going to crash.
The Psychologist by contrast will say that the reason is one’s second order belief that
one believes the plane will crash. Anti-Psychologism asserts only that the reasons which
motivates one are what one believes when one s for a reason, they needn’t deny that one’s
reasons can be considerations about what one believes.14
So Dancy resists the Psychologistic tendency of Davidson, and indeed of the fact ver-
sion of Psychologism too. The reasons which motivate are what the agent believes about
the situation – the factors which the agent takes to be normative reasons, so that in the
good case their reason just is what makes it so that they ought to . But, and importantly,
Dancy agrees with Davidson that the reasons which motivate the agent to  are identical
to the rationalisers of the agent’s -ing:
In this book I have argued against certain prevalent views about motivating
reasons, the reasons for which we act. Such reasons are the things we appeal
to when we try to explain (or at least to explain in a certain way) why someone
did what he did. So a theory of such reasons contains, or is, a theory about
the nature of a certain sort of explanation of action – and vice-versa. (Dancy,
2000:159)
13It is for this reason that when Turri (2009) contrasts what he calls ‘Factualism’, which is the Anti-
Psychologistic view that the reasons which motivate are facts, and ‘Abstractionism’, which is the Anti-
Psychologistic view that the reasons which motivate are the propositional contents of mental states thought
of as distinct from facts, with what he calls ‘Dualism’, which is the view that reasons which motivate are
sometimes mental items and sometimes worldly items, he is setting up a pair of straw men. Perhaps,
however, all Turri needs is to be more careful with his formulation of the Anti-Psychologistic views he
describes and how they contrast with his Dualism.
14For similar examples see Hyman (1999:444), Dancy (2000:125), and Alvarez (2010:48). The point here
mirrors a point made in the last chapter, that normative reasons can sometimes be facts about the agent’s
own psychology, even though they are typically facts about the world. This is no accident, given that what
motivates proponents of Anti-Psychologism is the thought that the reasons that motivate can sometimes
just be the agent’s normative reasons.
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So the rationalisers of the agent’s -ing are always to be identified with what the agent
believes about the situation. When I dial my uncle’s number, the reason that motivates
me is that it is his birthday. That is also what explains why I do it, for Dancy. That goes
for both the good case and the bad case: all rationalising explanations are explanations
which appeal to the reason for which the agent s – p – as their explanantia. So here
we have another disagreement with Davidson: the explanantia of rationalising explana-
tions are always what the agent takes to be a normative reason, and are not psychological
states which constitute their taking the relevant consideration to be a normative reason,
nor corresponding psychological facts. That further disagreement is generated partly by
an agreement with Davidson that the reasons which motivate are rationalisers and partly
by the original disagreement with Davidson over whether reasons which motivate are psy-
chological items.
Things start to get quite clearly controversial, with respect to Dancy’s View, once at-
tention is drawn to the fact that Dancy thinks that one can motivated by a reason, so that
(1)-(3) are true of one, even in the bad case:
If I say. . . “the reason for which he was running was that the train was leaving”,
I can perfectly well continue by saying “in fact, however, he was quite wrong
about that”. (Dancy, 2000:346)
So Dancy’s thought is that sentences (1)-(3), which report rationalising explanations
that appeal to an item to which a concept of a reason applies, are true in both the good and
bad cases, and across both sorts of case the item which is one’s reason is held fixed: it is
what one believes – p. That item just is the explanans of the rationalising explanation that
holds of one across each case. But in bad cases it can be false.
It follows from this that rationalising explanations needn’t have true explanantia – they
constitute a counterexample to the claim that reasons why are always facts or truths. Thus,
the rationalising explanations oﬀered by (1)-(3) are explanations which can be true, even
when their explanantia, namely instances of p, are false. And the same goes for every
rationalising explanation, provided by any type of sentence capable of supplying such an
explanation. This is consistent, of course, with the thought that there are ways of reporting
rationalising explanations which do require the truth of p. Non-Psychologistic rationalis-
ing statements that use the ‘because’ idiom and its cognates fit that description. But for
Dancy, in so far as such statements report rationalising explanations, they do not require
the truth of p. They might require that p be true, but that is not a function of the fact that
they provide rationalising explanations.15
Since causal explanations require the truth of their explanantia, it follows, in turn, that
rationalising explanations are not causal explanations, contra Davidson. It is not so that
15See Dancy (2000:Ch.6.3). We will be looking in more detail at what Dancy has to say about the ‘because
p’ idiom in the next chapter.
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when one reports a rationalising explanation of why S s the state of aﬀairs which one has
in mind is a state of aﬀairs involving a causal link between the agent’s -ing and whatever
is doing the explaining. Instead, Dancy thinks that there is a sui generis ‘-ing for a reason’
relation that holds between the agent’s -ing and the reason for which the agent s. This
relation is non-causal, it links the agent’s -ing with their reason – what they take to be a
normative reason, and it doesn’t require the truth or normative status of the agent’s reason.
It is that state of aﬀairs we have in mind when we think of a rationalising explanations as
applying to the subject’s -ing, as we do when we apply (1)-(3) to the subject and when we
apply psychologistic and non-psychologistic rationalising statements to the subject too.16
I’ve oﬀered a brief characterisation of Dancy’s position. But is it a version of the
Motivating Reasons View? I think it is, as I now want to argue.
Take the Motivating Reasons Postulate first. Dancy certainly uses the phrase ‘moti-
vating reason’ and he applies that phrase to the ordinary phenomenon of the reason that
motivates one to . But this doesn’t add up to a commitment to the Motivating Reasons
Postulate unless he thinks of motivating reasons as having features (i)-(iv). I think it’s
clear from quote from p.159, given above, that he ascribes to motivating reasons feature
(i): the motivating role played by motivating reasons just is a rationalising role. Feature
(ii), moreover, trivially holds of motivating reasons. We’ve also seen that feature (iii), in
conjunction with (i) and (ii), gets us feature (iv).
So now the question is: does Dancy ascribe feature (iii) to the reasons which motivate?
That is: does he think of the reasons that motivate one to  as items which constitute
part of a rationalising explanation that is true both in the good case and in the bad? The
answer to this, of course, is yes. For Dancy, rationalising explanation always consists in
an explanation that’s grounded in his sui generis, non-causal, non-factive ‘for the reason
that’ relation. That relation is present whenever the agent is purporting to  in response to
a normative reason – even if they blamelessly fail. And it links the agent’s reasons – what
they believe – with their -ing, so that the agent’s reasons are rationalisers.
Now let’s see whether Dancy subscribes to the Primacy of Motivating Reasons. Well,
Dancy acknowledges only one sort of rationalising explanation: that which is grounded in
the holding of his sui generis, non-causal, non-factive ‘for the reason that’ relation. That
relation obtains across both the good case and the bad case and links the same relata in
them. But as I’ve already noted, this suﬃces for one to be committed to some kind of
Reductionism about the good case. Given his background commitment to the Motivating
Reasons Postulate, Dancy will have to subscribe to the form of Reductionism specified
by the Primacy of Motivating Reasons. And indeed that sort of account does seem to be
the account Dancy goes for. He says that in the good case, on top of the sort of neutral
rationalising explanation he envisages holding, the reason for which one s is identical to
a reason in favour of one’s -ing, and that is all he has to say about what is involved in
16See 2000:Ch.8.
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the good case. That certainly makes it seem as if what he is up to is accounting for the
good case in terms of having a motivating reason – which consists in the holding of his
primitive, non-causal, non-factive relation – plus, over and about that, the truth of p.
It might be objected to this reading of Dancy that it doesn’t square well with what he
says here:
If we do speak in this way, of motivating and normative reasons, this should
not be taken to suggest that there are two sorts of reason, the sort that motivate
and the sort that are good. There are not. There are just two questions that we
use a single notion of a reason to answer. When I call a reason ‘motivating’,
all that I am doing is signalling that our attention is on matters of motivation,
for the moment. When I call it ‘normative’, again all that I am doing is stress-
ing that we are currently thinking about whether it is a good reason, one that
favours acting in the way proposed. (Dancy, 2000:2-3)
What Dancy seems to say here is that the distinction he draws is not intended to be a
distinction between two kinds of reasons: normative and motivating. I have attributed to
him the thought that normative and motivating reasons are diﬀerent in kind in the sense
that the concept of a reason associated with normative reasons is distinct from the concept
of a reason associated with motivating reasons. I haven’t attributed to him the thought that
they are diﬀerent in kind in the sense that they belong to diﬀerent ontological categories
– that’s no part of the Motivating Reasons View. So if such a metaphysical claim is what
Dancy has in mind when we says that they are the same in kind, then that’s no problem for
my interpretation.
However, Dancy is quite clear that he thinks that there is only one concept of a reason
in this area, which we use when posing two diﬀerent questions. So isn’t my reading of him
under threat?
I don’t think it is because, first of all, as I have argued, the details of Dancy’s theory
commit him to thinking that normative and motivating reasons are reasons in diﬀerent
senses of the word. Even if he wishes to deny that claim, his theory commits him to it
nevertheless. It commits him to it because reasons that motivate are present in the bad
case, and in the bad case those items really are reasons. But if that’s so, then the sense in
which they’re reasons is not that they are normative – for bad cases include cases in which
there is no normative reason present.
In any case, it’s not at all clear why the fact that there is a notion of a reason which
figures in a normative question and a notionwhich figures in amotivational question should
imply that those notions are identical. Of course, that fact is consistent with the thought
that there is really only one notion here – which is my preferred view. But it doesn’t imply
it. Thus, it’s not clear why pointing to that fact should give us any reason to think that
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there is only one notion of a reason here, as Dancy seems to think. I conclude, then, that
Dancy really does subscribe to the Motivating Reasons View.
2.2.3 The Neo-Davidsonian View
I think it is fair to say that Dancy’s resistance to Psychologism has been accepted by many
philosophers working in this area. It is also fair to say that few philosophers, including
those who accept Dancy’s Anti-Psychologism, have wished to follow Dancy in saying that
rationalising explanations are non-factive and hence non-causal. It is quite intuitive that
explanations why in general are factive, and that rationalising explanations are explana-
tions why. But how are we to combine the factivity of explanation with the claim that the
reason for which the agent s are what the agent takes to be normative reasons?
Well, one way to do it is to deny that (1)-(3) are true in the bad case, and to counteract
whatever supposed reasons there are for thinking that that’s so, so that (1)-(3) pick out
the phenomenon of responding to a normative reason. That way, one can say that the
rationalising explanation reported by (1)-(3) take the reason for which the agent s as
explanans, but the agent’s reason is a fact in such a situation, so we don’t have a violation of
Factivity. In the bad case there is a diﬀerent sort of rationalising explanation available, one
which appeals to the fact that the agent believes that p. So there are two forms rationalising
explanation. With respect to one of them, the agent’s reason is the rationaliser and it is non-
psychological. With respect to the other, there is nothing that counts as a reason which
forms part of the rationaliser, and the rationaliser is the fact that the agent believes that
p. That is the strategy which, ultimately, I want to defend, but it involves rejecting the
Motivating Reasons View, as we shall see in more detail in the next chapter.
Here I want to focus on an alternative strategy for marrying Anti-Psychologism with
Factivity. On this strategy, we are to accept that (1)-(3) are true in the bad case as well
as the good. Hence we are to follow Dancy and Davidson in thinking of the rationalising
explanations reported by instances of (1)-(3) as good case/bad case neutral. But we should
follow Davidson in saying that the explanantia of rationalising explanations are the beliefs
directed towards the reason held by the agent, or else a fact which records the presence
of such a state. We can combine that with Dancy’s plausible thought that the reasons
for which one s are what one takes to be normative reasons by rejecting the thought,
shared by both Davidson and Dancy, that the reason for which one s is identical to the
rationaliser of one’s -ing. The reason for which the agent s still counts as part of the
agent’s rationaliser. But it isn’t identical to it, as on the Davidsonian and Dancyan Views.
This is the strategy adopted by Smith (2003), Davis (2003, 2005), Olson and Svensson
(2005), Setiya (2011), and Hieronymi (2011). I label that view theNeo-Davidsonian View.
It is an attempt at synthesising Dancy’s View with Davidson’s View, at least in certain
respects. Here is a representative statement of the basic idea from Davis:
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We need to distinguish the claim that actions can be explained by reference
to reasons from the claim that the reasons are what explain the actions. The
former is true, the latter false. The statement that my reason for saving was
that my son will need money for college does explain why I saved. But it does
not follow, and it is not true, that my reason explains my action. For my reason
was that my son will need money for college. That something will be true in
the future cannot explain the fact that I did something in the past. Moreover,
my action would have the same explanation even if I were wrong in thinking
that my son will be going to college. (Davis, 2003:455)
What is the explanans of the rationalising explanation to which one’s -ing is subject
when one s for a reason, for Davis? He argues that -ing for the reason that p – the sort of
phenomenon picked out by (1)-(3) – consists in -ing in a way caused by the psychological
states which constitute one’s taking p to be a reason in favour of one’s -ing. The explanans
of the rationalising explanation to which S’s -ing is subject, for him, then, must be the
psychological states in question, or at least facts which record the existence of them. But
he’s clear that he accepts that the reason for which the agent s is that p, and indeed that
the reason for which the agent s is that p in both the good case and the bad – indeed,
this is one of the reasons cited in the above passage for thinking that such reasons can’t be
rationalisers: when such reasons are false, the relevant explanans is not identical to them,
and remains the same as it is in the good case. So for Davis the reason for which S s is
not identical to the rationaliser of their -ing. -ing for the reason that p can consist in
one’s -ing being caused by elements of one’s psychology, so that those elements are the
rationalisers of one’s -ing, even though those elements are not the reasons for which one
s. The reason for which one s still figures in the rationalising explanation of one’s -ing,
it just does so by being what’s believed by the agent, where it is the belief which constitutes
the presence to mind of one’s reason which is one’s rationaliser, on Davis’ picture. 17
The position defended by Setiya (2011) is much the same. First, we can note Setiya’s
subscription to Anti-Psychologism:
The doctrine of ‘psychologism’, according to which the reasons for which
we act are always states of, or facts about, our own psychology, is hopeless.
(Ibid.:132)
Next, we can note that he allows that S can  for the reason that p even in the bad case:
. . . the fact that I am doing  on the ground that p is consistent with its being
no [normative] reason at all for me to . (Ibid.)
17Sandis (2013) and Dancy (2014) think that Davis wishes to defend their own distinctive position which
purports to deny that the reasons for which the subject s are psychological entities, that rationalisers are
psychological entities, and that rationalisers are identical to the agent’s reasons, thus preserving Factivity.
I think they misread Davis, who clearly thinks that rationalisers are psychological items.
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Finally, we can note that Setiya thinks, like Davis, that -ing for the reason that p
consists in -ing in a way that’s caused by the states of mind which constitute one’s taking
p to be a reason. Rationalisers, for Setiya, then, must be the states which cause. But they
are not the reasons for which one s:
. . . [Dancy] seems to infer. . . that the failure of psychologism, so understood,
casts doubt on causal-psychological accounts of acting for a reason. This is
not the case. That agent’s reasons are not psychological states and need not
be facts about their psychology leaves open that, in order to act on the ground
that p, one must have certain psychological states, that these states must play
a specific ‘eﬃcient causal role’, and that this is what it is to act for that reason.
(Setiya, 2011:133)
We find a further proponent of Neo-Davidsonianism in Hieronymi:
We now have on stage three contenders for the title ‘reasons for action’: first,
considerations that (in fact, truly) count in favour of acting, which Scanlon
calls ‘reasons in the standard, normative sense’ and others sometimes call
‘normative reasons’; second, considerations that someone took to count in
favour of acting, on the basis of which he or she acted (considerations someone
treated as reasons in the standard normative sense). . .which are sometimes
referred to as ‘the agent’s reasons’ (and often as ‘motivating reasons’); and,
finally, considerations that explain an action, whatever these may be. Given
the possibility of error, this last role seems to be played by psychological states
of the agent. . . by keeping in mind that there are (at least) these three possible
characters, we can minimize confusion. (Hieronymi, 2011:413)
Here Hieronymi suggests that we should distinguish three things the phrase ‘reason for
action’ might stand for. First, there are normative reasons. Second, there are the reasons
which motivate the agent to , which are given Dancy’s Anti-Psychologistic treatment.
Then there are the explanans of rationalising explanations – a certain sort of reason why S
s. The latter are identified with psychological states by her, and the reason given for that
is that the subject’s reasons for -ing can be present in the bad case, but, given Factivity,
they can’t explain because they’re false. Thus, the agent’s reasons are not identical to the
agent’s rationalisers, for Hieronymi. She takes it that we can perfectly well distinguish
between the three sorts of reasons she describes – there is no problem in doing so, and
those who conflate the latter two sorts of reasons like Davidson and Dancy are simply
confused. Much the same position is recommended by Olson and Svensson (2005).
Some Neo-Davidsonians, such as Smith, Davis, Setiya and Olson and Svensson, go
along with Davidson in thinking that rationalising explanation is causal. Hieronymi does
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not commit to that, and I do not build a commitment to Causalism into the Neo-Davidson-
ian position. Moreover, there isn’t agreement amongst the Neo-Davidsonian camp about
precisely what the explanantia of rationalising explanations are. Some, like Smith, Setiya,
Davis, and Olson & Svensson, seem to be straight-up Davidsonians at the level of ratio-
nalising explanation. Others, like Hieronymi, wish to leave it open to some extent which
psychological states constitute rationalisers. I do not build into the Neo-Davidsonian po-
sition any particular conception of rationalisers. But I do build it into the position that:
(a) the rationalisers are not identical to the reasons for which the subject s; (b) the ratio-
nalising explanations are good case/bad case neutral; and (c) they appeal to states of mind
of the subject which constitute the subject taking p, the reason for which they , to be a
normative reason for them to , or else to facts which record the presence of such states.
Why are the Neo-Davidsonians subscribers to the Motivating Reasons View? Take
the Motivating Reasons Postulate first. Several of the authors mentioned use the phrase
‘motivating reasons’, or else something similar, to refer to the reasons which motivate
the agent to . But do they think of such things as exemplifying features (i)-(iv) of the
Motivating Reasons Postulate? Well feature (i) is quite natural, as has already been noted,
and none of the Neo-Davidsonians show any sign of recognising that it might be possible
to deny it. Feature (ii) is trivial. Feature (iv) follows from the conjunction of (i), (ii) and
(iii).
So now the question is: do the Neo-Davidsonians think of the reasons that motivate as
having feature (iii)? I think the answer is yes. For on the Neo-Davidsonian View, the rea-
sons which motivate the agent to  are constituents of the explanantia of rationalising ex-
planations, even though they are not identical to such explanantia. And the explanations in
question are good case/bad case neutral: they are given in terms of the psychological states
or facts which constitute the appearance of normative reasons to the subject, where those
states of mind are present across both the good and bad cases. So the Neo-Davidsonians
really are proponents of the Motivating Reasons Postulate.
Now let’s take the Primacy of Motivating Reasons. The Neo-Davidsonians don’t dis-
cuss what account to give of the good case very much, so far as I can tell, although many
of them – Olson and Svensson excepted – are sympathetic to Dancy’s claim that in the
good case one’s reason is identical to the reason which favours one’s -ing. However, one
thing is clear: all the Neo-Davidsonians are in agreement that there is only one sort of
rationalising explanation – the sort of good case/bad case neutral rationalising explana-
tions which Davidson envisages which appeal to certain states of mind. Thus, they must
be Reductionists about what -ing in response to a normative reason consists in. Given
their commitment to the Motivating Reasons Postulate, moreover, this Reductionism must
take the form encapsulated by the Primacy of Motivating Reasons.
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2.3 The Way Ahead
I’ve laid out the motivating reasons view and I’ve described the Dialectic of Psychologism,
in particular the three main views one can take with respect to that dialectic: the Davidso-
nian View, Dancy’s View, and the Neo-Davidsonian View. I’ve attempted to demonstrate
that the Dialectic of Psychologism is permeated by the assumption that the Motivating
Reasons View is correct, so that the three views mentioned are cast in terms which either
presuppose or otherwise commit their proponents to the Motivating Reasons Postulate and
to the Primacy of Motivating Reasons.
Although I have focused on reading theMotivating Reasons View into the authors who
are party to the Dialectic of Psychologism, I hope the reader will recognise that the View
is something of a mainstay of the contemporary analytic literature on the phenomenon
of -ing for reasons, both in the case of believing for reasons and in the case of acting
for reasons. A great many authors distinguish normative from motivating reasons, where
the latter are identified with the ordinary phenomenon of the reason which motivates one
to . And many of those authors think of motivating reasons as items which play an
explanatory function but which are present whether or not the subject is -ing for a genuine
normative reason. And, I think it’s plausible that a great many writers only envisage one
sort of rationalising explanation, thus committing them to a Reductionist model of the
good case which typically takes the form of the Primacy of Motivating Reasons, given a
prior commitment to the Motivating Reasons Postulate. Refuting the Motivating Reasons
View, then, is of no small consequence. At the very least, it would require a great many
philosophers to significantly recalibrate their views, but I will show that it will require
more than just that.
At this point I want to say something about how I’m going to proceed. In the next
chapter I’m going to attack the Motivating Reasons Postulate: I’m going to aim to show
that the reasons which motivate the agent to  are not items which exemplify features
(i)-(iv) that are definitive of being a motivating reason in the special sense indicated. In
particular, I’m going to argue that (1)-(3) report the success condition of -ing in response
to a normative reason, and hence that the concept of a reason applied by someone who
endorses one of them is distinct from the concept of a normative reason. Since there are
no other sorts of sentences which are true in both the good cases and the bad which do
apply a concept of a reason to anything which is supposed to play a rationalising role
specified by the sentence in question, there is no reason to think that there are such things
as motivating reasons in the special sense indicated.
I argue at the end of the next chapter, however, that although that result refutes the
Motivating Reasons View by refuting the Motivating Reasons Postulate, that is certainly
not the end of the debates to whichMotivating Reasons Theorists have applied themselves.
In particular, the Dialectic of Psychologism lives on even after the presupposition of the
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Motivating Reasons View is removed. I reformulate that dialectic at the end of the next
chapter in a way that’s free of that false assumption and in Chapter Four I attempt to address
that dialectic, settling the matter in favour of Anti-Psychologism and going some way
toward settling it in favour of the Dancy-Davidson thesis that the reasons which motivate
the agent are identical to the agent’s rationalisers. As we will see, the reasons to reject the
Motivating Reasons Postulate help to arrive at the correct resolution of the reformulated
Psychologism Dialectic.
Moreover, although the Primacy of Motivating Reasons is refuted in the next chapter,
given that it presupposes the Motivating Reasons Postulate, I aim to show that even with
the Motivating Reasons View refuted, it remains a live issue whether to account for the
good case in terms of what’s common to the good and bad cases, plus other factors present
in the good case over and above what’s common – a position which we’ve seen is logically
equivalent to the claim that there is only one sort of rationalising explanation. I address
that issue, again free of the false assumption in favour of the Motivating Reasons View, in
Chapter Five, where I argue against the Reductionist claim.
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Chapter 3
The Myth of Motivating Reasons
Suppose I get a taxi to the airport for the reason that my flight to Belgium leaves soon.
Would I still count as catching the taxi for that reason if I were blamelessly mistaken that
my flight leaves soon? That is, is -ing for the reason that p a condition that obtains across
both good and bad cases? The orthodox answer to this question is aﬃrmative, indeed an
aﬃrmative answer to that question has been taken to be obvious, or at least quite easy to
prove.1 But once we’ve given an aﬃrmative answer to the question, we’re on our way to
committing ourselves to the Motivating Reason Postulate. For if reasons which motivate
us to  are present, counting as reasons and doing their motivational work even in the bad
case then there are reasons which motivate agents across good cases and bad but which
don’t count as reasons in the sense of being normative reasons.
This chapter argues that -ing for the reason that p is a matter of -ing in response to
a normative reason, so that -ing for the reason that p is not a condition which obtains in
the bad case. With that claim rejected, we’re thereby in a position to reject the Motivat-
ing Reasons View by rejecting the Motivating Reasons Postulate. This will require us to
re-assess the Psychologism Dialectic, as well as the debate about whether to be Reduc-
tionist about the good case, stripped of the usual presumption in favour of the existence of
motivating reasons. Those tasks are begun here but are completed only in later chapters.
The style of argument to be developed here for the claim that -ing for the reason that
p is true only in the good case is a familiar style of argument that comes in two stages.
First, I establish that the thought that one can  for a reason only in the good case should
be our default view: a view which has the status of innocent until proven guilty. Second,
I attempt to undermine arguments to the contrary.
I shall proceed as follows. In §3.1 I outline my own preferred interpretation of sen-
tences (1)-(3) a consequence of which is that they are true only in the good case, and I try
1See, for example, Smith (1987), Parfit (1997), Turri (2009), Miller (2008), and Setiya (2011) for the obvi-
ousness of the claim and Dancy (2000, 2003, 2011), Schroeder (2008), and Comesãna and McGrath (2014)
for some attempts to prove the thesis with ease. Typically, the claim is simply presupposed without a com-
mitment to it explicitly being flagged-up, perhaps because it is treated as obvious or else easily provable by
the relevant philosopher.
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to show that that reading of them should be our default view, thus shifting the burden of
proof onto my opponent. In §3.2 I undermine an argument owed to Dancy (2000) which
drives the thought that it is obvious that the contrary reading of (1)-(3) is true: the argu-
ment that it’s simply intuitive that we can coherently conjoin a denial of p with each of
(1)-(3). In §3.3 I pause to address a dialectical worry that arises out of consideration of
that argument. In §3.4 I return to the task of refuting extant arguments for my opponent’s
position by attempting to refute a well-developed form of argument oﬀered by Schroeder
(2008) and separately by Comesãna and McGrath (2014) which appeals to connections
between -ing for a reason and -ing rationally. In §3.5 I dispatch the simple argument
that it is simply incredible to claim that the agent in the bad case s for no reason at all.
In §3.6 I aim to undermine an argument for the claim that (1)-(3) can be true in the bad
case which appeals the thought that we are always in a position to tell whether or not we
are -ing for the reason that p. That concludes my defence of my preferred understanding
of (1)-(3). In §3.7 I move on to assess what results the claim that (1)-(3) are true only in
the good case has for the Motivating Reasons View and I argue that it refutes it by refuting
the Motivating Reasons Postulate. In §3.8 I suggest that rejecting the Motivating Reasons
Postulate doesn’t preclude the Dialectic of Psychologism from getting under-way, and nor
does it preclude the possibility of a Reductionist account of the good case. I oﬀer cashings
out of those two issues free of the usual assumption in favour of the Motivating Reasons
View, so that I can pursue each of them afresh in future chapters. Finally, in §3.9 I address
a kind of scepticism about the debate to be engaged in here: that it is a merely linguis-
tic aﬀair with little philosophical significance. If the reader is sympathetic to that sort of
scepticism at the outset then I ask them to suspend it until the final section.
3.1 BeingMotivated by a Reason as Responding to a Nor-
mative Reason
Consider again sentences (1)-(3):
(1a) S ed/is -ing for the reason that p
(1b) The reason for which S ed/is -ing is that p
(2a) S ed/is -ing on the basis of p
(2b) The basis on which S ed/is -ing is that p
(3a) S ed/is -ing on the grounds that p
(3b) The grounds on which S ed/is -ing is that p
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These sentences record the fact that the agent has ed or is -ing motivated by the
reason that p, where being motivated by a reason constitutively involves -ing in a way
that is subject to a rationalising explanation. The rationalising explanation in question
takes one’s -ing as explanandum and takes, as its explanans, some condition with either
is, or at least involves, the reason for which the agent has ed or is -ing specified by the
relevant instance of (1)-(3).
On what I think is a perfectly intuitive reading of (1)-(3), they ascribe the property of
being a normative reason to the item that motivates and then say of the subject that they
are responding to that reason, so that the factor which is the agent’s normative reason is,
or is at least part of, the rationaliser of the agent’s -ing. On this view, the sense in which
the reasons that motivate are reasons is just that they are normative reasons. And on this
view (1)-(3) are false in the bad case even though the agent who reflects on their situation
in the bad case would mistakenly, though blamelessly, come to the conclusion that (1)-(3)
are true of them.
If we go for this reading of (1)-(3), the phenomenon of a reason which motivates the
agent to  is nothing over and above the phenomenon of -ing in response to a normative
reason, which was introduced in Chapter One. Thus, if we go for this reading, the intro-
duction of the phenomenon of being motivated by a reason doesn’t extend the debate in
this area further than the thought that there is such a thing as responding to a normative
reason. There would then be a debate about what that amounts to. I call the reading in
question the factive reading.
To be clear, the factive reading of (1)-(3) is intended to be identified with the claim
that (1)-(3) record the success condition of -ing in response to the normative reason that
p. The factive reading entails (i) that the concept of a reason utilised by (1)-(3) is that of a
normative reason, (ii) that (1)-(3) require the truth of p and its normative status, and (iii)
that (1)-(3) are false in the bad case. Indeed, one of the major consequences of the factive
reading is that the subject in the bad case does not  for a reason at all. For to say that they
do so is to say that they  for a normative reason. Yet that is precisely not what happens
in the bad case. According the contrary reading I wish to attack, (1)-(3) do not record the
presence of the success condition, so that they can be true even in the bad case. I call that
reading the non-factive reading.
The factive reading of (1)-(3) is preferred, for example, by Stout, who in the context
of a discussion of a case in which a subject, Sally, is running for the reason that a bear is
chasing her, focuses on the locution ‘Sally’s reason for running is that such-and-such’. He
labels that claim (C) and has this to say about it:
The reasons given in formulations like (C) seem to be normative reasons that
motivate. (Stout, 2009:55)
The factive reading is also preferred by Alvarez, who is quite clear on her commitment
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to the claim that in the bad case the subject doesn’t  for a reason at all:
. . . it is right to say that an agent who acts motivated by a false belief does not
act for a reason; rather he acts for a purpose and is motivated by an apparent
reason. (Alvarez, 2010:146)
Others who endorse it include Raz (2011), Roessler (2014) and Hyman (1999, 2006,
2010).2 Deniers of the factive reading must include all of those who subscribe to the
Motivating Reasons Postulate, for the factive reading, as we’ll see, is inconsistent with the
Postulate.
Is the factive reading of (1)-(3) really so intuitive? Can anything be said to help elicit
the intuition in favour of it? Well let’s take an instance of the present tense, progressive
form of (1a):
(1a*) Smith is walking to the quad for the reason that there is free coﬀee available there
One way of eliciting the intuition in favour of the factive reading of (1a*) is to compare
it with the following instance of a non-psychologistic rationalising sentence:
(1bc) Smith is walking to the quad because there is free coﬀee available there
(1bc) clearly requires a factive reading: what comes after the rationalising ‘because’
contained in the sentence must be a fact which favours Smith’s walking to the quad, and
Smith needs to count as responding to that normative reason as such, if (1bc) is to be true at
all. That’s just to say that non-psychologistic rationalising sentences report the condition
of -ing in response to a normative reason.
But intuitively, (1a*) and (1bc) say the same thing: they are just two diﬀerent forms of
words which function to express the very same thought. When Smith reports why he is
walking to the quad, he could use either sentence, or use one and then use the other, and
we would take him to be reporting the very same thing. More generally any sentence of
the form: ‘S has ed/is -ing for the reason that p’ means the same as a sentence of the
form: ‘S has ed/is -ing because p’, where the ‘because’ which appears in the latter sort
of sentence is a rationalising ‘because’. Thus, given that the factive reading holds of (1bc),
it must also hold of (1a*) too. The latter reports the success condition just as its ‘because’
counterpart does.
This result generates the following dialectical situation. Our default view in this area
should be that the factive reading of (1)-(3) is accurate. The onus of proof is thus on those
who wish to allow that (1)-(3) are true even in the bad case. If it can be shown, therefore,
that there are no good reasons to believe that the factive reading should be rejected, then
2As we’ve seen, Hornsby is equivocal with respect to whether she thinks that the agent s for a reason only
in the good case.
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we are within our rights to conclude that the factive reading is true. During the course
of this chapter I aim to disprove the four most compelling arguments in favour of a non-
factive reading of (1)-(3), beginning with an argument given its clearest expression in
Dancy (2000).3 Immediately after the discussion of Dancy, I will also seek to address a
worry about the dialectical strategy being pursued here.
3.2 Dancy’s Master Argument Rejected
Dancy has done much to promote the non-factive reading of (1)-(3). Here’s what Dancy
has to say in favour of his preferred reading:
I suggest that locutions such as:
His reason for doing it was that it would increase his pension
The ground on which he acted was that she had lied to him
are not factive. To test this we only need to consider whether it is possible
without contradiction to continue by denying that things were as the agent
took them to be. Consider the following sentences:
His reason for doing it was that it would increase his pension, but in fact
he was quite wrong about that.
The ground on which he acted was that she had lied to him, though ac-
tually she had done nothing of the sort.
Neither of these sentences sounds self-contradictory to me. Not everyone’s
ears agree with me about this, I know. But there seems to be no reason why
there should not be a way of revealing the light in which the agent saw things
as a way of explaining why he did what he did, but without asserting that he
was right to see things that way. I think that the two locutions above are ways
of doing that. (Ibid.:132-133)
I think there are really two separate arguments contained in the above passage. The
first argument is that intuitively, one can conjoin, with coherence, any of (1)-(3) with the
denial of p. It follows that the truth of (1)-(3) doesn’t require that p is a reason in favour of
the subject -ing, so that (1)-(3) cannot record the success condition of responding to the
normative reason that p. Much the same reasoning is defended by him elsewhere.4 I’ll be
spending most of my time undermining that argument, but before I do so I want to quickly
dispatch the second argument I think is contained in the passage.
3I explore and dispatch a fifth and final argument in Chapter Five.
4See, for example, Dancy (2003, 2004b, 2011, 2014).
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The second argument is expressed by the sentence beginning “But there seems to be
no reason why there should. . . ”. The thought seems to be that we can provide rationalising
explanations which do not commit us to the truth of what the agent takes to be a normative
reason, and that that provides support in some way for the non-factive reading of (1)-(3). It
is of course true that we can provide the sorts of neutral rationalising explanations at issue:
the sorts of explanations reported by psychologistic rationalising statements do just that.
But I do not see how this could support the non-factive reading of (1)-(3). To achieve such
support Dancy would have to appeal to the claim that (1)-(3) report the same rationalising
explanation as psychologistic rationalising statements. For only with that claim in tow
would it follow that the truth of (1)-(3) does not require p to be a reason in favour of S’s -
ing. But the proponent of the factive reading will precisely deny that (1)-(3) report neutral
rationalising explanations. The second argument, then, should be dismissed.
I now wish to return to the first argument, according to which it’s intuitive that the de-
nial of p can coherently be conjoined with any sentence of the (1)-(3) forms. The problem
with Dancy’s argument is that he conflates (1)-(3) with the following, quite diﬀerent sorts
of sentences, each of which, we can safely assume, mean the same thing:
(4) S’s reason for -ing is that p
(5) S’s basis for -ing is that p
(6) S’s ground for -ing is that p
The conflation is evidenced in the passage cited, but I believe it to run through all
of Dancy’s work on this matter. In the passage in question Dancy focuses on a pair of
sentences. The first in the pair – “his reason for doing it is that it would increase his
pension” – is an instance of (4). The second – “the ground on which he acted was that
she had lied to him” – is an instance of (3b). Dancy takes it for granted that they have the
same meaning. More generally, he takes it for granted that (1)-(3) have the same meaning
as (4)-(6).
Let’s focus on (4) and take the following example:
(4*) Smith’s reason for walking to the quad is that there is a free coﬀee available there.
What I’m charging Dancy with is committing himself to the following valid but un-
sound piece of reasoning: (4*) doesn’t require the truth of p, (4*) always means the same
as (1a*), therefore (1a*) doesn’t require the truth of p. The argument for the claim that
(4*) doesn’t require the truth of p is just the appeal to the intuition that we can conjoin
(4*) with the denial of the claim that there is free coﬀee available in the quad without any
incoherence. The claim that (4*) must mean the same as (1a*) is taken for granted. The
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argument can be iterated for any of (4)-(6) and their (1)-(3) counterparts yielding the de-
sired conclusion that (1)-(3) don’t require the truth of p and hence that the factive reading
is incorrect.
The piece of reasoning is unsound because it is not true that (4*) must mean the same
as (1a*) and more generally it is not true that (4)-(6) must mean the same as (1)-(3). What
I now want to argue is that (4)-(6) admit of two readings. On the one hand, they can be
read so that they do mean the same as (1)-(3), in which case they record the presence of the
success condition. On the other hand, they can be read so that they mean something quite
diﬀerent to (1)-(3), in which case a non-factive reading is true of them. Dancy’s argument
is undermined either way, as I shall show.
Sentences (4)-(6) tell us that the subject is -ing in response to something which is
qualified by the phrase ‘S’s reason’, a phrase which I take to mean the same as ‘S’s own
reason’. (4*), for example, says of Smith that he is walking to the quad, and it reports to us
that he’s doing that in response to something that is qualified as his own reason for doing
it – as Smith’s reason for doing it. The sentences in question, I take it, report rationalising
explanations which take as explanantia the item that is qualified as the subject’s own rea-
son, or else a condition which involves the item in question. Any interpretation of (4)-(6)
must accommodate that fact, and also provide an account of what it amounts to to qualify
the item in question as the subject’s own reason.
On the factive reading of (4)-(6), the sense in which the relevant item is said to be a
reason, basis or ground is that it is a normative reason: a fact which favours S’s -ing.
(4)-(6) are then construed as reporting the success condition of responding to a norma-
tive reason, just as (1)-(3) do on the factive reading. Thus, on the factive reading, (4*)
says that Smith is walking to the quad in response to the reason that there is free coﬀee
available there. The point of labelling the normative reason in question the subject’s own
is merely to emphasise that of all the normative reasons possessed by the subject who
s, the subject has selected that particular normative reason in question. The presence
of the phrase does not contribute to the proposition expressed by any of (4)-(6), on the
factive reading. Rather, (4)-(6) involve a mere stylistic variation on (1)-(3), and indeed on
non-psychologistic rationalising statements.
There is, on the other hand, a non-factive reading of (4)-(6) which is liable to be con-
fused with the factive reading. On the non-factive reading of (4)-(6) they tell us that the
subject takes p to be a normative reason and s accordingly, and they remain neutral on
whether p is a genuine normative reason. On this reading, to say of p that it is the subject’s
own reason is not to say that it is a normative reason which the subject has elected as that
for which they will . Rather, it is to say that it is that which the subject is taking to be
a normative reason, so that were they asked for their reason for -ing they would supply
their interlocutor with p, and not with some other consideration. And on this reading, (4)-
(6) report the same neutral type of rationalising explanation as reported by psychologistic
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rationalising statements. If we read (4*) non-factively, what it’s saying is that Smith is
walking to the quad for what he takes to be a reason in favour of his doing so: that there
is free coﬀee available there. Smith’s own reason for action, although perhaps not really a
reason, is that there is free coﬀee available in the quad.
There is an interesting feature of the non-factive reading of (4)-(6) which is worth
making explicit. On the non-factive reading, there is no concept of a reason applied to
anything by the endorsement of (4)-(6). For on the non-factive reading, the sense in which
p is S’s reason is that it is something which S takes to be a normative reason. It is not
something which is in any sense a reason. Read non-factively, to say of p that it is S’s
reason for -ing is not to say that it is a reason for which S s. On the non-factive reading,
then, (4)-(6) really do diﬀer in meaning from (1)-(3) – we’ve just arrived at independent
proof of that. That’s because (1)-(3) certainly do apply a concept of a reason to the relevant
item at issue.
Not only do I think it obvious that (4)-(6) can be read in the non-factive way described,
but I think something of an argument can be put forward for the claim that that’s so. Con-
sider what we want to get at when we ask what a subject’s values are, when we ask, for
example: what are Smith’s values when it comes to coﬀee? A correct answer to that ques-
tion consists in listing what Smith values about coﬀee: a strong aroma, a mild caﬀeine
kick, a certain amount of bitterness, and so on. The correct answer to the question does
not consist in identifying features of coﬀee which are in fact valuable, where Smith recog-
nises the relevant features to be so. Rather, the correct answer to the question consists in
identifying what Smith himself values about coﬀee: what it is about coﬀee which Smith
takes to be valuable. More generally, identifying the agent’s values is not a matter of iden-
tifying what is valuable and then going on to determine what amongst the correct set of
values the agent manages to recognise as so. Rather, it is a matter of identifying what the
agent takes to be valuable – what the agent values herself. Talk of S’s values, then, should
be read ‘non-factively’. This, I suggest, confers plausibility on to the suggestion that talk
of S’s reasons can be read non-factively too. If the operator ‘S’s x’ functions non-factively
in the context of values, we should expect it to be capable of performing the same function
with respect to reasons.
The failure to spot that (4)-(6) can be read so that they do not mean the same as (1)-(3)
is common in the literature, it is not just Dancy who makes the mistake. To pick but one
example, here’s the mistake made by Setiya (2011):
. . . let us concentrate on the explicit articulation of the agent’s reasons, as fol-
lows:
A is doing  on the ground that p; that is his reason for doing it.
(Ibid.:132)
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The phrase which appears before the semi-colon in the sentence Setiya focuses on is an
instance of (3a). The phrase which appears after the semi-colon is an anaphoric instance
of (4). Setiya shows no sign of recognising that the two sorts of sentences can come apart
in meaning.5
We’ve seen that (4)-(6) admit of a factive and of a non-factive reading. It should now
be clear where Dancy’s argument goes wrong. Either we read (4)-(6) factively or we read
them non-factively. If the former, then they do mean the same as (1)-(3), but we cannot
intuitively conjoin the denial of p to them with coherence. If the latter, then we can do so,
but they do not mean the same as (1)-(3), so no conclusion to the eﬀect that (1)-(3) should
also be read non-factively follows. I suggest that Dancy has conflated the factive reading
with the non-factive reading of (4)-(6), thus generating the illusion that they both are to be
read non-factively and have the same meaning as (1)-(3), when there is, in fact, no single
reading of (4)-(6) on with they have both of those properties.
Dancy might respond to all this by saying that I’ve misread his reasoning. There was
never supposed to be an argument for the non-factive reading of (1)-(3), he might say,
instead the reasoning was supposed to be a naked appeal to the intuition that the denial
of p can coherently be conjoined by (1)-(3). Thus, (4)-(6) do not really need to be relied
upon at all.
In response to this it should be noted that even if one does find it intuitive that (1)-(3)
can be coherently conjoined with the denial of p, what’s been said here provides us with the
material to explain away the intuition consistently with the truth of the factive reading of
(1)-(3). (4)-(6) admit of two readings: a factive reading and a non-factive reading. On the
former, they mean the same as (1)-(3). On the latter, they don’t, because they don’t apply a
concept of a reason to anything. To explain away the intuition that (1)-(3) can coherently
be conjoined with the denial of p we just have to say that the intuition results from the
conflation of (1)-(3) with (4)-(6) where the latter are read non-factively, and that one can
be prone to make that mistake because (4)-(6) have an alternative reading on which they
do mean the same as (1)-(3).
Alternatively, Dancy might respond to what I’ve been arguing here by abandoning his
reliance of (4)-(6) and instead appealing to another of his favoured constructions:
(7) S ed/is -ing in the light of p
Dancy could then argue that (7) can coherently be conjoined with the denial of p, assert
that (7) has the same meaning as (1)-(3), and thus conclude that the non-factive reading of
(1)-(3) is correct.
In response to this I want to suggest, again, that (7) is ambiguous. (7) can be read
factively, so that it has the same meaning as (1)-(3) and indeed as non-psychologistic ra-
5I am not the first to notice that (4)-(6) admit of a non-factive reading. Stout (2004) also notes it, although
he doesn’t develop the point very much and doesn’t oﬀer a positive account of what the non-factive reading
amounts to.
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tionalising statements. But, and I admit that I have to strain my ears here slightly, it can be
heard in a non-factive way too. On the non-factive reading, the ‘in the light of’ construc-
tion serves as a metaphor for a relation between the subject and what they believe, namely
p. The meaning of the metaphor is that p is said to be something which appears to be a
normative reason to the subject – p is cast in the light of normative reason-hood from the
subject’s own point of view, so to speak. Read in that way, (7) means the same as (4)-(6)
read non-factively and so cannot mean the same as (1)-(3). Thus, this fresh argument of
Dancy’s which appeals to (7) fails in the same way as his Master Argument. We can con-
clude that the factive reading of (1)-(3), which is the default view, escapes unscathed from
Dancy’s attack.
3.3 A Dialectical Impasse?
The conclusion just drawn might seem too quick. One might think that even if it has been
shown that the material from Dancy can be handled readily by the proponent of the factive
reading of (1)-(3), the material still generates a certain problem for the proponent of the
dialectical strategy I am pursuing. I nowwant to give a separate treatment of the dialectical
worry at issue here. I’ll describe the issue first, before oﬀering two responses to it.
The dialectical strategy I am pursuing comes in two stages. The first is to demonstrate
that my preferred view should be the default view. This is achieved by the eliciting of
intuitions in favour of the preferred view. The second stage is to demonstrate that the
strongest arguments for the contrary view can be handled by the proponent of my own
view. Sometimes the argument for the contrary position will take the form of pointing
to a datum and then arguing that only the proponent of the alternative view can handle
the datum. Responding to this type of argument would involve showing that, in fact, the
proponent of the preferred view can handle the datum just as well or else that the datum
isn’t really a datum after all.
Dancy’s Master Argument is an instance of the sort of strategy at issue. The datum in
question is linguistic: it is that (4)-(6) do not require the truth of p. It is then argued that
only the non-factive reading of (1)-(3) can handle that fact, because (1)-(3) mean the same
as (4)-(6). My response to this is eﬀectively to suggest that Dancy’s datum isn’t really a
datum, for the only datum in this area is weaker than advertised: it is that (4)-(6) admit
of a reading on which they do not require the truth of p. Thus, Dancy’s Master Argument
would require that on that reading, (4)-(6) mean the same as (1)-(3). At this point it is
suggested that when they are read as not requiring the truth of p, they precisely do not
mean the same as (1)-(3) for the only way of reading them so that they do not require the
truth of p requires that those sentences do not apply a concept of a reason to anything, as
(1)-(3) do.
Here’s the dialectical worry I want to address. Given that Dancy’s Master Argument
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works in the way described, the dialectical strategy I’m pursuing begins to look ineﬀective.
For, it might be protested, all I’ve done is elicit an intuition in favour of my preferred
view and then shown that, on the assumption that my preferred view is correct, Dancy’s
supposed datum can be handled. But Dancy, it seems, can pursue the very same dialectical
strategy in reverse. In particular, Dancy could say that it is indeed a datum that (4)-(6)
admit of a single, non-factive reading. He could then say that on this single reading, they
mean the same as (1)-(3) and hence conclude that the latter do not require the truth of p.
He could then come up with some way of handling my datum: that (1)-(3) mean the same
as the non-psychologistic ‘because’ analogues, from the standpoint of his own non-factive
view. Either he could ague, assuming that his non-factive view is correct, that there’s
grounds for doubting that the datum is really a datum, or else show that his theory can
handle it anyway. The resulting state of play would be one in which each party can elicit
an intuition in favour of their own position and, from the standpoint of their supposedly
intuitive position, handle the opposing parties’ datum. The result would be a dialectical
impasse. The worry is that I’ve landed myself precisely in that situation.
How to respond to this dialectical worry? One way of responding is to demonstrate
that the worry misconceives the way I’ve attempted to handle Dancy’s datum. I haven’t
merely shown that supposing the factive reading of (1)-(3) true, then Dancy’s datum can
be handled in the way described. On the contrary, the handling of the datum in the way
described is compatible with denying that the factive reading of (1)-(3) is true. The han-
dling of the datum is this: (i) there is a reading of (4)-(6) on which they do not require the
truth of p – that is the only plausible datum in this area; (ii) on that reading the phrase ‘S’s
reason/basis/grounds’ means ‘what S takes to be a normative reason’; (iii) given (ii), it
follows that (4)-(6) do not apply a concept of a reason to anything on the only non-factive
reading thereof, and hence do not mean the same as (1)-(3), which do. All of that is sup-
posed to be plausible independently of whether one goes for the factive reading of (1)-(3).
Thus, Dancy’s datum, and the Master Argument associated with it, is no good, even if one
agrees with him about (1)-(3).
So there isn’t a dialectical impasse generated in the way described because I am not
in the business of eliciting an intuition in favour of my preferred view and then showing
that from the standpoint of my own position, the datum, if indeed it is one, is handle-able.
Rather, I’m in the business of eliciting the initial intuition and then showing that everyone
should reject Dancy’s datum in favour of treating a weaker claim as a datum, where it’s
also independently plausible that that weaker claim doesn’t really get Dancywhat he wants.
Even if Dancy does come up with a way of handling my datum from the standpoint of his
own position, then, that would not generate an impasse in the way described, because his
argument has been shown to be independently implausible.
But there is a second way of handling the dialectical worry which is stronger than the
one just broached, for it grants that the description of my strategy is correct, but goes on to
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simply deny that Dancy does have a good way of handling my datum. We can begin with
the question: how does Dancy propose to handle ‘S ed/is -ing because p’ talk? Here’s
a statement of his position:6
There are factive explanations of action in terms of the agent’s reasons. For
instance, we have the non-factive:
His reason for doing it was that it would increase his pension.
But we have factive ways of saying the very same thing, for instance:
He did it because it would increase his pension.
I take it that unlike the former, the latter cannot coherently be continued ‘but
he was sadly mistaken about that’, which is the mark of its factivity. Should we
say, then, that we have here two explanations of the same thing, two ‘rational’
or rationalizing explanations, one of which is factive and one of which is not?
In general, such a situation is no cause for complaint. But I think that the
explanation itself is not a factive one; there are just factive ways of wording it.
The word ‘because’ renders the explanation factive, but only in the sense that
it commits the explainer to the truth of the explanans; the explanation itself,
which might have been given in other terms, remains stubbornly non-factive.
That is, the fact that the explanation can be given in non-factive form shows
that it is a non-factive explanation, even though that very explanation can be
given in ways that (for trivial reasons to do with the use of certain words) are
themselves factive. In the latter cases, it is not the explanation itself that is
factive, but the form of words that we use to express it. (Dancy, 2004b:28)
In the above passage Dancy focuses on the relationship between an instance of (4) and
a corresponding instance of a non-psychologistic rationalising statement. Since he takes
(4)-(6) to always have the samemeaning as (1)-(3), the passage tells us something about his
views on the relationship between (1)-(3) and non-psychologistic rationalising statements.
Thus, in interpreting this passage, I will pretend that he is comparing an instance of (1)-(3)
to a non-psychologistic rationalising statement.
The view seems to be this. (1)-(3), just like (4)-(6) and (7), report the presence of a
certain kind of rationalising explanation. The rationalising explanation does not require
the truth of p, but takes p as explanans. It is hence a type of explanation why that is non-
factive and non-causal, which is how Dancy thinks of rationalising explanations. That
6Although the passage does not come from Practical Reality I’m confident that the view expressed in it
matches the view expressed in that book.
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those sentences report the obtaining of the relevant sort of explanatory state of aﬀairs
exhausts their meaning.
Now, Dancy agrees with what I want to treat as a datum: that non-psychologistic ratio-
nalising statements say the same thing as (1)-(3). He does not wish to deny that my datum
is really a datum. So what he wishes to say is that non-psychologistic rationalising state-
ments report the same non-factive, non-causal, non-psychologistic rationalising explana-
tion as their (1)-(3) counterparts and that that exhausts their meaning. Such statements,
then, although they mean the same as (1)-(3) don’t really report the success condition of
responding to a normative reason. Rather, they just report the obtaining of a rationalising
explanation, as Dancy thinks of it.
Dancy’s view of non-psychologistic rationalising statements, however, generates an
obvious problem: ‘S s because p’ requires the truth of p – such statements are factive.
How does Dancy propose to render this consistent with his own account of such state-
ments? What he says is eﬀectively that ‘because’ talk performs a merely pragmatic func-
tion: it functions to make it explicit that the speaker wishes to commit themselves to the
truth of p, on top of asserting the explanatory proposition expressed by the statement in
question. The thought expressed by the non-psychologistic rationalising statements is the
same as the thought expressed by (1)-(3), it’s just that the former involve an idiom which
performs the merely pragmatic function of evincing the speaker’s commitment to p.
So Dancy would say, in response to me, that it’s agreed that (1)-(3) mean the same as
their ‘because’ counterparts. It’s just that the latter aren’t really statements that report the
success notion. They are factive, but their factivity is an artefact of the pragmatic function
performed by the ‘because’ which appears in the them. Thus, my datum can be handled
by Dancy’s theory.
However, Dancy’s account of ‘S ed/is -ing because p’ talk is, it seems to me, inad-
equate for a number of reasons. First, as he himself seems to acknowledge, there is such a
thing as -ing in response to a normative reason: there is such a thing as -ing for a good
reason. If we grant that, then presumably we must also grant that English aﬀords us a way
of talking about such a phenomenon. But what way could that be other than: ‘S ed/is -
ing because p’, in the rationalising sense of ‘because’? OnDancy’s view of such sentences,
it is not true that they are used to report the success condition: the thought we have in mind
when we assert ‘S is -ing because p’ is not that S is -ing in response to the normative
reason that p, but that one of Dancy’s non-causal, non-factive, non-psychologistic ratio-
nalising explanations holds true of the subject’s -ing. We are also, incidentally, evincing
a commitment to p and we are doing so by exploiting a device in English which, in the
context in question, functions solely to enable us to do so. We are not saying, of p, that it
is a normative reason to which S is responding by -ing. But to repeat: if the ‘S is -ing
because p’ idiom doesn’t aﬀord us a way of saying that, then what does?
Another problem with Dancy’s account can be brought out by considering, once again,
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(1a*):
(1a*) Smith is walking to the quad for the reason that there is free coﬀee available there
If I were to assert (1a*) but add to it: ‘but there is no free coﬀee available in the quad’ I
would end up asserting something on the face of it incoherent.7 Of course, on my preferred
view, we should take the incoherence at face value, for appending the denial of p to ‘S s
for the reason that p’ is in fact contradictory. But my opponent will have to acknowledge
and account for the oddness as well. It’s just that they’ll have to deny that (1a*) strictly
speaking entails that there is free coﬀee available in the quad. Instead, they’ll have to say
that that fact is presupposed by the speaker who asserts (1a*), but where the presupposition
in question is not also entailed by the sentence asserted.8
But now suppose Smith were himself to assert a first-person variant of (1a*):
(1afp) I am walking to the quad for the reason that there is free coﬀee available there
There would be a kind of incoherence which would attach to Smith’s assertion of
(1afp), were he to append to it: ‘but there is no free coﬀee available in the quad’ which
is not present in the corresponding third-person case in which that denial is added. This,
I submit, is because (1afp) not only involves the presupposition (whether entailed or not)
that there is free coﬀee available in the quad, but also involves Smith expressing his belief
that there is free coﬀee available in the quad. It involves this by dint of its first-person
form. Thus, combining (1afp) with the denial at issue would involve a kind of incoher-
ence at least analogous to the incoherence exemplified by instances of the belief-ascription
sentences that form the basis of Moore’s Paradox: ‘I believe that p but not-p’.
But now let’s suppose that Smith were to move from asserting (1afp) to asserting:
(1bc*) I am walking to the quad because there is free coﬀee available there
In my view, (1afp) and (1bc*) mean exactly the same thing, and on Dancy’s view like-
wise. But on my view each of these are mere stylistic variants on the other. For Dancy,
the diﬀerence is more substantial: there is a pragmatic feature of (1bc*) which (1afp) does
not exemplify. The former is supposed to carry with it a device which serves to evince
Smith’s belief that there is coﬀee available in the quad. However, that device would serve
no function that isn’t already guaranteed to be served by the first-person form of the latter.
Once we focus on the relevant first-person forms, then, Dancy’s account becomes dubious
for he is committed to saying that there is a diﬀerence between the ‘because’ idiom and
7It should be noted that the same thing does not hold of the relevant instance of (4), on the non-factive reading.
It is of course this fact which Dancy’s Master Argument exploits in order to generate the implausible result
that (1)-(3) don’t record the success condition.
8See Comesãna and McGrath (2014) for a development of such an account.
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the (1)-(3) idioms, when those are utilised first-personally, which cannot be there. That’s
so even though the diﬀerence is supposed to be merely at the pragmatic level.
So Dancy’s account of ‘S ed/is -ing because p’ talk is objectionable. Thus, Dancy
does not have an adequate way of dealing with my datum – that such talk means the same as
(1)-(3) – from the standpoint of his own theory. The dialectical impasse worry, according
to which Dancy can simply adopt my dialectical strategy in reverse with propriety, can
hence be avoided in more than one way. First, it can be avoided by appeal to the point
that my dealing with Dancy’s datum is independent of what verdict we pass on (1)-(3).
Second, it can be avoided by appeal to the point that Dancy does not have an adequate way
of dealing with my datum himself.
3.4 The Argument from Rationality Rejected
In this section I want to examine, and ultimately reject, a second argument for the non-
factive reading of (1)-(3) which has been advanced, separately, by Schroeder (2008) and
by Comesãna and McGrath (2014). The argument appeals to the thought that the agent s
rationally in the bad case, and then infers from that that the agent s for a reason in the bad
case. Schroeder’s argument diﬀers in minor detail from Comesaña and McGrath’s. For
example, Schroeder doesn’t invoke the distinction, which I’ll get to in a moment, between
substantive rationality and structural rationality. Instead, Schroeder operates with an un-
defined notion of rationality. I’ll be focusing on Comesaña and McGrath’s version of the
argument for, given that they draw that distinction, their argument is better developed. But
my response to their argument is just as eﬀective against Schroeder’s variant of it.
Comesaña and McGrath’s primary interest is not the phenomenon captured by (1)-(3)
of -ing for a reason, but the related phenomenon of possessing or having a reason to .
Roughly, that notion amounts to the notion of a psychological link between the subject
and p, so that p is readily available to them as the reason for which they . The argument
I’m going to investigate draws the sub-conclusion that S can  for the reason that p in the
bad case, and then moves from there to the thought that S can possesses the reason that p
in the bad case, which is Comesaña and McGrath’s ultimate conclusion. Since I’m more
interested in -ing for a reason I’ll restrict my attention to what consequences the argument
has for that phenomenon and ignore the further conclusions drawn concerning the related
phenomenon of possessing a reason.9
First of all we need the distinction between the two notions of rationality already al-
luded to. The distinction is, to borrow some terminology from Scanlon (2003), between
substantive rationality and structural rationality. We can bring out the contrast here by
focusing on the question: what do we mean when we say, of an agent, that they ought to
9Schroeder (2008, 2011) is also interested primarily in the phenomenon of possessing a reason but, again,
his argument has application with respect to the notion of -ing for a reason too.
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?10 One thing we might mean, as we’ve already seen, is that there is decisive reason for
the agent to . This is a matter of a certain sort of relation holding between the subject’s
-ing and the world: a relation of decisively favouring which links a certain set of facts
to one’s -ing. On the other hand, when we say that someone ought to  we might have
something seemingly quite diﬀerent in mind: that given that they have certain (other) at-
titudes, it’s rational for them to , which is to say that, given that they have the relevant
attitudes, it would be irrational for them not to . This second sort of ought is a matter of
a certain relation holding between an attitude, or set of attitudes, one has and one’s -ing
(where -ing can be another attitude available to one, or else an act or omission available
to one). We determine when one ought to  in this second sense in abstraction from what
facts in the world constitute what can be said for and against the agent’s -ing. Instead, we
focus solely on the attitudes the agent has.
These two notions are genuinely distinct. There might be conclusive reason for one to
 even if one has no set of attitudes such that it would be irrational for one not to . For
example, unbeknownst to me my car might have a flat tyre. That the car has a flat tyre is
a decisive reason for me to change it. But I might have no idea that the car has a flat tyre.
Thus, I have no attitude such that it would be irrational for me not to change it. Likewise,
I might have an attitude such that it would be irrational for me not to , even though there
is nothing to be said in favour of my -ing. I might believe, mistakenly, that I live on a
fault-line. Given that I believe that, and that I believe that houses built on fault-lines are
less stable than houses which are not, I ought to believe that my house is less stable than
those not built on a fault-line. But in fact I am wrong and there isn’t really any reason at
all for me to believe that my house is built on a fault-line. So it would be rational for me
to believe that my house is less stable than others, even though it’s not the case that there
is anything to be said in favour of my thinking that.
There are a great many general principles which tell us when one ought to  in the
second sense.11 Examining a handful of them might help to give us a clearer picture of
what the current distinction amounts to. Take, for example, the following set of principles:
Means-Ends If S desires to  and believes that -ing is necessary for  -ing, then S ought
to 
Modus Ponens If S believes that p, and S believes that if p then q, then S ought to believe
that q
C+ If S believes that there is conclusive reason to , then S ought to 
C- If S believes that there is conclusive reason for them not to , then S ought not to 
10My presentation of the distinction here closely follows that of Kolodny (2005).
11It might be that there are only a small sub-set of these principles which constitute the fundamental ones
– those by dint of which the truth of the rest can be explained. Kolodny (ibid.) thinks that the C+ and C-
principles I’m about to state occupy such a position.
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In each case, what we have is a principle which tells us that in circumstances in which
one possesses the attitudes specified in the antecedent, a certain ought applies to one –
our second sort of ought. The ought in question applies to one independently of what can
be said for and against one’s -ing, prior to one having the relevant attitudes. The ought
holds just by dint of one’s possessing the attitudes in question.
The first sort of ought is the ought of substantive rationality, the second the ought
of structural rationality. There are, of course, many lively debates about quite how to
understand the relation between substantive and structural rationality. For example, there’s
the issue of whether we should think that rational requirements generate normative reasons
for one to  in response to them. And if so, what we should identify such reasons with
and how we are to enable this suggestion to avoid problematic bootstrapping.12 We need
not get involved with those debates here.13
There is a further background distinction which needs to be drawn, one which has a
familiar Kantian flavour. This is the distinction between -ing in accordance with what
rationality requires of one, and -ing rationally. This distinction cuts across the distinction
just drawn between substantive and structural rationality to yield us two separate distinc-
tions. On the one hand there’s the distinction between -ing in accordance with what
substantive rationality requires of one and -ing in a substantively rational way. This is a
matter of -ing in a way that happens to be decisively favoured by the reasons there are
for one to  and -ing in response to those reasons. That is just the Kantian distinction I
started out with, but where the normative reasons in question are decisive. On the other
hand, there’s the distinction between –ing in a way that’s required by some principle of
rationality which, given the antecedent attitudes one has, applies to one, and -ing in a way
that is not merely in accordance with what structural rationality requires but is a matter of
-ing for the sake of what structural rationality requires. This is just an analogue of the
Kantian distinction I started out with applied to structural rationality.
We have a rough-and-ready intuitive notion of -ing in response to a normative reason,
12See Kolodny (2005, 2007), Broome (1999, 2007), Dancy (2000) and Raz (2011) for a sample of this
debate.
13As I have said, when one ought to  in the first sense, we can say that it is substantively rational for one to .
When one ought to  in the second sense we can say that it is structurally rational for one to . The latter
label is appropriate because rationality in the second sense is a matter of the avoidance of incoherence
between one’s attitudes and one’s -ing. The distinction I have in mind is not always referred to using
the Scanlonian labels I favour. Kolodny (2005) labels the distinction the distinction between the ought of
normative reasons and the ought of rationality, and he refers to the factors which generate the first reasons
(in the sense of normative reasons) and the sorts of principles associated with the second requirements,
or requirements of rationality where that terminology is in turn borrowed from Broome (1999). Another
appropriate label might be the distinction between objective and subjective rationality, which Kolodny
himself also sometimes uses. Hooker and Struemer (2004) call structural rationality procedural rationality.
I use the Scanlonian labels because those are the labels favoured by Comesaña and McGrath. Whatever
labels we decide to use is immaterial. The point to bear in mind is that there is an important diﬀerence
between it being the case that one ought to  by dint of there being decisive reasons in existence for one
to  and it being the case that one ought to  because one is in some state of mind such that it would be
incoherent for one not to .
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and hence -ing in a substantively rational way. That intuitive notion has been brought in
to play numerous times so far. But the notion of -ing in a structurally rational way is, I
think, quite opaque. What does -ing in a structurally rational way amount to? My own
view on the matter is this. To  in a structurally rational way is not to  for the reason that
it is structurally rational for me to , where that is taken to be a normative reason for one
to . Nor is it to  for the reason that I am in M, where M is the attitude or set of attitudes
that correspond to the antecedent of the relevant rational requirement, and where that fact
is taken to be a normative reason for one to . Neither of these suggestions is plausible:
we would judge an agent as -ing in a structurally rational way even if we know that they
don’t have any conception of the rational requirement which applies to them.14 Instead,
-ing in a structurally rational way is just taking something to be a normative reason and
-ing accordingly, so that a neutral rationalising explanation is true of one. The relevant
consideration is the content of the belief which corresponds to the antecedent of the rational
requirement that one is -ing for the sake of: that -ing is necessary for  -ing, that p and
that if p then q, that there is conclusive reason to , that there is conclusive reason not
to , and so on. -ing in a structurally rational way is, in a certain sense, transparent to
-ing for a reason: to  in a structurally rational way just is to  in response to apparent
normative reasons (if not a genuine one).
I’m now in a position to state Comesaña and McGrath’s argument. They rely on the
following principle connecting -ing in a rational way with -ing for a reason:
(RR) One does something rationally only if one has reasons that make it reasonable for
one to do it and one does it on the basis of some (sub-) set of those reasons, i.e. one
does it “for” those reasons. (Comesãna and McGrath, 2014:62)
(RR) is intended to be a claim about substantive rationality. Given that, (RR) is plausi-
ble. Substantive rationality is a matter of there being decisive reasons in existence for one
to . To  in a substantively rational way, then, must be to respond to those factors which
make it substantively rational for one to : to  in response to the relevant normative rea-
sons. When one responds to the normative reason that p, (1)-(3) is true of one – no one
doubts that claim. So when one s in a substantively rational way, (1)-(3) are true of one:
one s for a reason.15
They then focus on the following pair of cases, variants of the famous case of Bernie
14See Kolodny (2005:§4) for an argument for the claim that, where beliefs are concerned at least, it is not
possible for -ing in a structurally rational way to take such forms.
15Comesaña and McGrath derive (RR) from two plausible looking principles (Comesãna and McGrath,
2014:61). The first says that it is substantively rational for one to  only if there is a reason for one to ,
where that reason makes it rational for one to . The second says that one s substantively rationally only
if there is something which makes it rational for one to  and one s in the light of that factor. I leave
specification of these extra principles, and indeed others that I discuss in the following three footnotes, out
of the main body of the text in order to avoid an unhelpful and unnecessary proliferation of principles and
theses.
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and the gin and tonic introduced by Williams (1980). First, there’s the following good
case:
Thirsty Bernie: Bernie is at a party and is in the mood for a drink. At the bartender’s
counter, there are glasses of gin and tonic and bottles of a good Belgian ale. Bernie
reaches for a glass of gin and tonic, remembering the host’s superb gin and tonics,
and preferring them even over a good Belgian ale. The glass does indeed contain
gin and tonic. All goes well. (Comesãna and McGrath, 2014:62)
Then there is the following bad case:
Deceived Bernie: Bernie is at a party and is in the mood for a drink. Everything is the
same as in Thirsty Bernie except that on the bartender’s counter the glasses are not
filled with gin and tonic, but only tonic (the bartender forgot to add gin). Bernie
reaches for a glass just as in Thirsty Bernie. In a moment, Bernie is disappointed.
(Ibid.)
Comesaña andMcGrath suggest take it as a datum that Deceived Bernie s in a rational
way.16 Given (RR) it follows that Deceived Bernie s for a reason: (1)-(3) is true of him.
This leads us the question: what is the reason for which Deceived Bernie s? Well, the
reason for which Thirsty Bernie reaches for the glass is that the glass contains gin and tonic.
If the factive reading of (1)-(3) is true, then that cannot be Deceived Bernie’s reason, for
it is false in his situation. What else could his reason be? Comesaña and McGrath go
through the three most plausible options and dismiss each of them: (i) that he believes that
there is gin and tonic in the glass; (ii) that it is probable that the glass contains gin and
tonic; and (iii) the set of propositions which make it probable that the glass contains gin
and tonic (for example: that the glass looks to contain gin and tonic, that the bartender is
not generally forgetful, and so on). In each case, the candidate reason is dismissed on the
grounds that Deceived Bernie is the same in all relevant psychological respects to Thirsty
Bernie.17 The thought here, I take it, is that what Thirsty Bernie takes to be a reason for
his -ing is the same as what Deceived Bernie does, so that whatever consideration the
latter s on the basis of, if any, must be the same as that which Thirsty Bernie s on the
basis of.18 Since the only remaining option is to agree that the reason for which Deceived
16Comesãna and McGrath (2014:62). They call that claim the Rationality Assumption.
17They dismiss (i)-(iii) for other reasons too. For example, they think (iii) violates a further plausible thesis:
that Deceived Bernie and Thirsty Bernie are equally rational in -ing.
18Comesãna and McGrath (ibid.:62-63). They call the claim that the two subjects are the same in all rel-
evant psychological respects the Sameness of Psychological Basis Assumption. Their formulation of the
assumption is, however, confusing: “The second assumption is that the psychological story about Bernie’s
basis for reaching for the glass is the same in the two cases: the same consideration moves Bernie to act
in the two cases.” What’s said here is confusing for two reasons. First, what follows the colon is not ob-
viously equivalent to what comes before the colon. It might be that there are psychological diﬀerences
between the two cases (for example: Thirsty Bernie knows but Deceived Bernie doesn’t) even though the
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Bernie reaches for the glass is that the glass contains gin and tonic, it follows that one can
 for the reason that p even though p is not true. The factive reading of (1)-(3), then, is
false.
The problem with this argument is the claim that Deceived Bernie s in a rational
way. Since (RR) concerns substantive rationality, the sense in which Deceived Bernie s
rationally needs to be that he s in a substantively rational way, if the principle (RR) in
particular is to generate for us the result that (1)-(3) is true of Deceived Bernie. But S s
in a substantively rational way only if there is a normative reason for S to , and S s in
response to it: (RR) is a true principle which connects a certain notion of rationality with
the notion of a normative reason. But Bernie does not  in response to a normative reason.
Rather, there is an apparent reason on the scene and he s accordingly. The apparent reason
is that the glass contains gin and tonic. But as a falsehood, that proposition can be nothing
more than a merely apparent reason. So Deceived Bernie does not  in a substantively
rational way. Given that, (RR) is useless, when applied to the case of Deceived Bernie, in
generating the result that (1)-(3) is true of Deceived Bernie.
It is indeed a datum that Deceived Bernie is -ing rationally – Comesaña and McGrath
have got that much correct. But the only sense in which Deceived Bernie is -ing rationally
is that he is -ing in a structurally rational way. That is to say, he is -ing in a way that
is both in-keeping with a rational requirement that applies to him, and he is -ing in the
light of the relevant rational requirement. The rational requirement in question is this: if
one believes that p, and one takes p to be a conclusive reason for one to , then one ought
to .19 As I have said, I think that -ing in a structurally rational way reduces to -ing in a
way that manifests one’s taking there to be a decisive reason in favour of one’s -ing. So
the correct thing to say about Deceived Bernie’s rationality is that he reaches for the glass
in a way that manifests his taking there to be a conclusive reason for him to reach for the
glass, so that he satisfies the rational requirement just specified.
In sum, then, we can say of Deceived Bernie that he s rationally. We can say that he
s for an apparent normative reason. We can say that Bernie reaches for the glass because
he believes that the glass contains gin and tonic, in the rationalising sense of ‘because’.
We can also say that (4)-(6) and (7) are true of him on the non-factive readings thereof:
Bernie’s reason, in the case in question, is that the glass contains gin and tonic, and there
is a sense in which Bernie s in he light of the glass containing gin and tonic. But Bernie
consideration on the basis of which they act is the same. Second, it’s confusing because describing the
case of Deceived Bernie as a case in which there is a consideration or basis for which Deceived Bernie
acts is potentially question-begging, for the proponent of the factive reading will precisely want to say that
there is no basis on which Deceived Bernie is -ing. In the text, I’ve attempted to avoid these worries by
stating the essential point of the second assumption in a diﬀerent way.
19Strictly speaking, this principle would have to be modified if it were to stand a chance of being true.
It would have to say that if one rationally believes that there is conclusive reason for one to  and one
rationally takes p to be a conclusive reason for one to , then one ought to . I don’t think this makes a
diﬀerence to the argument in the text.
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does not reach for the glass for a reason. (1)-(3) are false of him.
Comesaña and McGrath might respond to this by saying that it is the case that Bernie
s in a substantively rational way and that does indeed require that Bernie s in response
to a normative reason. But normative reasons needn’t be facts: whether p is true or false
doesn’t aﬀect it’s status as a normative reason; (NR=F) is false. One might read the fol-
lowing passage as intended to assert such an idea:
There are many, many considerations out there for and against any action. We
care about finding out which ones are true, since those are the ones that will
make our lives go best. Still, the other ones are still reasons, and if someone
acts on them, their life might not go best. . . , but they will be acting rationally.
(Comesãna and McGrath, 2014:78)
One could read this passage as saying that p, whether true or false, is a reason in favour
of one’s -ing. What truth adds to p is not a diﬀerent status reasons-wise, but the following
property: -ing for the reason that p is conducive to the successful achievement of one’s
goals. If p were false, then it wouldn’t have that property. That’s why it’s important to us
that we  only for sake of true considerations. But, to repeat, its having that status isn’t
required for it being a normative reason.
If this were right, then our conception of the dialectic being addressed in the current
chapter would have to change significantly. For if it were true that normative reason needn’t
be facts, then we’d have to separate the idea that the notion of reason involved in (1)-(3) is
a normative reason, so that (1)-(3) can be thought of as recording the success phenomenon
of responding to a normative reason, from the idea that (1)-(3) are factive in the sense of
requiring the truth of p. The claim that (1)-(3) requires the truth of p would no longer be
entailed by the claim that (1)-(3) express the success notion.
It is, however, implausible that normative reasons can be falsehoods. There are two
reasons for endorsing (NR=F) and a challenge to those who deny it, which I now want to
draw attention to.
First, if p is a normative reason, then p is something which can explain why one pro-
tanto ought to : p is a normative reason only if ‘S (pro-tanto) ought to  because p’ is
true.20 But p can explain why q only if p is true. Explanation why is factive. Hence: p is
normative reason only if p is true.
Second, I noted in Chapter One that one can  in response to the normative reason that
p (and more generally: can  in a way that’s subject to a rationalising explanation), only if
p is present to mind in the right sort of way, which involves p being present to mind qua
normative reason. (DT) is part of the truth here, in my view: for p to be present to mind in
20This is not to endorse the claim, defended by Broome (2004), that what it is to be a normative reason is
for it to play that explanatory role. The claim which I defend in the text is weaker than that: it is merely a
necessity thesis, not a thesis to the eﬀect that the explanatory status is constitutive of the normative status.
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the right sort of way requires that p is believed. But even if one denied (DT) in favour of a
more liberal thesis so that, for example, sensory experience could constitute the presence
to mind of p in the right sort of way, still it seems uncontroversial that only truth-directed
attitudes can constitute the presence to mind of reasons in the way at issue. Desiring that
p, hoping that p, wishing that p, suspending judgement about whether p, and so on, cannot
constitute the presence to mind of p in the right sort of way. Only attitudes which one
has towards p only if p is thereby taken to be true are candidates to do the relevant work.
Only cognitive attitudes – sensory experiences (assuming that they have content), beliefs,
articles of knowledge and the like – can play the role, and even then I think it’s only the
commitment attitudes like belief and knowledge which can do it. But now let’s ask the
question: why does -ing in response to the normative reason that p require that one has
some truth-directed attitude towards p? A plausible answer here, I suggest, is that p is a
normative reason only if p is true. If it’s part of what it is to be a normative reason that the
relevant item is true, then no wonder awareness of normative reasons as such needs to be
truth-directed awareness.
Finally, the challenge. When one finds out that p is false, one ceases to treat p as a
reason in favour of one’s -ing: one is no longer disposed to rely on p in reasoning and
one is no longer disposed to oﬀer p as a reason to anyone who asks, for example. But
having those dispositions is necessary for taking p to be a normative reason at all. Hence
we are disposed to no longer think of p as a normative reason, upon learning that p is false.
If Comesaña and McGrath were right, then this attitude would be mistaken. But they have
not supplied any independent reason for thinking that it is. The challenge to them is to
provide such reason for thinking that we’re incorrect to cease treating p as a reason when
we find out that it’s false.
We can conclude, then, that the Argument from Rationality is unsound. The factive
reading of (1)-(3) still stands.
3.5 The Argument from Incredulity Rejected
As I noted above, the factive reading of (1)-(3) implies that the subject in the bad case is
not a subject who s for a reason. Were I to falsely but blamelessly believe that my airport
boarding gate is about to close and thus start running towards it accordingly, the factive
reading of (1)-(3) would imply that I’m not running for the reason that my gate is about
to close. Since that’s the only candidate for the reason for which I act, it follows that I’m
running for no reason at all. But that is surely a suggestion which should be met with
incredulity, is it not?
In response to this worry I think it should be pointed out that there is plenty which the
proponent of the factive reading can say about the bad case which I think should assuage
the incredulity. The proponent of the factive reading can say that the subject in the bad
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case is -ing because they believe that p, in the rationalising sense of ‘because’; that they
are taking p to be a normative reason and are -ing accordingly; that they are -ing in a
(structurally) rational way; that their own reason for -ing is that p – (4)-(6), on the non-
factive reading, are true of them; and that they are -ing in the light of p, on the non-factive
reading thereof too.
Given all that, one should not find it too diﬃcult to allow that the subject in the bad
case does not also  for a reason. The thought that that result is incredible is driven by the
conflation of the claim that the agent is -ing for no reason with the claim that it is a case
in which the agent is not even so much as taking p to be a reason and -ing accordingly –
it is a case of an agent being merely caused to . But the proponent of the factive reading
of (1)-(3) needn’t say that, for they can say that all of the conditions mentioned in the
preceding paragraph hold in the bad case.
3.6 The Argument from Transparency Rejected
I turn now to the final argument I want to dispatch against the factive reading. I’ve been
exploring the state of -ing for a reason, and in particular I’ve been exploring an issue in
what we can think of as the metaphysics of -ing for a reason: whether it is possible to  for
a reason in the bad case. But there is a certain epistemic issue involving that phenomenon
which I now want to draw attention to. The epistemic issue is this: when one s for the
reason that p, is one always thereby in a position to know that one s for the reason that p?
And relatedly: when one s, but one doesn’t  for the reason that p, is one in a position to
know that one doesn’t? Let’s codify the two epistemic theses:
Reasons-Luminosity+ If S s for the reason that p, then S is in a position to know that
they are -ing for the reason that p.
Reasons-Luminosity- If S s and it is not the case that S s for the reason that p, then S
is in a position to know that they are not -ing for the reason that p.
Let’s call the conjunction of Reasons-Luminosity+ and Reasons-Luminosity-Reasons-
Transparency. In a slogan, Reasons-Transparency says that if one s – if one acts, omits,
believes, desires, intends, hopes, wishes, etc. – then one is always in a position to know
whether or not one is doing so for the reason that p. For any instance of -ing one is
undertaking, it is transparent to one what is going one with one reasons-wise, with respect
to one’s -ing.
As it stands, Reasons-Transparency is in need of some clarification, if it’s to seem at
all plausible. To see why consider the following passage from Dancy (2008):
Its seeming to me as if I am acting in the light of a particular fact is no proof at
all that this fact is really the reason for which I am acting. We just don’t have
68
this sort of access to our reasons. It might well be that I seem to myself to be
acting from pure altruism when in fact my motivation is not at all something
to congratulate myself about. (Dancy, 2008:271)
As Dancy notes, it is possible for a subject to  for the reason that p, while making
a mistake about the reason for which they are -ing. One might  for the reason that
p, yet mistakenly believe that one is -ing for the reason that q, or for no reason at all.
This might happen for a reason internal to the subject. For example, it might happen
because of self-deception on the subject’s part: perhaps they have some reason for not
admitting to themselves that they are -ing for the reason that p because it would reveal
something about their character which they don’t want to admit. But it might be a simple
case of misremembering or confusion on the subject’s part. On the other hand the sort of
error might come about for a reason external to the subject. For example, it might happen
because were the subject to start reflecting on what their reason is for -ing, that would
trigger into action a hypnotist who has set himself the anti-Socratic task of making sure
that people are mistaken about what is going on in their own minds.
Reasons-Transparency is consistent with the possibility of such cases, for the relevant
notion of being in a position to know is weak enough to allow for the possibility of them.
Someone who makes the relevant sorts of mistakes might still be in a position to know
in the sense at issue, they would just not be in a position to exploit their favourable epis-
temic condition in order to arrive at the truth, because of the relevant internal or external
disabling conditions.21 Of course, there might be another sense of ‘being in a position to
know’ where the subjects in the cases at issue are not in a position to know. But if so,
all that follows is that we shouldn’t understand the notion of being in a position to know
utilised by Reasons-Transparency in that way.
What reason is there to endorse Reasons-Transparency? One might wish to endorse
it because one endorses Transparency about every psychological condition, and -ing for
a reason is a psychological condition. A more interesting motivation, however, can be
extracted from the following remarks made by Williamson in the context of a discussion
about the nature of evidence and our possession of it:22
Rational thinkers respect their evidence. Properly understood, that is a plat-
itude. But how can one respect one’s evidence unless one knows what it is?
So must not rational thinkers know what their evidence is? If so, then for ra-
tional subjects the condition that one has such-and-such evidence should be
non-trivial yet luminous. (Williamson, 2000:164)
There is an argument gestured at in this passage which purports to prove that the evi-
dence possessed by the subject is a luminous condition: that the possession or having of a
21See McHugh (2010) for an elaboration and defence of such a weak conception of being in a position to
know.
22It should be noted that Williamson does not himself endorse the argument or arguments in question.
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piece of evidence, in the sense of ‘possessing’ or ‘having’ which interests Comesaña and
McGrath, satisfies one or both of a Luminosity+ and a Luminosity- thesis. What I want
to do now is describe an argument for Reasons-Transparency which can be extracted from
the passage fromWilliamson, with the concept of evidence replaced with that of a reason.
The argument in question is this. -ing in a rational way is something that it is always
in our power to do. If we ever fail to  rationally, that will be because of a mistake on
our part which, as long as our cognitive functions are working properly, we aren’t prone
to self-deception, and we aren’t in a position where an external source would stop us from
being able to exploit an opportunity for knowledge, we can correct for just by reflecting and
reasoning more carefully. But if that’s so, then it must be that we are always in a position
to tell whether or not we’re -ing for the reason that p. For suppose we weren’t. Then in
the situations in question we might still not be able to know what is the reason for which
we believe, if any. But then, how are we to go about changing the rational credentials of
our -ing, with a view to improving it? And if we can’t, then in those circumstances it’s
not in our control to  rationally afterall, contradicting our initial assumption. So Reasons-
Transparency must be true.
I’ve introduced and explained Reasons-Transparency, and I’ve provided a sketch of
two motivations for it. I’m now in a position to state the final argument against the factive
reading of (1)-(3) I want to focus on in this chapter. The argument takes as its starting point
the thought that Reasons-Transparency is true: when one s, one is always in a position
to know whether or not one is -ing for the reason that p. But, the argument continues,
if (1)-(3) are true only in the good case then Transparency is false. That’s because if the
factive reading of (1)-(3) is true, then Reasons-Luminosity- is false. So, (1)-(3) must be
true across good and bad cases. Only then can we secure the sort of infallibility about our
reasons for -ing engendered by the supposedly plausible Reasons-Transparency.
Why does the factive reading of (1)-(3) rule out Reasons-Luminosity-? To see why,
consider the case of the brain-in-a-vat. Suppose the envatted subject believes that it’s
going to rain later on today, because, unbeknownst to them, they’ve been induced to suﬀer
a hallucination of a weather report which told them so. So they believe that it’s going to
rain later because they believe falsely that a reliable weather report told them so. If the
factive reading of (1)-(3) is true, then they don’t believe for a reason, even though they are
not in a position to tell that they don’t believe for a reason. The envatted subject would
believe falsely, were they to reflect on their situation, that they believe that it’s going to
rain later for the reason that a reliable weather report told them so, and they are not in a
position to believe in any other way. So if the factive reading is true, Reasons-Luminosity-
is false.
Although the argument relies only on the thought that the factive reading of (1)-(3)
rules out Reasons-Transparency by ruling out Reasons-Luminosity-, I think it’s worth
noting that the factive reading also serves to undermine Reasons-Luminosity+, too, even
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though it is not straightforwardly inconsistent with it. That’s because the factive reading is
inconsistent with the more interesting way of motivating the Reasons-Transparency thesis
identified above. If the factive reading of (1)-(3) is true, then the brain-in-a-vat is not in a
position to control for whether they believe for a reason anyway. So that undermines the
general thesis that we can always control for the rational credentials of our -ings, which
is one of key premises in the more interesting argument for each Luminosity thesis.
My response to this argument is to accept that the factive reading of (1)-(3) violates
Reasons-Transparency, but to reject Reasons-Transparency anyway. I don’t think there is
good reason to endorse either Reasons-Luminosity+ or Reasons-Luminosity-. To begin
with, let me just state my opposition to the thought that all psychological conditions are
transparent. I think Williamson (2000) does a good job of refuting that suggestion and I
am not going to say anything more about that matter here. Thus, I reject the first way of
motivating Reasons-Transparency.
But what about the more interesting way of motivating Reasons-Transparency? Ac-
cording to the more interesting way of motivating it, the only way to change the rational
credentials of one’s -ing would be to engage in reasoning the outcome of which is a
change to one’s -ing so that its rational credentials are improved. The change would have
to be a change with respect to the reasons for which one is -ing. The further thought is
that this episode of reasoning would have to take a certain shape: it would have to involve
the appearance of a second-order knowledgeable judgement about one’s -ing prior to the
process of reasoning being undertaken, to the eﬀect that it was, or wasn’t, a -ing for the
reason that p. Now if we add to that picture of the sort of reasoning one would have to
engage in in order to bring about positive change to the rational credentials of one’s -ing
the thought that we are always in a position to aﬀect such changes, so that we are always
in a position to engage in such reasoning, we get the result that we’re always in a position
to know whether or not we’re -ing for the reason that p, when we are -ing. So what
we have here is a conception of what it would take to change the rational credentials of
one’s -ing for the better – it would take engaging in an episode of reasoning that involves
the manifestation of a piece of knowledge to the eﬀect that one is currently -ing for the
reason that p – added together with the thought that one is always in a position to change
the rational credentials of one’s -ing for the better.
I think there is room to challenge either claim. It simply isn’t clear what wouldmotivate
the thought that one is always in a position to change the rational credentials of one’s belief
for the better. The thought that we can looks to be an article of faith in the sort of normative
luck convincingly attacked by Williams (1976). But I won’t pursue that line of response
in detail here. Instead, I want to challenge the positive conception of what it would take to
change the rational credentials of one’s -ing for the better operated with by the proponent
of the argument. Here, there are two claims: (i) that changing the rational credentials of
one’s -ing for the better involves engaging in an episode of reasoning and (ii) that the
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episode of reasoning would have to involve a second-order judgement that manifests one’s
knowledge that one is -ing for a certain reason, or no reason at all.
In response, I wish to accept (i), but to reject (ii). (ii) is objectionable because it is not
clear why an episode of entirely first-order reasoning, successfully carried out, should not
be capable of ringing positive changes to the rational credentials of one’s -ing. Consider
an episode of reasoning which results in the changing of the rational credentials of my
belief that Labour will win the by-election. Suppose I reflect on whether I should have that
belief. And suppose I held that belief for no reason, prior tomy engaging in reflection about
it. I might change the status of my belief from irrational to rational just by engaging in first-
order reasoning about Labour’s chances of victory: reasoningwhich focuses entirely on the
relevant facts about the by-election. There need be no second-order judgement to the eﬀect
that I don’t currently believe that Labour will win for a reason in play at all. In general, then,
one can engage in reasoning which results in positive change to the rational credentials of
one’s -ing which does not involve the occurrence of a knowledgeable judgement about
whether one’s -ing is currently a -ing for a reason. (ii) looks false.23
There is a response to these points available to the proponent of (ii) which involves
bringing in the distinction between substantive and structural rationality. The response is
that the argument for Reasons-Luminosity under consideration can be read as utilising the
notion of substantive rationality or as utilising the notion of structural rationality. But, so
the response continues, it is intended to be read as utilising the latter notion. So understood,
the argument would be that one is always in a position to change the structural-rational
credentials of one’s -ing, and that would indeed involve engaging in reasoning which
involves making judgements about the reasons for which one is currently -ing.
But this response does not succeed. Ringing changes to the structural-rational creden-
tials of one’s -ing either consists in engaging in reasoning which involves second-order
judgement or it doesn’t. If it does, the second-order judgement would take the shape not
of a judgement about the reasons for which one is -ing, if any, but a judgement to the
eﬀect that one is in certain mental states which make it structurally rational for one to .
One could then reason from such second-order propositions to a judgement about whether
one ought, in the structural sense, to  and thus to changing the structural-rational creden-
tials of one’s -ing. But if that’s the way the reasoning which results in positive change to
the structural-rational credentials of one’s -ing works, then one can at best conclude, in
conjunction with the thought that we are always in a position to change for the better the
structural-rational credentials of our -ing, that we are always in a position to know what
rationality-making mental states we’re in. But whatever the truth of that claim, that is not
what Reasons-Luminosity says.
On the other hand, ensuring that one is -ing in a structurally rational way might in-
volve engaging only in first-order reasoning. This is indeed how -ing in a structurally
23Compare Williamson (2000:180, 192).
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rational way works, I think: roughly, one counts as coming to  in a structurally rational
way just by engaging in reasoning which one cannot distinguish from an episode of rea-
soning which would be coming to  in response to a genuine reason. But, as we’ve seen,
the latter sorts of episodes need involve the invocation of no second-order judgement. We
can conclude, then, that explicitly operating with the notion of structural rationality, in-
stead of which the notion of substantive rationality, is of no help to the proponent of the
current argument for Reasons-Transparency.
The upshot is that there is nothing to be said in favour of Reasons-Transparency. The
mundane way of motivating it is objectionable. Moreover, the more interesting way of
motivating it relies on a premise to the eﬀect that we’re always in a position to change the
rational credentials of our -ings and the premise that changing the rational credentials of
our -ings is necessarily a matter of engaging in reasoning which is partly second-order.
The first premise is undermotivated and the second looks false. The proponent of the
factive reading of (1)-(3) can thus reject the Transparency Thesis as undermotivated in
turn.
3.7 The Motivating Reasons View Rejected
I’ve defended the factive reading of (1)-(3) against four arguments to the contrary. -ing
for a reason is always to be thought of as -ing in response to a normative reason. What
eﬀect does this have on the issue of whether the Motivating Reasons View is correct?
Well, it looks like theMotivating Reasons View is rendered false by our result, because
it looks like our result renders the Motivating Reasons Postulate false. It renders the Pos-
tulate false because according to the latter, when the agent s for a reason, so that (1)-(3)
are true of them, the sense in which the agent is motivated by a reason is not that they
are motivated by a normative reason. Rather, they are motivated by an item which has a
special status of reason-hood individuated by the rationalising role it plays, where it plays
that rationalising role across both the good case and the bad case. But the argument here
has established that (1)-(3) involve the normative sense of reason-hood. So the postulate
is false: there are no motivating reasons.
It’s important to stress that the claim that there are no motivating reasons sounds need-
lessly paradoxical. That’s because there is an ordinary phenomenon tracked by talk of the
reasons which motivate. The ordinary phenomenon is what’s captured by (1)-(3). When
I say that there are no motivating reasons it might seem as if, absurdly, I’m denying the
existence of that phenomenon. But that’s not what I’m doing. Rather, I’m denying that
a certain interpretation of that phenomenon is correct – the interpretation embodied by
the Motivating Reasons Postulate. That’s how the slogan that there are no such things as
motivating reasons should be understood.
But the proponent of the Motivating Reasons Postulate has a way of responding to
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what I’ve said here. They might try to say that even if the factive reading of (1)-(3) is
true, it doesn’t follow that the Motivating Reasons Postulate, or something true to the
spirit of it anyway, is correct. That’s because the Motivating Reasons Postulate eﬀectively
tells us that the phenomenon of -ing for a reason is a phenomenon which consists in
the obtaining of a state of aﬀairs which grounds the truth of a good case/bad case neutral
rationalising explanation, where the explanation in question takes as its explanans, either
wholly or partly, an item which counts as a reason in a sense diﬀerent from the sense in
which normative reasons are reasons. (1)-(3) do capture a phenomenon worth calling ‘-
ing for a reason’, and it is indeed true that that phenomenon shouldn’t be modelled in the
way described by the Postulate. To the extent that the Postulate was intended to oﬀer us
a theory of the phenomenon captured by (1)-(3), then, it is false. But given what’s been
said here, (4)-(6) read non-factively also capture a phenomenon worth calling ‘-ing for
a reason’, and that phenomenon, which is distinct from that captured by (1)-(3), is apt for
an analysis in terms of the Motivating Reasons Postulate. So the Postulate can live on, in
spite of what’s been said here.
The problem with this is that the phenomenon captured by (4)-(6) read non-factively
do not apply the concept of a reason to anything. So it cannot be that the Postulate is true of
the phenomenon captured by (4)-(6) because the Postulate requires that the phenomenon
in question is one which involves something to which we’re willing to apply a concept of
a reason. There is no way to resurrect the Motivating Reasons Postulate: there really are
no such things as motivating reasons.
3.8 Re-Drawing the Map of the Terrain
The Motivating Reasons View has been refuted. Where does this leave the issues flagged
up in the last chapter? In particular: where does it leave the Dialectic of Psychologism,
which seems premised on the truth of the Motivating Reasons View, and where does it
leave the second component of the Motivating Reasons View – the Primacy of Motivating
Reasons? In this section I’m going to argue that each of those issues is still live even
though the Motivating Reasons View has been refuted. We’ll just have to be careful to
reformulate them in the light of the rejection of the Motivating Reasons Postulate.
3.8.1 The Dialectic of Psychologism
There are three parties to the Dialectic of Psychologism: Davidson, Dancy, and the Neo-
Davidsonians. All players in the debate are proponents of the Motivating Reasons View,
and so would deny the factive reading of (1)-(3). They would all agree that (1)-(3), (4)-
(6) and (7) are true across both good cases and bad, and that they should be interpreted
as applying a concept of a reason distinct from the concept of a normative reason to the
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relevant item and as saying that S is -ing in response to that item. They would take each
of those sentences to report the sort of neutral rationalising explanation that they think is
the only type of rationalising explanation, although there would be disagreement about the
nature of the rationalising explanation in question, as we’ve seen.
Now, there are two issues at the heart of the Dialectic, as standardly conceived. First,
there’s the issue about whether to think of motivating reasons as psychological items. Sec-
ond, there’s the issue of whether to think of rationalisers as motivating reasons. The di-
alectic gets under way because it looks implausible to identify motivating reasons with
psychological items instead of with what the subject takes to be a normative reason. But
it looks implausible also to identify rationalisers with motivating reasons conceived of in
the non-psychologistic way, for then we’d have to deny that rationalising explanation is
factive. The three players in the debate stake out diﬀerent territories in this dialectical
terrain.
However, I take it it’s possible for there to be a debate about the two issues that’s
independent of the truth of the Motivating Reasons View. The issues can be reformulated
in a way that doesn’t require us to endorse the existence of motivating reasons in the special
sense without significant loss. Take the first issue first. Stripped of the usual presumption
in favour ofmotivating reasons, the issue boils down to this: are the reasonswhichmotivate
the agent to  to be identified with psychological items or not? And the second issue
boils down to this: must rationalisers be identified with the reasons which motivate the
agent to ? The notion of a reason which motivates in play here is the ordinary notion
expressed in sentences (1)-(3), not the special notion of a motivating reason. The players
in the Psychologism Dialectic make the mistake of identifying that ordinary notion with
the special notion of a motivating reason, and so they end up casting the debate, and their
positions with respect to it, in the terms they do. But a neutral casting of the debate is
possible, and that’s just what I’ve supplied.
It might be that re-cast, the issues here are more easily solvable than they were when
cast in terms of the special notion of a motivating reason. But the point for the moment
is just that they can be re-cast, so that the debate is still live. I attempt to settle the re-cast
first issue in the next chapter and I attempt to make some initial headway of resolving the
re-cast second issue there too.
3.8.2 The Primacy of Motivating Reasons
The Primacy of Motivating Reasons says that we should oﬀer a Reductive account of what
it is for an agent to  in response to a normative reason, where that Reductive account is
cashed out in terms of the special notion of a motivating reason, as defined by the Moti-
vating Reasons Postulate.
It should be easy to see how to abstract the central issue here from the Motivating
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Reasons Postulate: it is possible to subscribe to a Reductionist account of the good case
whilst denying the Postulate. That would amount to saying that the success phenomenon
of -ing in response to the normative reason that p consists in -ing in a way that’s subject
to the sort of neutral rationalising explanation paradigmatically reported by psychologistic
rationalising statements, plus further factors present in the good case which are, together
with the explanatory condition, suﬃcient for one to count as -ing in response to a reason.
The Primacy of Motivating Reasons makes the mistake of taking it that rationalising
explanations are always to be written in terms of the special notion of a motivating reason,
and thus makes the mistake of thinking that a Reductive account of the good case must
always take the shape of an account which reduces -ing in response to a normative reason
to -ing for a motivating reason, plus whatever further factors need to be added in order
to generate success. But Reductionism need only take this form if there are such things as
motivating reasons, and it’s been established that that’s an empty category. From now on,
I’ll be understanding Reductionism in the neutral way just described.
Again, one might think that the material presented in this chapter puts us in a better
position to refute the Reductionist account of the good case than we were when the Moti-
vating Reasons View was a live option. Whatever the truth of that idea, all that’s important
to note for now is that oﬀering a Reductive account of the good case needn’t take the form
of accounting for the good case in terms of -ing for a motivating reason plus extra fac-
tors. It can take the more neutral form of -ing in a way that’s subject to a neutral type of
rationalising explanation, which is the only type of rationalising explanation there is, plus
the relevant extra factors.
3.9 A Merely Linguistic Dispute?
In this chapter I’ve been engaging in a debate that has been advertised as a debate about
the meaning of certain types of sentence: (1)-(3). I’ve argued that we need to read them as
applying the concept of a normative reason, so that they report the condition of -ing in
response to a normative reason and are hence only true in good cases. But why is such a
linguistic debate interesting from the philosophical point of view? We might have learned
something about the English language: that certain types of sentences belonging to it are
true only in certain sorts of cases, and that the word ‘reason’ doesn’t have a distinctive
meaning when it comes to the notion of being motivated by a reason, but why should
those linguistic results be of any interest?
One immediate point to make is that the linguistic results here refute the Motivating
Reasons Postulate, which is itself a significant result.
A further quite weak point tomake at the outset is of an ad hominem character. Philoso-
phers like Dancy, Turri, Setiya, Schroeder, Comesaña and McGrath, and many others who
haven’t been explicitly discussed here, clearly ascribe philosophical importance to the idea
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that the agent s for a reason even in the bad case. That claim is put to work in arguments
by some of those philosophers, whereas others go to significant lengths in order to argue
for it. The philosophers in question clearly ascribe importance to it, then, for whatever
reason. The present chapter refutes the claim that agent’s  for reasons in bad cases. That
result will trouble the philosophers in question and that in itself carries some significance.
But the results here are not merely linguistic anyway. For the results here tell us some-
thing about the metaphysics of -ing for reasons, and they tell us something about the
conceptual repertoire we employ when we think of agents as -ing for reasons, as I now
wish to detail.
First, the metaphysical consequences of what has been established here. I take it that
establishing that (1)-(3) are true only in the good case tells us something about what it is to
 for a reason. It tells us that -ing for a reason consists not in standing in some relation to
a rationalising item that has the status of a reason and which is present, playing the relevant
role, even in the bad case. Rather, -ing for a reason consists in standing in some relation
– the ‘responding to’ relation – to an item which favours one’s -ing. 24
Second, there are conceptual consequences of what has been established here. I take
it that establishing that (1)-(3) are true only in the good case tells us something about
what the concept of a reason in play in (1)-(3) amounts to. It tells us that that concept is
the concept of a normative reason. An upshot of this is that at most, we have only two
concepts of a reason: the concept of a normative reason and the concept of an explanatory
reason. We apply the former concept in cases where we’re thinking of a fact as having
a certain sort of normative dimension, and in contexts in which we’re thinking of the
agent as -ing for a reason. We apply the latter whenever we endorse an explanation why
something is the case. The two concepts might well overlap: it might be that a fact could be
both a normative reason and an explanatory reason and indeed later on I’ll be arguing that
in addition to the sort of neutral rationalising explanations reported paradigmatically by
psychologistic rationalising statements there is a type of rationalising explanation which
takes as explanantia normative reasons. Normative reasons can be the explanantia of such
rationalising explanations precisely because of the normative dimension they display. So
later on I’ll be arguing not just that normative reasons can also be explanatory reasons, but
also that they get to play the second role by dint of playing the first.25
So I have not merely been engaging in a linguistic dispute in this chapter. Another way
in which the results of this chapter are significant is that they provide us with a basis for a
response to an influential argument in favour of Psychologism, as we shall see in the next
chapter. Moreover, they help us undermine the conception of rationalising explanation at
the heart of the Reductionist’s position, as we shall see in Chapter Five.
24Indeed, I’ve sometimes switched from a linguistic way of talking about the issues to a metaphysical way
of talking about them.
25This is a position defended by Raz (2011). See also Alvarez (2010) and Roessler (2014).
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Chapter 4
The Dialectic of Psychologism
Consider the following passage fromMichael Smith’s The Humean Theory of Motivation:
. . . the claim that is, as I understand it, constitutive of the Humean theory – is
the claim that motivation has its source in the presence of a relevant desire and
means-end belief. This claim finds more formal expression in the following
principle:
P1. R at t constitutes a motivating reason for agent A to  iﬀ there is some
 such that R at t consists of a desire of A to  and a belief that were he
to  he would  .
(Smith, 1987:36)
Here Smith identifies the reasons whichmotivate the subject to act with states of believ-
ing and desiring belonging to the subject: the desire specifying the goal the agent pursues
in acting, the belief the information that so acting is a way of achieving that goal. These
states are the subject’s motivating reasons for action, and they are distinguished from the
agent’s normative reasons for action.1 Smith is a proponent of Psychologism about the
agent’s reasons for action. He is also a proponent of the Motivating Reasons View, so that
his preferred version of Psychologism is written in terms which presuppose the existence
of motivating reasons in the special sense.
There are no such things as motivating reasons in the special sense, as we have seen.
So Smith’s view is already in need of some modification. However, even if we reject
the Motivating Reasons View we are still left with the following question: should we
identify the reasons for which the subject s with psychological items possessed by the
subject? We’re ignoring the contribution made by any relevant conative state in this area
and focusing entirely on the belief the subject has, the content of which is what gets taken
to be a normative reason to  by the subject. So the question becomes: should we identify
1Smith (1987:§.2)
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the reasons for which the subject s with states or facts of believing that p, where p is
what the subject takes to be a normative reason for them to ? This chapter argues for a
negative answer to that question and instead suggests, following Dancy and a good deal of
other contemporary philosophers, that the reasons which motivate the agent to  are what
the subject takes to be the reasons in favour of their -ing.
However, that answer to the first question complicates our assessment of a second
question: should we identify the reasons which motivate the agent to with the explanans
of the rationalising explanation to which the agent’s -ing is subject, when they  for a
reason? If we say that the reason for which the subject s is just that p, then won’t we have
to deny that explanation why is factive, as Dancy does?
All of this is just to introduce, in a diﬀerent way, the Dialectic of Psychologism, which
should already be familiar. There are two issues to be addressed here:
The Psychologism Question. Are the reasons for which the subject s to be identified
with psychological items belonging to the subject?
The Explanatory Question. When the agent s for a reason, is the explanans of the ra-
tionalising explanation to which their -ing is subject to be identified with the reason
for which they ?
To repeat, these issues are to be interpreted here without a presumption in favour of
the Motivating Reasons View, so that the notion of a reason which motivates the subject to
 at work in the questions above is the ordinary notion utilised by (1)-(3), not the special
notion of a motivating reason, which has been shown to be empty.
There are two preliminary points to be made. First, the phenomenon we’re focusing
on is the phenomenon of -ing for the reason that p. That is the phenomenon paradigmati-
cally reported using sentences (1)-(3). Putting aside whether the factive reading of (1)-(3)
is true for a moment, isn’t the Psychologism Question simply settled in favour of Anti-
Psychologism anyway, given that sentences (1)-(3) quite clearly identify what the agent
takes to be a normative reason – namely p – with the reason for which the agent s? And
if that’s so, why do we need to give that question substantive treatment in this chapter?
Some thought like this is what motivates Setiya to suggest that:
The doctrine of ‘psychologism’, according to which the reasons for which
we act are always states of, or facts about, our own psychology, is hopeless.
(Setiya, 2011:132)
The response to this is simply that the proponent of Psychologism does indeed have
ways of dealing with the worry, as we shall see in more detail later on. Thus, the present
thought that the debate over Psychologism can simply be finessed in favour of Anti-Psycho-
logism in the way described is, it will turn out, untrue.
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I will proceed in this chapter as follows. §§4.1-4.2 take up the Psychologism Question.
§4.1 presents and defends two arguments in favour of Anti-Psychologism. §4.2 identifies
and rejects two arguments in favour of Psychologism, which I take to be the strongest avail-
able. Finally, §4.3 makes a start on the Explanatory Question. The Explanatory Question
cannot be completely answered prior to the results of Chapter Five, in which it is argued
that there are two types of rationalising explanation: a neutral type the explanans of which
is the fact that the subject believes that p and an essentially successful type, the explanans
of which is the fact that p, qua normative reason. The burden of §4.3 is to merely unpack
my positive answer to the Explanatory Question, how the conclusion of the next chapter
delivers it, and to relate it the positions on the Explanatory Question already presented.
This sets things up for a solution to the Explanatory Question to come as a corollary of the
argument of the next chapter.
4.1 Two Arguments for Anti-Psychologism Defended
This section presents and defends two arguments for Anti-Psychologism. §4.1.1 focuses
on a linguistic argument and §4.1.2 focuses on an argument which appeals to the idea that
Psychologism has some counter-intuitive results. Before I begin, a preliminary point is in
order. I distinguished in Chapter Two between a state version of Psychologism and a fact
version of Psychologism. This section provides arguments against Psychologism in gen-
eral. Each argument to be considered is eﬀective against both versions of Psychologism.
4.1.1 The Linguistic Argument
The first argument I focus on is The Linguistic Argument.2 The claim to be established
is that when the agent s for a reason, the reason for which they  is that p, and not their
believing that p or that they believe that p. Presented slightly diﬀerently: the condition
of being motivated to  by a reason – the condition picked out by (1)-(3) – is a condition
which involves an item that has the status of a reason, and the claim to be established is
that the item in question is p, not the agent’s believing that p or that they believe that p.
The linguistic argument focuses on (4)-(6):
(4) S’s reason for -ing is that p
(5) S’s basis for -ing is that p
(6) S’s ground for -ing is that p
The proponent of the Linguistic Argument says that the correct semantics for (4)-(6)
implies that Anti-Psychologism is true.
2Proponents of the Linguistic Argument include: Miller (2008) and Alvarez (2010:131).
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In order to enable us to get a grip on the Argument, let’s focus on the following instance
of (4):
(4a) My reason for believing that Labour will win the by-election is that the exit-poll
predicts a Labour victory
The proponent of the Linguistic Argument makes the following claims about (4a): (i)
the copula ‘is’ which appears in (4a) is the ‘is’ of identity, and (ii) the that-clause which
appears in it denotes what the subject believes. So the proponent of the Linguistic Argu-
ment says that we should think of (4a) as identifying my reason with what I believe: that
the exit-poll predicts a Labour victory. More generally, the proponent of the Linguistic Ar-
gument says that any sentence of form (4)-(6) is in the business of identifying the subject’s
reason with what they believe about the situation.
It is not diﬃcult to see how this supposedly natural semantics for (4)-(6) delivers us the
result that an Anti-Psychologism about what gets characterised by (4)-(6) as the subject’s
reason/basis/ground is true. For on the natural semantics the subject’s reason is identified
by those sentences with the referent of the relevant that-clause. And the referent of the
relevant that-clause is what the subject takes to be a normative reason, it is not the subject’s
state of believing that p or the fact that they believe it.
If we were working with the assumption that (4)-(6) always mean the same as (1)-(3)
then we could readily conclude that Anti-Psychologism is correct. For Anti-Psychologism
is a thesis concerning what gets picked out by (1)-(3), and if (4)-(6) just mean the same
as (1)-(3) then, given that (4)-(6) identify the subject’s reasons with what they believe, as
opposed to their believing it or that they believe it, we’d get the result that (1)-(3) do so
too.
But we are precisely not operating with the assumption that (4)-(6) must always mean
the same as (1)-(3). How, then, do the linguistic considerations which yield an Anti-
Psychologism about what gets characterised as the subject’s reason by (4)-(6) deliver us
Anti-Psychologism about -ing for reasons – the condition denoted by (1)-(3)?3
(4)-(6) admit of a factive reading, on which they do mean the same as (1)-(3) and a
non-factive reading, on which they don’t. On the first, the phrase ‘the subject’s reason’
is intended to characterise the item in question as a reason. On the second, the phrase
serves to characterise the item only as something that counts as a normative reason from
the subject’s own point of view, and hence doesn’t apply a concept of a reason to the item
in question.
Read either way, the semantics described has initial plausibility. The only diﬀerence
would be that read in the factive way, the semantics generates the result there is something
3Alvarez and Miller are insensitive to this question because they assume that (4)-(6) must always mean the
same as (1)-(3). What follows, then, should be advertised as a developed version of the argument they oﬀer.
They are not, strictly speaking, proponents of precisely the argument I state here.
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that is designated as a reason by (4)-(6), and that item is identified by (4)-(6) with the
referent of the relevant that-clause. On the non-factive reading, what gets identified with
the referent of the relevant that-clause is not something which also gets characterised as a
reason by (4)-(6) but something that gets characterised as an apparent normative reason.
On the factive reading, (4)-(6) have the same meaning as (1)-(3). The semantics de-
scribed is plausible for the factive reading and it establishes an Anti-Psychologism about
the condition reported by (4)-(6) on the factive reading. So we get the result that Anti-
Psychologism concerning the condition reported by (1)-(3) is true too, which just is our
desired conclusion.
It’s worth noting that there is a more direct way of utilising linguistic considerations
in order to prove Anti-Psychologism. Let’s focus on (1b)-(3b):
(1b) The reason for which S ed/is -ing is that p
(2b) The basis on which S ed/is -ing is that p
(3b) The grounds on which S ed/is -ing is that p
The emphasised copula in each of (1b)-(3b) can naturally be read as an ‘is’ of identity.
Thus, (1b)-(3b) seem to identify the reason/basis/grounds on which S has ed or is -
ing with what gets denoted by the relevant that-clause: what the subject believes, and not
their believing of it, or the fact that they believe it. Since (1b)-(3b) quite clearly mean the
same as their (1a)-(3a) counterparts and hence denote the condition of -ing for a reason,
it follows directly that Psychologism is false and Anti-Psychologism true. In short, the
same style of argument which takes us from (4)-(6) to Anti-Psychologism can be applied
to (1b)-(3b) to get us that same result more directly.
The phrase the Linguistic Argument will be used to denote the argument which takes
us from the supposedly natural semantics for (4)-(6), to the truth of Anti-Psychologism,
via the thought that the semantics is plausible for (4)-(6) on the factive reading. The more
direct alternative to the Linguistic Argument will feature in the discussion below but be-
cause much of the literature in this area focuses on (4)-(6) instead of on (1b)-(3b),4 I will
continue to focus for the most part on the former set of sentences and the argument for
Anti-Psychologism associated with it.
That concludes my presentation of the Linguistic Argument. I now want to describe
and respond to a problemwith it. The basic problem is that there is an alternative semantics
for (4)-(6) available which coheres with Psychologism. I call this alternative semantics the
Pyror semantics, because it was first suggested by Pryor (2007). I’ll refer to the supposedly
natural semantics as the orthodox semantics.
4Including, as we will see momentarily, work which has been done by way of refuting the Linguistic Argu-
ment.
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According to the Pryor semantics, we should accept (ii),5 but reject (i) in favour of the
claim that the copulawhich appears in (4a) functions to specify the content of amental state
picked out by the singular term ‘my reason’, as it appears in (4a). On this view, we shouldn’t
think of (4a) as telling us that the agent’s reason is identical to what gets designated by
the relevant that-clause. Rather, we should think of the phrase ‘my reason’ as it appears
in (4a) as denoting a mental states of the subject. And we should think of the copula as
functioning to specify the content of the mental state in question, by appeal to what gets
denoted by the relevant that-clause. On the Pryor semantics, then, (4a) doesn’t identify
the agent’s reason with anything at all, but rather picks out a certain mental state which
is itself to be thought of as the agent’s reason and oﬀers us a specification of its content.
More generally, Pryor suggests that (4)-(6) are not in the business of identifying the agent’s
reasons/bases/grounds with what gets denoted by he relevant that clause, but rather serve
to specify the content of the mental state picked out by ‘S’s reason/basis/ground’ by appeal
to the referent of the that-clause.6
An analogy which Pryor himself draws with propositional attitude ascriptions might
help to bring the Pryor semantics into clearer focus. Consider the following pair:
(8a) S’s belief is that p
(8b) S’s belief is long-standing
According to a familiar view about propositional attitude ascriptions, such ascriptions
are ambiguous between a state and a content reading. On a state reading, the propositional
attitude ascriptions tells us something about the subject’s state of believing. On the con-
tent reading, the ascriptions tells us something about what is believed: the content of the
subject’s belief.
That standard view about propositional attitude ascriptions is supported by reflection
on (8a) and (8b). For let’s suppose that ‘S’s belief’ always refers to S’s state of believing.
Since it’s natural to think that the ‘is’ which appears in (8a) is the ‘is’ of identity, we’d
get the result that (8a) is at least false if not unintelligible because it identifies S’s state of
belief with what gets denoted by the that-clause which appears in it. So we must instead
read ‘S’s belief’ as it appears in (8a) as denoting the content of S’s belief. That way we
can read the whole sentence as identifying the content of S’s belief with the referent of the
relevant that-clause. But we shouldn’t think of ‘S’s belief’ as it appears in (8b) as referring
to the content of S’s belief. For the content of S’s belief is not itself long-standing. What’s
5Although Pryor does in fact raise several objections to the claim that that-clauses are referring devices.
6Strictly speaking, Pryor distinguishes between the familiar ‘is’ of predication from what he calls the ‘is’ of
specification. He argues against identifying the copula which appears in (4)-(6) with the ‘is’ of predication
(Pryor, 2007:§.6) and instead suggests that we should identify it with the ‘is’ of specification (ibid.:§.7). I
run roughshod over this distinction because it isn’t necessary to go into it for my purposes.
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being referred to and qualified as long-standing is, rather, S’s state of believing. Thus, we
get the result that ‘S’s belief’ has a state and a content reading.7
For reasons that need not concern us, Pryor argues that we should reject the orthodox
suggestion that ‘S’s belief’ is ambiguous between a state and a content reading. He sug-
gests instead that we should think of ‘S’s belief’ as always referring to S’s state of believing
and we should reject the idea that the copula in (8a) is an ‘is’ of identity. Instead, Pryor
suggests, we should read the copula as functioning to specify the content of the belief by
appeal to what gets denoted by the relevant that-clause. (8a) says that S’s belief has the
content: p. Both (8a) and (8b) talk about S’s state of believing.
What goes for (8a) goes for (4a) and for (4)-(6) more generally, according to Pryor.
Just as we should think of ‘S’s belief’ in (8a) as referring to S’s state of believing and then
read the whole sentence as specifying the content of the belief, so we should think of ‘my
reason’ in (4a) as referring to a mental state and read (4a) as specifying the content of the
state in question by appeal to what gets denoted by the relevant that-clause.
It’s easy to see how the Pryor semantics would, if true, undermine the Linguistic Ar-
gument. Were the Pryor semantics true, the orthodox semantics for (4)-(6) would be false.
So the starting point for the Linguistic Argument would be undermined. This objection
to the linguistic argument however, is not decisive, I have only tried to show that the ar-
gument as it stands is inconclusive. The thought is that as long as there is no argument
in favour of the orthodox semantics or against the Pryor semantics oﬀered, the Linguistic
Argument is dialectically ineﬀective.
Moreover, the Pryor semantics, if true, rules out the more direct linguistic argument
for Anti-Psychologism which appeals to (1b)-(3b). For it is possible to construct an ana-
logue of the Pryor semantics for (1b)-(3b). The analogue semantics would say that the
emphasised copula in (1b)-(3b) is not an ‘is’ of identity but an ‘is’ of specification. What
the referent of the relevant that-clause denotes is the content of the mental state which
gets referred to by the descriptive phrases ‘the reason for which’, ‘the basis on which’, and
‘the grounds on which’ in (1b), (2b), and (3b) respectively. The ensuing dialectical situ-
ation would then be the same for the proponent of the idea that the correct semantics for
(1b)-(3b) deliver us the truth of Anti-Psychologism.
So the possible truth of the Pryor semantics undermines the Linguistic Argument and
its more direct cousin. I want to reject the Pryor semantics in favour of the orthodox
semantics, thus rescuing the Linguistic Argument and its more direct cousin from the
dialectical bind they find themselves in.
Before I do that, however, there is a point worth drawing attention to. I noted in the
introduction to this chapter that Psychologism looks to be a doctrine that’s obviously false,
given that (1)-(3) seem clearly to identify p with the reason for which the subject s. But
we’re now in a position to see how the proponent of Psychologism might accept (1)-(3)
7The same goes for analogous noun phrases associated with other types of propositional attitude.
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consistently with their view that the reason for which the subject s is their belief, or the
fact that they have the relevant belief. For the proponent of Psychologism can and should
accept the idea that whenever we have a sentence which concatenates a copula with a
that-clause so that it seems as if something that’s being designated as a reason is being
identified with the referent of the relevant that-clause, what is really going on is that the
copula is functioning to specify the content of a mental state of believing being picked out
by whatever phrase is doing the work of characterising the relevant item as a reason.8 The
proponent of Psychologism can and should adopt the Pryor semantics for (4)-(6) and an
analogue of the Pryor semantics for any other sentence types – including (1b)-(3b) – that
would look to cause them trouble. This is enough to fend oﬀ Setiya’s suggestion that the
Question of Psychologism can simply be finessed in favour of Anti-Psychologism.
The Pryor semantics for (4)-(6) is, however, implausible. I now want to raise two
problems for it. The first is an objection, the second is an attempt to shift the burden of
proof.
The first problem I want to raise is that if the Pryor Semantics is correct, then we
should expect to be able to make sense of sentences which predicate properties to what
gets denoted by the expression ‘S’s reason’, which appears in sentences of type (4), that are
properties of propositional attitudes the subject has. The issue is that such sentences sound
very odd, and appear to constitute category errors. Consider the following sentences:
(9a) S’s reason for -ing has persisted throughout S’s life
(9b) I caused S’s reason for  by telling her that p
(9c) S’s reason for -ing is justified
(9d) S’s reason for -ing was hastily formed
If the Pryor semantics is right, then we should be able to make ready sense of (9a)–
(9d). But, as I say, the sentences are odd to say the least. Suppose, for example, that Tim’s
reason for riding his bike to work is that it will cut down on petrol costs. Does it sound
correct to say, as the Pryor semantics seems committed to thinking it is, that Tim’s reason
has persisted throughout his life?
8It’s worth noting at this stage that the Pryor semantics, were it true, wouldn’t cohere well with fact Psy-
chologism, only state Psychologism. For the copula is said, by the proponent of the Pryor semantics, to
specify the content of a state, not to characterise the character of a certain fact. Indeed, it’s not clear whether
there is a type of copula which performs a role with respect to facts as Pryor’s specificational copula does
with respect to states of mind. Thus, linguistic considerations might still be thought to count against fact
Psychologism, for the only options with respect to the semantics of (4)-(6) – the orthodox semantics and
the Pryor semantics – get us the result that fact Psychologism is false. But that doesn’t serve to undermine
the main point being made here, which is that the availability of the Pryor semantics renders the Linguistic
Argument inconclusive. For that argument purports to rule out Psychologism in general, and thus prove
Anti-Psychologism true.
85
Now, it should be noted that the claim here isn’t that (9a)-(9d) sound odd no matter
what the corresponding instance of (4)-(6) is. If S’s reason for -ing is that they believe
that p, or that they desire to  , for example, then the relevant instance of (9a)-(9d) might
be readily intelligible – ‘S reason for -ing has persisted throughout S’s life’ makes ready
sense if the corresponding instance of (4) is ‘S’s reason for -ing is that they desire to  ’,
for example. The present point is just that (9a)-(9d) should always be readily intelligible
if the Pryor semantics is true, no matter what the corresponding instance of (4)-(6) is. But
that isn’t so, for when S’s reason for -ing is some state of the world, as it is in the example
I selected above, (9a)-(9d) will come out as counter-intuitive.
Moreover, the objection here can be extended to the analogue of the Pryor semantics for
(1b)-(3b), thus rescuing the orthodox semantics for those sentence types and rescuing, in
turn, the more direct linguistic argument for Anti-Psychologism. Consider the following:
(10a) The reason for which S s has persisted throughout S’s life
(10b) I caused the reason for which S s by telling her that p
(10c) The reason for which S s is justified
(10d) The reason for which S ed was hastily formed
If the analogue of the Pryor semantics for (1b)-(3b) were true, then we should be able
to make ready sense of (10a)-(10d), at least when the corresponding instances of (4)-(6)
concern states of the world. But, again, such sentences sound quite odd indeed.
There is a second problem for the Pryor semantics which I now want to discuss, the
point of which is to shift the onus of proof onto the proponent of it. It concerns what sense
the proponent of the Pryor semantics can make of the idea that it is possible for agent’s to
 on the basis of good or the right reasons, statuses which I take to amount to the same
thing.
What I want to suggest, first of all, is that the proponent of the Pryor semantics is
committed to thinking that when we say of an agent that they have ed or are -ing for
good reasons, what we are doing is predicating the mental state of believing which the
proponent of the view is committed to thinking of as the agent’s reason. The phrase ‘good
reason’ in other words, functions to predicate some property of themental state of believing
picked out by the phrases ‘S’s reason/basis/grounds for -ing’ as it appears in sentences
(4)-(6), according to the Pryor Semantics.
To see this, consider the sentences:
(11) Arthur’s reason for visiting the zoo is a good one
The proponent of the orthodox semantics is committed to saying, about (11), that it
predicates the property of being a good reason to what gets denoted by the that-clause
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which would appear in the corresponding instance of (4). For they think the referent of
‘Arthur’s reason’ is identified with the referent of the that-clause by the corresponding
instance of (4), and (11) predicates the property of being a good reason to whatever the
referent is of the relevant that-clause. So (11) ascribes the property of being a good reason
to what the subject believes.
The proponent of the orthodox semantics can thus say that when we ascribe the prop-
erty of being a good reason to the subject’s reason using a sentence like (11), the property
we have in mind is simply the property of being a normative reason – the property of being
a reason in favour of the subject’s -ing. That’s because what the agent believes is the sort
of thing that could be a normative reason – it is the sort of thing that could be a fact which
favours -ing. So what the proponent of the orthodox semantics could say about (11) is
that it says that Arthur is acting on the basis of a genuine reason in favour of his action,
although it does not tell us what that reason is. They can say this, moreover, whether the
phrase ‘Arthur’s reason’ is read factively or non-factively, although if it were read factively
then (11) would be trivial.
The proponent of the Pryor semantics, by contrast, is committed to saying that the
referent of the phrase ‘S’s reason’ is a mental state of believing the agent is in – a mental
state which partly constitutes the subject taking a certain factor to be a normative reason
for their -ing. It is that mental itemwhich is the agent’s reason for -ing. So what is being
predicated with the property of being a good reason by (11) is a mental state of believing
the subject is in, not what the agent believes.
The upshot of this is that the proponent of the Pryor semantics is committed to say-
ing something particularly contentious about what property we have in mind when we
predicate the property of being a good reason using a sentence like (11). What they are
committed to saying is that the property being predicated cannot be the property of being
a normative reason, for the agent’s belief is not a reason in favour of their -ing.
Why is it problematic to deny that the property of being a good reason ascribed by
sentences like (11) is not the property of being a normative reason? To see why, consider
the following inference:
Good Reasons Inference
(I) S’s reason for -ing is that p
(II) S’s reason for -ing is a good reason
(C) P is a good reason for S to 
The Goods Reasons Inference is valid, on the face of it. One way of explaining why
it’s valid is that (I) identifies S’s reason with p and (II) ascribes the property of being a
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normative reason to whatever S’s reason is, thus giving us the result that p has the property
of being a normative reason for S to , which is what (C) says. That account of the validity
of the inference is open only to the proponent of the orthodox semantics, of course.
Thus, the proponent of the Pryor semantics owes us a fresh account of the validity of
the inference which coheres with their favoured semantics for sentences (4)-(6) and (11).
But I don’t want to press the point that there is no such account available. Want I want
to suggest is simply that at first glance, the Good Reasons Inference concludes that p is a
normative reason for S to . After all, that is what sentences of type (C) are usually used
to assert, and we’d need an argument to convince us that in the context generated by the
Good Reasons Inference, things are radically diﬀerent. And, moreover, at first glance the
argument utilises a single sense of good reasonhood. On the face of it, that is, there is no
transition from one use of the phrase ‘good reason’ in (II) to a second, quite diﬀerent use
of the phrase by (C). On the face of it, the phrase ‘good reason’ is used univocally.
This is not, of course, a decisive point against the Pryor semantics. But it does serve
to shift the onus of proof onto the proponent of the Pryor semantics. Unlike the orthodox
semantics, the Pryor Semantics is saddled with the thought that when we utter sentences
like (11) we are ascribing a property using the phrase ‘good reason’ which is diﬀerent
from the property of being a normative reason, and they are thus committed to thinking
that (C) isn’t ascribing the property of a normative reason to p or else that it is but that the
Good Reasons Inference doesn’t use the phrase ‘good reason’ univocally. On the face of
it, neither of those claims is true. Thus, the proponent of the Pryor Semantics will need
to present us with an argument for their favoured semantics. In the absence of such an
argument, the Pryor Semantics should be rejected in favour of the Orthodox Semantics.
I’ve been focusing on the Linguistic Argument and thus on sentences (4)-(6), but an
analogous point holds with respect to the more direct cousin on the Linguistic Argument
which focuses instead on (1b)-(3b). The analogue of the Pryor semantics with respect
to those sentences is likewise committed to the thought that ‘the reason/basis/grounds for
which/on which S s’, as those expressions appear in (1b)-(3b), function to pick out mental
states of the subject and hence when we say of the item picked out by those phrases that
it is a good reason what we’re doing is ascribing a certain property to the relevant mental
state. An analogue of the Good Reasons Inferences involving (1b)-(3b) would then prove
that the onus is on the non-orthodox treatment of (1b)-(3b).
In conclusion then, merely pointing out that there is an alternative semantics for (4)-(6)
available which undermines the Linguistic Argument is no good because the alternative
semantics is one which will need to be motivated, if it’s to be acceptable. The orthodox
semantics should be our default. Moreover, the alternative semantics is independently
objectionable anyway. These points apply in equal measure to the analogue of the Pryor
semantics for (1b)-(3b) which is supposed to undermine the more direct cousin of the
Linguistic Argument too.
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4.1.2 The Counter-Intuitiveness Argument
In this section I develop and defend an argument for Anti-Psychologism promoted by
Dancy (2000). Let’s begin with a statement of the argument. Dancy markets the argument
as an argument against the fact version of Psychologism.9 Consider once again statements
(1)-(3):
(1a) S ed/is -ing for the reason that p
(1b) The reason for which S ed/is -ing is that p
(2a) S ed/is -ing on the basis of p
(2b) The basis on which S ed/is -ing is that p
(3a) S ed/is -ing on the grounds that p
(3b) The grounds on which S ed/is -ing is that p
Dancy’s thought is that if one thinks that the reasons for which the agent s are always
facts about what the agent believes, then one will have to think of (1)-(3) as being elliptical
for:
(1a*) S ed/is -ing for the reason that they believe that p
(1b*) The reason for which S ed/is -ing is that they believe that p
(2a*) S ed/is -ing on the basis of the fact that they believe that p
(2b*) The basis on which S ed/is -ing is that they believe that p
(3a*) S ed/is -ing on the grounds that they believe that p
(3b*) The grounds on which S ed/is -ing is that they believe that p
The problem is that (1*)-(3*) are counter-intuitive in a way that the following example
brings out:
9There is another argument to be found in Dancy against the state version of Psychologism (Dancy,
2000:103-106). According to that argument, when the agent s for a good reason, the reason for which
the agent s is identical to the normative reason in response to which they are -ing. It follows that the
reasons which motivate the agent to  must be the right sort of things to be normative reasons – they must
occupy an ontological category such that, in so far as they belong to that category, it is possible for them to
be normative reason. But normative reasons are facts whereas if the state version of Psychologism is true,
the reasons which motivate would be states. Since states are not the right sort of thing to be fact, it follows
that the reasons which motivate cannot be psychological states. I do not comment on this argument in the
main body of the text. I do, however, think it’s defensible and it’s worth noting that the argument of the last
chapter commits me to Dancy’s claim that the reason for which one s in the good case is identical to the
normative reason in response to which one s.
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Consider a case where my reason for acting is genuinely that I believe that p.
For instance, that I believe that the cliﬀ is crumbling is my reason for avoiding
climbing it, because having that belief I am more likely to fall oﬀ (I will get
nervous). This is a case where that I believe what I do is genuinely my reason
for action. . .But this is a quite unusual situation, not at all the normal case.
Normally, I suppose that if things are not as I believe them to be, I do not in
fact have the reason that I take myself to have. It would be quite peculiar to
suppose that no practical reasons are like this, and that all are of the special
sort that we found in the case of the crumbly cliﬀ. (Dancy, 2000:124)
Dancy’s plausible suggestion is that at the intuitive level, (1*)-(3*) are not true in
ordinary contexts. This is brought out by the plausible thought that one only s for the
reason that one believes that p in the special circumstances in which one treats the fact
that one believes that p itself as a reason in favour of one’s -ing. That we recognise these
circumstances to be unusual is what brings it out that, intuitively, it is not the case that
one’s reason for -ing is always the fact that one believes that p. But the fact version of
Psychologism is committed to saying that the (1*)-(3*) are true in ordinary contexts. So
the fact version of Psychologism is committed to the denial of something that’s intuitively
compelling. Thus the onus of proof is on the proponent of fact Psychologism.
The argument against fact Psychologism just rehearsed can be readily generalised to
state Psychologism, so that it is eﬀective against Psychologism in general and delivers us
a powerful reason to be Anti-Psychologistic. To achieve the generalisation, we’d have to
replace the that-clause which appears in (1*)-(3*) with a phrase that picks out the corre-
sponding psychological state of the subject: ‘S’s belief that p’, or ‘S’s believing that p’. We
could then run the same example to show that the resultant sentences are counter-intuitive
in ordinary contexts, which would in turn shift the burden of proof onto state Psycholo-
gism.
Now, the argument so far has one significant dialectical feature: it is not decisive. It
is an argument which serves to shift the burden of proof onto Psychologism. In §4.2 I
will be attempting to undermine the best arguments in favour of Psychologism. So I could
rest content with an onus shifting move here. But instead I want to develop the argument
already rehearsed into a decisive argument in favour of Anti-Psychologism and leave the
onus shifting argument of Dancy in the background. The resultant decisive argument is
what I’m going to call the Counter-Intuitiveness Argument.
Dancy’s plausible suggestion is that at the intuitive level, (1*)-(3*) are not true in
ordinary contexts, as we have seen. This intuition is to be elicited by noting the specialness
of the crumbly cliﬀ case and its ilk. But what I want to suggest now is that the intuition
that (1*)-(3*) are false in ordinary contexts can be explained only by appeal to the claim
that the sort of relation involved in -ing for a reason is a relation which requires that the
reason is an item which gets taken to be a normative reason by the subject. But it follows
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from that claim that the reason for which one s is always to be understood as what one
believes, for it is what one believes which is taken to be a normative reason by one. Only
the Anti-Psychologist can say this, so Anti-Psychologism must be true.
This argument does not say: (1*)-(3*) are intuitively false in ordinary cases, but the
proponent of Psychologism is committed to their truth, so the onus of proof is on the
proponent of Psychologism. That’s Dancy’s own argument, as I understand it, generalised
to all varieties of Psychologism. That argument is one which I think is ultimately eﬀective
against Psychologism, given my refutation of the main arguments for Psychologism to
come in §4.2, but it is not to be confused with the Counter-Intuitiveness Argument. The
Counter-Intuitiveness Argument is a deductive argument the conclusion of which is that
Anti-Psychologism is true. It is not a burden-shifting argument which gets converted into a
decisive argument when a refutation of themain counter-arguments is added. The Counter-
Intuitiveness Argument says: (i) (1*)-(3*) are counter-intuitive in ordinary contexts; (ii)
this can be explained only by appeal to the thought that the relation which holds between
the subject and the reason for which they  requires that the reason in question is taken to
be a normative reason by the subject; hence: (iii) the reason for which the subject s is
what gets taken by them to be a normative reason. Since it is only the Anti-Psychologist
who can say this, it follows that Anti-Psychologism is true.
It’s possible for the proponent of Psychologism to respond to the Counter-intuitiveness
Argument by appeal to the Pryor semantics, or rather to the (1b)-(3b) analogue of it. The
response here would be that Psychologism isn’t committed to thinking that (1b)-(3b) are
elliptical for (1b*)-(3b*). That’s because (1b)-(3b) are not in the business of identifying
the reason for which one s with the referent of any relevant that-clause. Rather, p func-
tions to specify the content of the mental state that’s referred to using the phrases such as
‘the reason/basis/grounds for which/on which. . . ’ which appear in (1b)-(3b). Since (1b)-
(3b) have the same meaning as (1a)-(3a), the latter are elliptical for their psychologistic
counterparts only if the former are. Hence, (1a)-(3a) are not so elliptical either.10
The problem with this response is, of course, that the Pryor semantics is implausible
and is, in any case, a theory which should not be our default view in this area. So the
undermining of the Pryor semantics achieved previously has work to do both with respect
to the Linguistic Argument and with respect to the Counter-Intuitiveness Argument.
This concludes my presentation and defence of the Counter-Intuitiveness Argument. I
want now to end by drawing out two significant consequences of it.
First of all, the counter-intuitiveness of (1*)-(3*) in ordinary contexts and the expla-
nation of why they are false in ordinary contexts oﬀered here are independent of whether
or not the factive reading of (1)-(3) is true. Let’s suppose that the non-factive reading
of (1)-(3) is true, so that they can be true even in the bad case. And let’s suppose that a
sentence of form (1) is indeed true of a subject in the bad case. The suggestion I make is
10This response would also serve to undermine Dancy’s own onus shifting argument.
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that even if this were so, it would be counter-intuitive to suggest that the reason for which
the subject s is really that they believe that p, instead of just that p. And this intuition
could still only be explained by appeal to the idea that the sort of relation between -ing
and reasons must be one which requires the subject to take their reason to be a normative
reason. The upshot is that even if one is impressed with the non-factive reading of (1)-(3),
one will still have to accept that they concern a relation between the subject’s -ing and
an item which the subject takes to be a normative reason for them to . It’s just that one
would think of the relation in question as one which doesn’t necessarily link the subject’s
-ing with a genuine normative reason.11
Here is the second consequence I want to note. Earlier, I suggested that sentences
of the form: ‘S s for the reason that p’ mean the same as sentences of the form: ‘S s
because p’, in the rationalising sense of ‘because’. In short, it is intuitive that (1)-(3) mean
the same as non-psychologistic rationalising statements. It’s a consequence of Dancy’s
claim, endorsed here, that (1*)-(3*) are counter-intuitive applied in ordinary contexts, that
‘S s for the reason that they believe that p’ does not mean the same as: ‘S s because they
believe that p’, in the rationalising sense of ‘because’. In other words, it is a consequence of
Dancy’s counter-intuitiveness claim that (1*)-(3*) do not mean the same as psychologistic
rationalising statements. That’s because (1*)-(3*) are intuitively false in all but the special
circumstances in which the fact that one believes that p is itself taken to be a normative
reason by one. But in ordinary circumstances psychologistic rationalising statements are
true of one. Across ordinary and extra-ordinary cases, as well as across good cases and
bad, it’s true to say of a subject who s for a reason that they are -ing because they believe
that p, in the rationalising sense of ‘because’, where p is whatever they take to be a reason
in favour of their -ing. So if (1*)-(3*) are false in ordinary cases, yet in those cases there
are corresponding psychologistic rationalising statements which are true, we get the result
that the former cannot mean the same as the latter.
In the special circumstances in which it is true to say of someone that they  for the
reason that they believe that p, it will be true to say of them that they  because they believe
that p, in the rationalising sense of ‘because’. But that rationalising statement is actually
an instance of the non-psychologistic form of rationalising statement, for it takes as its
apparent explanans what the agent takes to be a normative reason, instead of the state/fact
of belief which constitutes the presence to mind of that which the agent takes to be a
normative reason. So it remains true to say in general that sentences of the form ‘S s for
the reason that they believe that p’ don’t mean the same as their counterpart psychologistic
rationalising statements.
Another way of putting the result here would be to say that (1)-(3) and (1*)-(3*) are
asymmetric with respect to the relation each stands in to non-psychologistic and psycholo-
11If we add to the mix here the claim that the relation in question is explanatory and non-causal what we
have just is Dancy’s View.
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gistic rationalising statements respectively. The former mean the same as the correspond-
ing class of rationalising statements. The latter don’t. It follows from this that one of the
elements of the picture argued for by Hyman in How Knowledge Works cannot be correct.
Hyman focuses on a case discussed by Ryle (2000) in which a subject keeps to the edge
because the ice is thin, in the rationalising sense of ‘because’.12 Ryle contrasts that success
case with a case in which the subject keeps to the edge merely because they believe that the
ice is thin. Hyman interprets Ryle as committing himself to the claim that in the success
case, the subject keeps to the edge for the reason that the ice is thin whereas in the bad
case they keep to the edge for the reason that they believe that the ice is thin: in the good
case an instance of (1) is true of the subject whereas in the bad case an instance of (1*) is
true of them.13 Hyman makes the following comment about Ryle’s view, so interpreted:
Exactly so. In the first case, the man’s reason is that the ice is thin; in the
second case, it is that he believes that the ice is thin. But the man’s reason
stands to his action in a diﬀerent relation in the two cases, and the sort of
explanation given by identifying his reason diﬀers commensurately. (Hyman,
1999:446)
An element of Hyman’s position, at least inHowKnowledgeWorks, then, is this. There
are two forms of rationalising explanation: a good case form where the normative reason
that p is S’s rationaliser and a neutral form where the fact that S believes that p is S’s
rationaliser. We can report the first form by saying: ‘S s because p’ and also by saying:
‘S s for the reason that p’, where those sentences mean the same thing. We can report
the second form by saying: ‘S s because they believe that p’ and also by saying: ‘S s
for the reason that they believe that p’, where those two sentences mean the same thing
too. Thus, for Hyman, -ing for the reason that p involves a diﬀerent type of relation than
-ing for the reason that one believes that p. The first is an explanatory relation that links
a normative reason with a -ing where the reason in question is taken to be such by the
subject. The second links a psychological fact to a -ing, where that psychological fact is
designated as a reason, but is not taken to be a normative reason by the subject.
12In fact, the good case explanation in question which Ryle focuses on is an instance of: ‘S s because they
know that p’, but we can ignore that detail for our purposes in this chapter.
13What Ryle actually says about his case is this:
. . . to say that [someone] keeps to the edge because he knows that the ice is thin, is. . . to give
quite a diﬀerent sort of ‘explanation’, from that conveyed by saying that he keeps to the edge
because he believes that the ice is thin. (Ryle, 2000:129-130)
Here Ryle doesn’t commit himself to the claim that an instance of (1) is true in the good case and an
instance of (1*) is true in the bad, only that an instance of ‘S s because they know that p’ is true in the
good case and an instance of ‘S s because they believe that p’ is true in the bad. Hyman’s interpretation
of passage from Ryle reflects his taking it for granted that those explanatory sentences mean the same as
their corresponding (1) and (1*) counterparts.
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In Chapter Five I argue that Hyman is quite right to suggest that there are these two
kinds of rationalising explanation, the first of which can be reported using a non-psycholo-
gistic rationalising statement, the second a psychologistic rationalising statement. But
there are two thoughts I’ve just attributed to Hyman which cannot be right, given what’s
been said here. First, it cannot be right that ‘S s for the reason that they believe that
p’ means the same as ‘S s because they believe that p’, for the latter is true in ordinary
contexts but, as Dancy points out, the former isn’t. Second, it cannot be right that ‘S s
for the reason that p’ and ‘S s for the reason that they believe that p’ designate diﬀerent
types of relation. Dancy’s point that (1*)-(3*) are counter-intuitive in ordinary contexts
tells against the thought that the latter is true in ordinary contexts, and, as the Counter-
Intuitiveness Argument has it, the only way to explain this is to say that the sort of relation
specified by ‘S s for the reason that they believe that p’ is one which requires S to take
whatever the reason is to be a normative reason. Hence, the relation involved in -ing for
the reason that one believes that p cannot be a relation that’s diﬀerent from that which is
specified by ‘S s for the reason that p’, for the first requires that the reason is what gets
treated as a normative reason just as the second does.
In sum, what we should say about Ryle’s case is that in the good case, he s because p
and he s for the reason that p, where these are to the say the same thing. In the bad case,
he s because he believes that p, but he does not  for a reason at all: there is no sentence
‘S s for the reason that. . . ’ which is true of him, although there might be similar looking
sentences which are, such as instances of (4)-(6) and (7), on their non-factive readings.
4.2 Two Arguments for Psychologism Rejected
I’ve defended two arguments for Anti-Psychologism. But there are several arguments in
the literature in favour of Psychologism. If I can’t say anything by way of undermining the
latter, then my achievement in this chapter will merely be to plunge us into a state of aporia
with respect to the Psychologism Question. This section examines the two most troubling
arguments for Psychologism and rejects each of them. In §4.2.1 I consider an argument
which appeals to the thought that the non-factive reading of (1)-(3) is correct and in §4.2.2
I consider an argument which appeals to the idea that we are prone to describe the reason
for which we  using the language of belief, in cases in which we doubt that p. That final
argument also constitutes a fresh argument for the non-factive reading of (1)-(3).
4.2.1 The Argument from Error
The first argument for Psychologism I wish to reject I call the Argument from Error. Let’s
take a subject in the good case who s for the reason that p and let’s focus on a correspond-
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ing bad case in which p is false.14 The argument is this:
(P4.1) The reason for which S s is the same in the good case and bad
(P4.2) In the bad case, p is false
(P4.3) The rationaliser of S’s -ing when S s for a reason is identical to the reason in
question
(P4.4) Explanations why can only take facts as explanantia
(P4.5) The reason for which S s is either: (i) the fact that S believes that p or (ii) p
(P4.6) The reason for which S s in the bad case must be a fact (From (P4.3) & (P4.4))
(P4.7) P cannot be the reason for which S s in the bad case (From (P4.2) & (P4.6))
(P4.8) The reason for which S s in the bad case is the fact that they believe that p (From
(P4.5) & (P4.7))
(C4.1) The reason for which S s in both good cases and bad is the fact that they believe
that p (From (P4.1) & (P4.8))
In essence, the argument here is that the subject s for a reason in both good cases and
bad, and it is the same reason in each case. This raises the question of what that reason
is. It looks like there are two options: either the fact that S believes that p, or p itself. But
since the reason for which one s plays an explanatory role, and reasons why must always
be facts, p cannot be the reason for which S s in the bad case, for in the bad case p is false
(or at least that’s so with respect to the sorts of bad cases the argument focuses on). So
in the bad case the reason for which one s must be that one believes that p. Our initial
assumption was that the reason for which one s is the same in both good cases and bad.
So the reason in question must be that one believes that p, and not p itself, in both cases.
One thing to note immediately about this argument is its conclusion. The conclusion
is essentially that fact Psychologism is correct. The argument does not purport to prove
state Psychologism correct, or to leave it open which variety of Psychologism is correct.
That’s still troubling for the proponent of Anti-Psychologism, of course.
(C4.1) is validly inferred from (P4.1) and (P4.8). Thus, the argument is valid. (P4.6)-
(P4.8) are validly inferred from prior premises in the argument. So our question is: are each
of (P4.1)-(P4.5) true? Our attention is restricted to bad cases in which p is false, so (P4.2)
is trivially true. (P4.5) should also be granted, for Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism
14See Dancy (2000:121) for a statement of an argument for Psychologism which I take to be an underdevel-
oped version of the argument described here.
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are the only options, and given that the argument presupposes that facts are explanantia,
the fact version of Psychologism is the only Psychologistic option available. Finally, I’m
granting that explanation why is factive here, so I grant (P4.4).
This just leaves (P4.1) and (P4.3). My view on (P4.3) is complicated, as was intimated
in the introduction, and I haven’t yet begun to develop it. So I’ll leave (P4.3) aside. That
just leaves (P4.1), and it is the obvious premise to reject. There are two ways of rejecting
it. On the one hand, one might agree that S s for a reason in both the good case and
bad, but say that the reason is diﬀerent in each case: it’s that p in the good case, but that
one believes that p in the bad case. That way, one can agree that one’s reasons are always
facts, given the explanatory role they play, without being forced to accept a Psychologistic
conclusion across the board. One would accept Psychologism about the bad case but Anti-
Psychologism about the good case. The second way of rejecting (P4.1) would simply be
to reject the claim that S s for a reason in the bad case at all.
It should be obvious which option I prefer: I eﬀectively argued for the second option
at length in the last chapter.15 The first premise of the argument goes wrong at a funda-
mental level: it makes the presupposition that S s for a reason at all in the bad case. That
presupposition is mistaken, as we’ve seen. It should now be clear why the work of the
last chapter is quite significant: it enables me to undermine the quite influential Argument
from Error for Psychologism.
4.2.2 The Argument from Doubt
The final argument I want to consider for Psychologism is the Argument from Doubt. The
argument in fact purports to establish two conclusions, both of which are troubling for
me. The first conclusion is that the non-factive reading of (1)-(3) is true. The second
conclusion is that Psychologism is true. Thus, the Argument from Doubt constitutes a
problem both for my Anti-Psychologism as well as a fifth, and final, argument in favour of
the non-factive reading of (1)-(3).
What does the argument say? Consider a case in which one s for the reason that p and
one is asked why one is -ing. One will typically respond by saying: ‘p’ or with a cognate
sentence, so that one’s answer to the question is that one is -ing for the reason that p. The
Argument fromDoubt says that in cases in which one has been made to question p by one’s
interlocutor one will move from answering the ‘what’s your reason for -ing?’ question
by asserting p to answering it by saying ‘I believe that p’. Thus, the argument continues,
the answer one gives in such cases is that one is -ing for the reason that one believes that
p. Moreover, it will seem to one as if one is oﬀering precisely the same answer each time,
just using diﬀerent forms of words. But since the second answer is clearly non-factive, the
15In any case, the first option cannot be right given that it is counter-intuitive that the agent ever s for the
reason that they believe that p in ordinary contexts, even if one grants that they  for a reason in bad cases.
This was one of the lessons drawn from the Argument from Counter-Intuitiveness rehearsed above.
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former must be too: the non-factive reading of (1)-(3) is correct, after all. Moreover, since
the second answer implies that the reason for which one s is the state or fact of one’s
believing that p, we get the result that Psychologism is true.
For example, suppose Smith is asked for the reason for which he’s walking to the quad.
He would respond: ‘there’s free coﬀee available there’. But suppose further that Smith
were prompted to doubt the claim that there’s free coﬀee there in some way. At that point,
he’d revert to saying: ‘well, I believe there to be free coﬀee available there’. The thought
is that the first response commits Smith to the claim that the reason for which he walks
is that there’s free coﬀee available whilst the second commits him to the claim that he
walks for the reason that he believes there to be free coﬀee there. Moreover, it seems to
Smith that he’s oﬀering the same answer each time. But since the second answer doesn’t
require it to actually be the case that there’s coﬀee in the quad and identifies Smith’s reason
with his belief, we have to conclude that, really, the claim that Smith walks to the quad
for the reason that there’s free coﬀee available there is non-factive and is elliptical for a
corresponding instance of (1a*).
Let’s look at the argument in more detail. What the argument focuses on is a certain
type of conversational exchange which is directed towards the question of what the reason
for which one is -ing is. One would, ordinarily, respond to the question by asserting the
truth of p – which is what one takes to be a normative reason in favour of one’s -ing. The
conversational exchange in question involves one’s interlocutor prompting one to question
whether p really is true – they prompt one to doubt whether p really is the case. The prompt
might involve the presentation of reasons for thinking that p is false, or it could take some
other form, for example the simple assertion that p isn’t actually the case. Whatever form
the prompt to question p takes, in response to the prompt one would respond by casting
one’s answer in psychologistic language – one would move from asserting p, to saying
something along the lines of: ‘well, alight then: I believe that p’.
There are then two claims made about the exchange by the proponent of the argument.
The first claim is that pre-doubt one is committing oneself to the following answer to the
question: the reason for which I  is that p and post-doubt one is committing oneself to the
following, psychologistically expressed, answer to the question: the reason for which I  is
that I believe that p. The second claim about the sort of exchange made by the proponent
of the argument is that, from one’s own point of view, the two forms of words one uses pre
and post-doubt express the very same answer to the question. As Dancy (2000), following
Collins (1997), would put it: the psychologistic answer to the question – ‘I believe that p’
– seems to one to be a re-statement of the non-psychologistic statement – ‘p’. It doesn’t
seem to one as if one is withdrawing the thought expressed by the first statement and then
oﬀering one’s interlocutor a quite diﬀerent thought, expressed by the second. Rather: the
thought oﬀered is the same, but is oﬀered using diﬀerent forms of words. Putting those
two claims together, we get the result that from one’s own point of view the answer to the
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question which dovetails with the simple assertion of p, namely: that the reason for which
one is -ing is that p, is the very same answer to the question as the answer which dovetails
with the psychologistic response ‘I believe that p’, namely: that the reason for which one
is -ing is that one believes that p.
Given that we shouldn’t convict ordinary subjects with systematic error with respect
to what their answers are to such questions, we must take it that the two answers really
are the same. There are then two further inferences made from this: an inference to the
non-factivity of (1)-(3) and an inference to Psychologism. First, the inference to the non-
factivity of (1)-(3). The thought there is that since the second, psychologistic, answer is
non-factive, so must be the first, non-psychologistic answer. The resulting view is the
sort of conception of -ing for reasons which is associated with the Motivating Reasons
View and which should already be familiar. Second, the inference to Psychologism. The
thought is that since the psychologistic answer identifies the state or fact of the subject’s
belief that p as the reason for which they , and the psychologistic answer is the same as
the non-psychologistic answer, the reason for which the subject s must be their state/fact
of believing that p. -ing for the reason that p is always really -ing for the reason that
one believes that p. It takes reflection on cases of doubt to bring this out. (1)-(3) really are
elliptical for (1*)-(3*).
In order tomake a start on undermining theArgument fromDoubt I first want to suggest
that there is an important distinction to be drawn between two variants of the basic sort
of conversational exchange in question. First, there is the variant in which the subject
continues to believe that p, despite being prompted to doubt that p by their interlocutor.
In that variant of the basic sort of case, the subject holds fast to their belief despite the
prompt to doubt oﬀered by their interlocutor, perhaps putting oﬀ engaging in self-critical
reflection about it for a later date, or perhaps agreeing with whatever objections have been
raised but only lowering credence slightly in response to them. Second, there is a variant
of the case in which the subject drops their belief that p in response to the prompt to
doubt. In that variant of the basic sort of case, the subject agrees with their interlocutor
and ends up exchanging their belief that p for a suspension of judgement about p or else
an outright belief that not-p. In that variant of the basic sort of case, what will be at issue
is not a transition from ‘p’ to ‘I believe that p’, but a transition from ‘p’ to the past-tense
‘I believed that p’.
With that distinction in the background the proponent of the argument will need to
show that with respect to at least one variant of the basic sort of case, the Argument
from Doubt holds. What I want to do now is suggest that the argument fails for each
variant. Regarding the first variant, my main contention will be that the argument doesn’t
go through because there is a special use of ‘I believe that p’ operated with by the subject in
such cases on which the subject is simply using the phrase in order to hedge their assertion
that p. With respect to the second variant, my contention will be that the answer to the
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question one is giving post-doubt is not really ‘I ed for the reason that I believed that p’,
but ‘I ed because I believed that p’, which, as we have seen, is diﬀerent.
I’ll start with the first variant, in which one continues to believe that p post-doubt.
With respect to the first variant, the initial thought would have to be that prior to doubt,
one asserts: ‘p’, post-doubt one says: ‘I believe that p’, but one continues to believe that
p post-doubt. The answer one gives pre-doubt is that the reason for which one s if that
p; the answer post-doubt, where one is continuing to believe that p, is that the reason for
which one s is that one believes that p. The further thought would then be that in such a
situation, it seems to the subject as if the psychologistic idiom expresses the same answer to
the question of what the reason is as the non-psychologistic idiom. And the final thought
would be that the psychologistic answer doesn’t require the truth of p and identifies the
agent’s state/fact of believing as the reason for which they .
In response, I want to first of all examine some remarks made about belief-talk by
Bernard Williams in Deciding to Believe:
. . . to say ‘I believe that p’ itself carries, in general, a claim that p is true. To
say ‘I believe that p’ conveys the message that p is the case. It is a way, though
perhaps a somewhat qualified way, of asserting that p is true. (Williams,
1970:137)
Elaborating on this somewhat, Williams goes on to say this:
The most elementary and straightforward expression of the belief that it is
raining is to say ‘it is raining’, not to say ‘I believe that it’s raining’. ‘I believe
that it’s raining’ does a rather special job. As a matter of fact, it does a variety
of special jobs. In some cases, it makes what is very like an autobiographical
remark; but very often in our discourse it does a special job of expressing the
belief that p, or asserting the belief that p, in a rather qualified way. On the
whole, if somebody says to me, ‘Where is the railroad station?’ and I say ‘I
believe that it’s three blocks down there and to the right’, he will have slightly
less confidence in my utterances that if I just say ‘It’s three blocks down there
and to the right.’ (Ibid.:137-138)
What’s happening here is that Williams is seeking to draw our attention to two uses of
the phrase ‘I believe that p’. On the one hand, there’s a ‘reporting’ use of the phrase, in
which one is attributing to oneself a state of a certain type, where what one says is true just
in case one is in a state of that type. On the other hand, there’s an ‘expressive’ use of the
phrase, in which one is evincing one’s state of believing that p in the same sense in which
one does so when one simply asserts that p. The thought is that on the expressive use, ‘I
believe that p’ just is an assertion that p, but where one is hedging one’s endorsement of
p, or expressing a certain sort of lack of confidence in what one is asserting.
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So even though asserting that p is the paradigm way of evincing one’s belief that p, a
phrase which is sometimes used to report the fact that one is in a state of believing can also
be used to evince one’s belief. A good analogy here is with the phrase ‘I want x’. That
phrase can be used to report the fact that one is in a certain sort of pro-attitude state, or it
can be used to express that very state which one is in.16
Relying on this material fromWilliams, it is possible to undermine the Argument from
Doubt, applied to the first variant of the basic type of conversational exchange we’ve been
focusing on. For one continues to believe that p even post-doubt in the first variant of the
case. This makes it plausible that the phrase ‘I believe that p’ as one uses it post-doubt, is
functioning not to report that one is in a state of believing that p but to express one’s belief
that p, albeit in the hedged way Williams describes. With that point in tow, it can now be
said that the answer to the question one commits oneself to post-doubt is indeed the same
as the answer to the question pre-doubt, but the answer to the question is just the non-
psychologistic one throughout: I’m -ing for the reason that p. It’s just that, post-doubt,
one is hedging the assertion of p one makes in so far as one asserts that sentence. Thus,
no conclusion in favour of the non-factive reading of (1)-(3) or Psychologism follows.
Now I’ll move on to examining whether the argument might work when applied to the
second variant of the basic sort of case, in which one drops one’s belief that p post-doubt.
With respect to that second variant, the initial thought would have to be that prior to doubt,
one asserts: ‘p’, post-doubt one has dropped one’s belief that p, so one asserts the past-
tense: ‘I believed that p’. The first response is supposed to commit one to the claim that
one is -ing for the reason that p; the second to the claim that one was -ing for the reason
that one believed that p. The further thought will be that from one’s own point of view,
the second response is merely a past-tensed way of reporting the very same answer to the
question as the first: each response characterises one’s reason for -ing in the same way,
the only diﬀerence is the tense in which things are reported. The final thought will then
be that since ‘I ed for the reason that I believed that p’ doesn’t require that p was true
at the time of one’s -ing and because it identifies the reason at the time of one’s -ing
with a state/fact of belief, so the ‘I’m -ing for the reason that p’ answer must likewise be
non-factive and identify the reason for which one s with a state/fact of belief.
In response to this, it’s worth oﬀering the reminder that it is quite counter-intuitive in
ordinary contexts to identify one’s reason with the state/fact of one’s belief that p. Only in
Dancy’s special contexts is it intuitive to identify one’s reason with such a factor. That goes
for past as well as present tense characterisations of one’s reasons. In the sorts of cases at
issue, I suggest, when one responds post-doubt by saying ‘I believed that p’, the answer to
the question one is committing oneself to is not that one’s reason for -ing was that one
believed that p, but that one was -ing because one believed that p, in the rationalising
sense of ‘because’. But if that’s what’s going on, then it’s false that from one’s own point
16Compare Marcus (2012:§1.3).
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of view the answer provided by the pre-doubt response is the same as the answer provided
by the post-doubt response. The former says that one is -ing for the reason that p. The
latter retracts that claim in favour of the claim that one was -ing because one believed
that p. Only in the first variant of the basic sort of conversational exchange, in which one
continues to believe that p post-doubt, is there pressure to say that it seems to one as if
one’s answer is the same each time.
This concludes my response to the Argument from Doubt. In sum, we’ve seen that
there are contexts in which one is prompted to question the truth of what one takes to
be a normative reason for one’s -ing by an interlocutor, and in those contexts one is
disposed to make a transition from characterising one’s reason in a non-psychologistic
manner to characterising it in a psychologistic manner. If one retains the belief post-doubt,
one isn’t saying that one is -ing for the reason that one believes that p, when one makes
the transition. Rather, one is saying that one is -ing for the reason that p, but it’s just
that one is using belief-talk to hedge one’s assertion that p, in the familiar way Williams
describes. If, on the other hand, one drops one’s belief, then one will resort to a past-tense
characterisation of one’s -ing, and this would not seem to one to be simply a past tensed
way of recording the very same thing that one records when one says ‘I’m -ing for the
reason that p’. Rather, it would be matter of explaining why one ed by appeal to one’s
belief that p.
It is worth noting, by way of finishing, that the Argument from Doubt would not work
were it to concern linguistic contexts in which one is describing the reason for which
someone else is -ing, instead of first-personal contexts in which the agent who s for the
reason that p herself is subject to the doubt and so re-states things psychologistically. In
the third-personal form of the case, the proponent of the argument would have to say that
one would move from describing someone else as -ing for the reason that p to describing
them as -ing for the reason that they believe that p, in response to the sort of doubt
about p put to one by one’s interlocutor. The problem with this third-personal form of
the Argument from Doubt is the same as the problem for the version of it which focuses
on first-personal cases in which one drops one’s belief post-doubt. It is quite counter-
intuitive to characterise an agent’s reason for -ing as a state/fact of believing, in ordinary
contexts. That goes whether or not the agent in question is oneself or someone else. In
third personal contexts what one would do is characterise the agent in question as -ing
because they believe that p, which, as we’ve seen, is quite diﬀerent from saying that their
reason for -ing is that they believe that p.
4.3 The Explanatory Question
In the last chapter I reconfigured the Dialectic of Psychologism in light of the fact that there
are no such things as motivating reasons in the special sense described. The Dialectic of
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Psychologism is not to be understood as a debate about the nature of motivating reasons
thought of as entities that count as reasons and which play a rationalising role across both
the good case and bad: whether they are psychological items andwhether they are identical
to rationalisers.
I take myself to have articulated and defended an answer to the Psychologism Ques-
tion, which is one half of the Dialectic of Psychologism. My answer is this: the reasons
for which the agent s are what the agent takes to be the normative reasons in favour of
their -ing.17 They are not the beliefs the agent has which constitute the presence to mind
of such normative reasons, nor facts which record the existence of such states. The pro-
ponent of Psychologism falls foul of intuitions concerning (1*)-(3*) as well as powerful
linguistic considerations which tell in favour of Anti-Psychologism. The arguments for
Psychologism described are, moreover, all ineﬀective.
Along the way, a number of interesting results have emerged. First, that ‘S s for the
reason that S believes that p’ is false in ordinary contexts and so cannot be equivalent to
‘S s because S believes that p’ in those contexts: the former is not simply another way of
stating the latter. Second, that there are contexts in which one uses psychologistic language
to characterise one’s reason, but those contexts involve hedged assertions that p or else oﬀer
psychologistic rationalising explanations. Third, the refutation of the Motivating Reasons
Postulate has helped to undermine Psychologism by supplying a basis for a response to a
would-be powerful argument for Psychologism.
All of that is by way of summary of my response to the first part of the Dialectic of Psy-
chologism. This section makes a start on the second part of the Dialectic of Psychologism:
the Explanatory Question, which asks: when the agent s for a reason, is the explanans of
the rationalising explanation to which their -ing is subject to be identified with the reason
for which they ? As we shall see, that second question cannot be given a definitive an-
swer until the next chapter, and so the Dialectic of Psychologism cannot be fully resolved
until then either. The burden of this final section is to set up my answer to the Explanatory
Question by sketching the solution I want to provide and fitting it into the dialectic as it
has been presented so far.
The Dancy of Practical Reality and Davidson are committed to a positive answer to
the Explanatory Question. The Neo-Davidsonians are committed to a negative answer.
How should we answer the question?
I will be arguing for a positive answer to the question: whenever one s for a reason,
the reason for which one s is one’s rationaliser. My argument for a positive answer hinges
on the argument, to be given in the next chapter, that there is an essentially successful form
of rationalising explanation which takes the fact that p qua normative reason as explanans
and which obtains if, and only if, one is responding to a normative reason, as well as
17Indeed, given the results of the last chapter: the reasons which motivate are always genuine normative
reasons, typically about the external world.
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a neutral type of explanation which takes the fact that one believes that p as explanans.
Since it was shown in the last chapter that when one s for the reason that p, the reason
for which one s just is the normative reason to which one is responding, it follows that
when one s for the reason that p, there is a rationalising explanation to which one’s -ing
is subject which takes the reason for which one s as explanans. That just is a positive
answer to the Explanatory Question.
In light of my commitment to the thought that there are fundamentally two kinds of
rationalising explanation, and also in light of my commitment to the claim that one s
for a reason only in the good case, my positive answer to the question takes on a certain
distinctive shape. I argue for a positive answer to the Explanatory Question. But given that
I think that one only s for a reason in the good case I do not commit myself to the claim
that all rationalising explanations take the reason for which the agent s as explanans: only
the rationalising explanations particular to the good case do so. And because I think that
there are two fundamental types of rationalising explanation where both hold in the good
case (although one of them holds in the bad case too), I do not think that every rationalising
explanation which holds in the good case has the agent’s reason as its explanans: only the
essentially successful type does. So my positive answer to the Explanatory Question is not
marketed as a claim about the nature of rationalising explanation in general. The claim is
that of all the cases in which one’s -ing is subject to a rationalising explanation of any
form, there is a sub-set of those cases in which one s for a reason. In that sub-set of cases
one’s -ing is subject to two diﬀerent kinds of rationalising explanation: a neutral one and
an essentially successful one. The view I defend is that the essentially successful one has
an explanans identical to the reason for which one s.
It is worth bringing out how this kind of positive answer to the Explanatory Question
diﬀers from the positive answer provided by Dancy and Davidson. Dancy and Davidson
agree that whenever one s for a reason, the reason for which one s is identical to one’s
rationaliser, it’s just that Davidson suggests, but Dancy denies, that the reason in question is
a psychological item. But they go further. They say that rationalising explanation always
takes the reason for which one s as its explanans. That’s because, given that they are
proponents of the Motivating Reasons Postulate, they think that one counts as -ing for
a reason across both good cases and bad. Good cases and bad exhaust the set of cases
in which one’s -ing is subject to a rationalising explanation. So when they agree that
when one s for a reason, the reason for which one s is one’s rationaliser, what they
commit themselves to is the thought that whenever one’s -ing is subject to a rationalising
explanation, the explanation to which one’s -ing is subject has the reason for which one
s as its explanans. Moreover, as proponents of Reductionism about the good case, they
think that there is only type of rationalising explanation. So, on their view, there cannot
be a form of rationalising explanation present in either case which does take as explanans
something diﬀerent to the reason for which the agent s. In short: their positive answer to
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the Explanatory Question, given their background commitment to the Motivating Reasons
View, commits them to saying that something is a rationaliser if, and only if, it is a reason
which motivates the agent to . That is not my position. I allow that there are rationalisers
which are not reasons for which the subject s. The neutral explanation fits that bill. It’s
just that there are also rationalisers which are identical to the reasons for which one s:
the essentially successful explanations fit that second bill.
It should be clear now how my positive answer to the Explanatory Question relates to
the positive answer provided by Davidson and Dancy. But how does my positive answer
fit in with the negative answer provided by the Neo-Davidsonians? The Neo-Davidsonians
think that the only type of rationalising explanation there is is a neutral type which takes
the state or fact of belief as explanans. This is explicitly supposed to be consistent with the
thought that the reasons for which the subject s (which are conceived of as motivating
reasons in the special sense by the Neo-Davidsonian) are non-psychological. So Neo-
Davidsonianism, like Dancy’s view but unlike the view of Davidson, is consistent with
the main conclusion of this chapter. One obvious way in which my view diﬀers from that
of the Neo-Davidsonians is that I think that there is a non-neutral type of rationalising
explanation. But I also think that that non-neutral type takes the fact that p, as opposed to
some psychological factor, as explanans. Moreover, central to Neo-Davidsonianism is the
thought that (1)-(3), in so far as they express a rationalising explanation, do not express an
explanation with p as its explanans but with the agent’s state or fact of believing that p as
explanans. My view predicts, like Dancy’s, that (1)-(3) report a rationalising explanation
which does take p as its explanans. Despite all this disagreement, however, I agree with the
Neo-Davidsonians that there is a type of rationalising explanation which is neutral, which
takes the fact that one believes that p as explanans, and which doesn’t have as explanans
a factor that counts as the reason for which the agent s. My position thus represents
something of a half-way house between the position of Davidson and Dancy on the one
hand, and the Neo-Davidsonians on the other.
Whatmotivates Neo-Davidsonianism is the thought that we need to avoid the claim that
rationalising explanations are non-factive. Dancy explicitly runs into that problem because
he takes it that one can  for the reason that p evenwhen not-p, that the reason for which one
s when one s for the reason that p is p itself, that when one s for the reason that p there
is a rationalising explanation which applies to one’s -ing, and that p is the explanans of
rationalising explanation. Thus, one’s -ing can be subject to an explanation why which
takes p as explanans even when not-p. Wishing to avoid this unpalatable consequence
but also wishing to subscribe to the claim that -ing for the reason that p can happen
even when not-p, that -ing for the reason that p involves one’s -ing being subject to
a rationalising explanation, and Dancy’s Anti-Psychologism, the Neo-Davidsonians are
motivated to deny that rationalisers are one’s reasons.
The possibility of my own position on this matter undercuts the motivation for Neo-
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Davidsonianism. More precisely, it points to a way to avoid the problem without opting
for a negative answer to the Explanatory Question. The claim to reject is that one s for
the reason that p even when not-p. That way, one can allow that -ing for the reason
that p involves one’s -ing being subject to a rationalising explanation, Dancy’s Anti-
Psychologism, that p is the explanans of rationalising explanation when one s for the
reason that p, and factivity. Factivity is preserved because it is denied that one can  for
the reason that p even when p is false. Centrally, the position in question requires that the
rationalising explanation present when one s for the reason that p is distinct in kind from
that present in the bad case – a possibility which Neo-Davidsonians do not acknowledge
but which holds the key to my solution to the Explanatory Question.
That is how I wish to answer the Explanatory Question. The argument for the theory
of rationalising explanation which provides me with my answer to it will come in the next
and final chapter of this essay, in which I explore the question of whether we should go
Reductionist about the good case. So settling the Explanatory Question will have to be put
oﬀ until that argument has been defended.
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Chapter 5
Williams’ Dictum
I’ve been operating with a distinction, introduced in Chapter One, between good cases and
bad cases of taking p to be a reason for one to  and -ing accordingly. A good case is a
case in which the subject responds to the genuine normative reason that p. A bad case is a
case in which the agent takes p to be a reason for them to  and s in a way that manifests
their taking p to be a reason in favour of their -ing, but they nevertheless blamelessly fail
in responding to a normative reason. Most straightforwardly, this will be because p isn’t
really a reason for them to  at all, even though they blamelessly take it to be, but it could
be that p is a reason for them to , and yet they blamelessly fail to be connected to p in the
right sort of way.
So far, I’ve been paying almost all of my attention to the condition of -ing for the
reason that p. I’ve argued, in Chapter Three, that it just is the success condition of re-
sponding to the normative reason that p, so that it is a condition which does not obtain
in the bad case. This refutes the popular Motivating Reason View, articulated in Chapter
Two, according to which the subject s for reasons even in the bad case. I’ve also argued,
in Chapter Four, against a Psychologistic construal of the reasons for which we .
All of this material can be, and at points has been, related to the notion of rationalis-
ing explanation, also introduced in Chapter One. A rationalising explanation is a type of
explanation why which explains why the agent ed or is -ing by appeal, in some way,
to what the agent takes to be a reason in favour of their -ing. Across good cases and
bad cases, the agent’s -ing is subject to a rationalising explanation which can be reported
using a sentence of the form ‘S ed/is -ing because S believes that p’. In the good case
only, a rationalising explanation can also be reported using: ‘S ed/is -ing because p’.
The condition of -ing for the reason that p is connected to the notion of rationalising
explanation: -ing for the reason that p is -ing in a way that is subject to a rationalising
explanation which takes as its explanans, wholly or partly, the reason for which one is
-ing.
Although I have brought into play the notion of a rationalising explanation on a number
of occasions I have not said much about what our account of it should be, other than to
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provide a brief sketch of the account I want to oﬀer, and to bring out its relation to the
Explanatory Question, at the end of the last chapter. This chapter aims to fill in that lacuna
via the settling of an outstanding issue: whether or not we should go for a Reductionist
account of what it is to respond to a normative reason.
My focus is going to be on the rights and wrongs of the following thesis, articled once
again by Williams:
. . . the distinction between false and true beliefs on the agent’s part cannot alter
the form of the explanation which will be appropriate to his action. (Williams,
1980:120)
I shall refer to the thesis committed to by Williams here Williams’ Dictum. I will be
suggesting that Williams’ Dictum is ambiguous, but that on one reading it says that there
is a single type of rationalising explanation and that type is neutral with respect to whether
or not p is a genuine reason for S to . Contrary to Williams’ Dictum, on that reading, I
will be arguing that there are two diﬀerent types of rationalising explanation: one which
is neutral in the way described and which takes the fact that S believes that p as explanans
on the one hand, and on the other hand one that has the fact that p qua normative reason
as explanans, which can hold only in the good case. Refuting Williams’ Dictum in the
way described delivers us the result that Reductionism is false as well as delivering us the
desired answer to the Explanatory Question, as we will see.
I will proceed as follows. In §5.1 I present a preliminary account of -ing in response
to the normative reason that p, laying out some salient necessary conditions. In §5.2 I
oﬀer an interpretation of Williams’ Dictum. I suggest that it is ambiguous, in the light
of the distinction between a form of explanation and particular explanations which ex-
emplify the form. In §5.3 I bring Reductionism onto the scene and relate it to Williams’
Dictum on both of its readings. In §5.4 I present my own positive view, which constitutes
a rejection of Williams’ Dictum and hence Reductionism. In §5.5 I examine and reject
two arguments currently available in the literature against Williams’ Dictum. This creates
a need for a fresh argument and in §5.6 I attempt to provide one by first demonstrating
that my preferred view should be the default view in this area, thus shifting the burden of
proof onto the proponent of Williams’ Dictum and, second, rejecting extant arguments for
Williams’ Dictum. Finally, in §5.7 I address the question of whether we should think of
the type of explanation which I argue is special to the good case as in some sense primary.
I argue that my own position delivers the relevant primacy thesis.
5.1 The Elements of Success
I begin with an attempt to get clear about what is required for the subject to  in response
to a normative reason, which builds on the account oﬀered in Chapter One. I am not
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going to attempt to oﬀer a set of individually necessary and jointly suﬃcient conditions
for responding to a normative reason. Nor am I going to attempt to oﬀer anything worth
describing as a complete account of that condition. My intention is rather to get on the table
some salient necessary conditions of responding to a genuine reason. Much of my energy
will be spent defending the claim put on the map by Hornsby (2007a, 2007b, 2008) and
Hyman (1999, 2006, 2010, 2011), and later defended by McDowell (2013b) and Marcus
(2012), that responding to a normative reason requires knowledge.
Suppose Smith walks to the quad for the reason that there is free coﬀee available there.
And suppose Smith’s case is a good case: he is responding to a genuine normative reason.
What is going on with Smith, in so far as he is responding to a normative reason?
The first thing to say is that Smith’s action is subject to a rationalising explanation:
the holding of a certain rationalising explanation either is, or is at least an element of,
what it is to respond to a normative reason. An explanation of the relevant sort can be
reported in myriad ways, as we have seen. The holding of the rationalising explanation
will require, as we saw in Chapter One, certain psychological elements, for example that
the subject believes that p and takes p to be a normative reason. It may also require more
(for example: a causal relation between Smith’s action and his belief), depending on one’s
theory of rationalising explanation.
A second thing we can say immediately is that responding to a normative reason re-
quires the reason to which one is responding to actually be a reason for one to . It needs
to be true that there is free coﬀee available in the quad and it needs to be the case that that
has the normative force Smith takes it to have.
The two necessary conditions just broached are connected. The first condition says that
a rationalising explanation applies to Smith’s action. The second says that Smith’s reason
must be a genuine reason. If the normative reason is that p, then p, or some element
corresponding to it, will have to at least be a part of the explanans of the rationalising
explanation in question. The explanation to which Smith’s -ing is subject will have to
involve Smith’s reason: that there is free coﬀee available in the quad, which, by the second
condition, is a genuine one.
But -ing in a way that manifests one’s belief that p and one’s taking be to be a norma-
tive reason, so that one’s -ing is subject to a rationalising explanation, does not suﬃce for
responding to a normative reason, even when p really is a reason for one to . Something
more is required, as Hornsby and Hyman point out, in order or one’s -ing to be linked up
to the normative reason in the way distinctive of the good case. To see what, let us focus
on the following example, presented by Hornsby:
The example concerns Edmund, who believes that the ice in the middle of the
pond is dangerously thin, having been told so by a normally reliable friend,
and who accordingly keeps to the edge. But Edmund’s friend didn’t want
Edmund to skate in the middle of the pond (never mind why), so that he told
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Edmund that the ice there was thin despite having no view about whether or
not it actually was thin. Edmund, then, did not keep to the edge because the
ice in the middle was thin. Suppose now that, as it happened, the ice in the
middle of the pond was thin. This makes no diﬀerence. Edmund still didn’t
keep to the edge because the ice was thin. (Hornsby, 2008:251)
What we have here is a case in which the subject is performing an action for which he
believes there to be a decisive reason. The action is one of skating on the outskirts of the
frozen pond and the consideration taken to be a decisive reason is: the ice in the middle of
the pond is thin. Edmund justifiably believes, in some sense of ‘justification’, that the ice
in the middle is thin and his source of justification is testimony from his normally reliable
friend. Now we have two variants of that basic case: a case in which it’s true that the ice
is thin and a case in which it isn’t. In the latter case, Edmund is mistaken in treating the
relevant consideration as a decisive reason for action because normative reasons are facts.
Moreover, it’s clear that Edmund doesn’t stick to the edge because the ice is thin: acting
because p requires the truth of p. But more interesting is the former variant of the case,
in which it is true that the ice in the middle is thin. Edmund has a justified true belief that
the ice in the middle is thin, but he doesn’t know it. The case is a type of Gettier Case.
Moreover, it’s intuitive that even in that situation, Edmund still doesn’t act because the
ice in the middle is thin. The plausible suggestion is that we can best explain why not by
appeal to the thought that acting because p, in the rationalising sense of ‘because’, requires
nothing short of knowing that p.1
Hornsby’s plausible conclusion is marketed as a claim about acting because p, in the
rationalising sense of ‘because’.2 Since the condition reported by ‘S s because p’ just is
the success condition of responding to the normative reason that p, we can conclude that
acting in response to the normative reason that p requires knowing that p.
Hornsby defends a claim which links knowing with acting in response to a normative
reason. I think her argument is sound. Moreover, I think it can be generalised to cover all
judgement sensitive phenomena, not just actions. That is, I think the following thesis is
plausible:
The Epistemic Thesis. S s in response to the normative reason that p only if S knows
that p.
1McDowell (2013a) relies on the same case as Hornsby.
2This is why Dancy (2008) fails to undermine Hornsby’s argument by suggesting that the intuition is not
generated when the condition is not S -ing because p, but one of (1)-(7). As McDowell (2013b) points
out, this objection fails because even if it’s granted that the intuition is not generated with respect to the
condition reported by (1)-(7), it doesn’t follow that it’s not generated with respect to the condition reported
by ‘S s because p’, which is the condition Hornsby focuses on. For the record, I think the intuition does
hold for (1)-(3). It does not hold for (4)-(6) and (7) on the non-factive readings thereof, but it does hold for
them on their factive readings.
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Responding to the normative reason that p, so that one counts as -ing because p, re-
quires knowing that p, whether the type of -ing in question is acting, omitting, believing,
intending, hoping, doubting, imagining, desiring, or whatever.3
We’ve seen what can be said in favour of the Epistemic Thesis applied specifically to
action. How might we lend support to the much stronger, generalised thesis? Hornsby’s
case can readily be extended to omissions as well as to what we might think of as the
practical attitudes: intending, desiring, wishing, hoping, and so fourth. Moreover, I think
we can appeal to a case oﬀered by Hyman (1999) in order to prove that the thesis holds
for belief. I assume that once it’s been shown that the thesis holds for the central practical
phenomena and that it holds also for belief, we can reasonably infer that the thesis can be
extended to judgement sensitive phenomena across the board. Here is Hyman’s case:4
Henry is watching the television on a June afternoon. It is Wimbledon men’s
finals day, and the television shows McEnroe beating Connors; the score is
two sets to love and match point to McEnroe in the third. McEnroe wins the
point. Henry believes justifiably that:
(1) I have just seen McEnroe win this year’s Wimbledon final
and reasonably infers that
(2) McEnroe is this year’s Wimbledon champion.
Actually, however, the cameras at Wimbledon have ceased to function, and
the television is showing a recording of last year’s match. But while it does so
McEnroe is in the process of repeating last year’s slaughter. So Henry’s belief
(2) is true, and surely he is justified in believing (2). But we would hardly
allow that Henry knows (2). (Ibid.:447)
Now let’s suppose, for example, that Henry believes that McEnroe is pleased with him-
self. DoesHenry harbour that belief becauseMcEnroe is this year’sWimbledon champion,
in the rationalising sense of ‘because’? I don’t think so. The best explanation of this is
that believing in response to a normative reason requires knowing it.5 Putting that result
together with the previous results in the practical domain I think we get a strong case in
favour of the Epistemic Thesis.
3Hyman supports the generalised thesis. Marcus supports the thesis applied to action and belief, and I see
no reason why he’d wish to deny the generalised thesis too. Hornsby and McDowell restrict themselves to
the action case only, although, again, I see no reason why they wouldn’t also wish to go for the generalised
thesis to be defended here.
4The case in question, as Hyman notes, was given its first written presentation by Dancy (1985), who in turn
attributes it to Brian Garrett.
5See alsoMarcus (2012:37-38) for additional Gettier style cases which purport to prove the doxastic instance
of the Epistemic Thesis.
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I’ve oﬀered an argument for Epistemic Thesis. But now I want to consider an objection
to it raised by Hughes (2014). Hughes distinguishes between two sorts of Gettier cases:
those in which there is a causal connection between the agent’s belief that p and the fact
that p and those which do not involve such a causal connection. The well-known Barn
Façade Case is an instance of the former, whereas Hornsby’s Edmund Case, Hyman’s
Tennis Case and Gettier’s own cases are an instance of the latter. Hughes suggests that
in Causal Gettier Cases, or at least in the Causal Gettier Cases he considers, the subject
fails to know that p, but they are in a position to  in response to the normative reason that
p, nevertheless. This contradicts the Epistemic Thesis. Hughes considers two cases: a
variant of Hyman’s Tennis Case and a variant of the standard Barn Façade case. The latter
is the simpler of the two, so I’ll consider that one, although what I have to say in response
to it applies equally well to the former:
Henry is out hiking. He’s lost, and the weather is turning nasty. The situation
is getting serious. He sees what he believes to be a hiker’s hut in the distance,
and feels relieved. In fact, unbeknownst to Henry, he is in fake hiker’s-hut
county – an area where there are only a handful of real huts, and many hut
façades designed to look exactly like real huts to passing hikers. Henry justi-
fiably and truly believes that the structure in the distance is a hut, but he does
not know this. (Ibid.:461)
And here is what Hughes says about it:
Is the fact that there is a hut in the distance Henry’s reason for being relieved?
Intuitively, I submit, it is. (Ibid.)
The case is supposed to be one in which Henry truly believes that there is a hiker’s hut
in the distance, and that that is a reason for him to feel relieved. He feels relieved in a way
that manifests those commitments. Henry doesn’t know that there is a hiker’s hut in the
distance, however, by dint of his being in Hut-Façade County. That’s so even though the
fact that there is a hiker’s hut in the distance causes Henry’s belief. It is supposed to be
the case, nevertheless, that Henry feels relieved in response to the normative reason that
there is a hiker’s hut in the distance. The supposed upshot is that the Epistemic Thesis is
false: there are cases in which S s in response to the normative reason that p, but they do
not know that p.
Now, there’s an obvious response to this on the part of the proponent of the Epistemic
Thesis which is, in the end, defensible. The response consists in the proponent of the Epis-
temic Thesis attempting to explain away Hughes’ intuition consistently with the truth of
their own view. Here’s how they might do that. As I pointed out in Chapter One, there
are ways of understanding talk of agent’s responding to facts where the sort of response
in question is not the kind of response we’re interested in, that is: a rational response, one
111
which is an operation of the capacity to  for reasons. Moreover, this goes even if the fact
to which the agent is responding, in the non-rational way at issue, just so happens to be a
normative reason. The chicken sexer believes that the chick is male in response to the fact,
sub-personally detected by him, that the chick is letting oﬀ a distinctively male pheromone.
That would not be a response to a reason in the sense we’re interested in, even though the
fact in question happens to be a reason for the corresponding belief. Hughes’ hiker case
does involve a non-rationalising causal link between an attitude and a fact which happens
to be a reason for it. So the proponent of the Epistemic Thesis can say that Hughes finds
it intuitive that the Hiker feels relieved because there’s a hut in the distance in the ratio-
nalising sense of ‘because’ because he has conflated the rationalising sense with the more
brutely causal sense just intimated. Thus, Hughes’ intuition is explained away consistently
with the truth of the Epistemic Thesis.
The problem with this initial reaction to Hughes’ case is that it is dialectically inef-
fective. For let’s suppose Hughes were simply to say: ‘no, it really is the case that Henry
feels relieved because there’s a hut in the distance, in the rationalising sense’. What could
the proponent of the Epistemic Thesis say then? Well, what they would have to say is
that the onus of proof is on Hughes to demonstrate that there is anything more than the
causal sense of ‘because’ in operation. Now, this response essentially takes it to be the
case that the Epistemic Thesis is well-motivated and hence that the onus of proof is on
Hughes to demonstrate that his verdicts are correct. However, Hughes’ verdicts about his
case serve to undermine the very motivation for the Epistemic Thesis. That’s because the
Epistemic Thesis is motivated by appeal to an inference to the best explanation concerning
the Hornsby-Hyman cases. The best explanation of why the subject fails to  because p,
so the inference goes, is that the subject doesn’t know that p. But if Hughes’ verdicts are
correct, then there is an alternative explanation available: the subjects fail to  because
p because their beliefs that p are not caused by p. Moreover, if Hughes is right then that
explanation would be better than the explanation in terms of the agent’s lack of knowl-
edge because it is more general: it is able to explain why subjects are not in a position
to respond to reasons in a greater range of cases than the hypothesis that responding to
reasons requires knowledge, given that the causal condition is weaker than knowledge. So
the obvious response to Hughes will not work, as it stands.
I think, however, that the obvious response to Hughes can be rescued, because it can
be shown, independently of the debate concerning the truth of the Epistemic Thesis, that
the hypothesis that responding to normative reasons doesn’t require one’s belief that p to
be caused by p. Consider the following case:
On his day oﬀ, Billy decides to go and read his novel in a coﬀee house some-
where in town. He knows that there are a lot of coﬀee houses on Main Street.
So: he catches the bus to Main Street for the reason that there are a lot of
coﬀee houses there.
112
The case of Billy and his day oﬀ is intended to be an entirely ordinary case of -
ing because p: Billy does indeed catch the bus because there are a lot of coﬀee houses
on Main Street in the rationalising sense of ‘because’. If the hypothesis that responding to
normative reasons requires a causal link between one’s belief and the fact which constitutes
one’s normative reason is right, the Billy’s belief will have to count as being caused by the
fact that there are a lot of coﬀee houses on Main Street. But it is implausible that there is
such a causal relation between his belief and that fact. His belief might be caused by an
inference from a number of other beliefs, some of which record the presence of a number
of diﬀerent coﬀee houses on Main Street, but the fact that there are a lot of coﬀee houses
there is not amongst the causes of his belief – what would it be for such a quantificational
fact to cause his belief? It isn’t true, in general, then, that responding to reasons requires a
belief which is caused by the fact that is one’s reason.
What is the upshot of this? The upshot, I think, is that Hughes’ verdicts no longer serve
to undermine the motivation for the Epistemic Thesis. For central to the thought that they
undermine the motivation for it is the availability of an alternative hypothesis: that -ing
because p, in the rationalising sense, requires believing that p in a way that’s caused by
p. But that hypothesis has been shown to be independently false, and so isn’t available
as an alternative with respect to explaining what’s going on in the Hornsby-Hyman cases.
It follows in turn that those cases can be relied upon in order to motivate the Epistemic
Thesis,6 and this serves to shift the onus onto opponents of it like Hughes to prove that
what’s going on in cases in which the subject doesn’t know that p but does  because p
is that we have something more than a merely causal ‘because’ in operation. Until such
proof is forthcoming, we can conclude that the Epistemic Thesis is true.
I am not quite finished with my initial exploration of what responding to a normative
reason requires. I want, finally, to argue for the truth of a condition on responding to
normative reasons which constitutes something of an extension of Hornsby and Hyman’s
Epistemic Thesis.
I’ve been defending a certain thesis linking awareness of one’s normative reasons with
one’s being able to  in response to those reasons. But being aware of one’s reasons in such
cases is not the only psychological status that is supposed to enable one to  in response to
the facts. As I’ve already noted, the subject’s taking p to have the normative significance
it does is also a condition required for responding to normative reasons.
I do not want to oﬀer an account of this taking-to-be-normative condition in this essay.
But what I want to point out here is that, whatever that condition turns out to be, we can
make sense of the thought that the subject knowledgeably takes p to have the normative
significance it does. This will be a case of the subject not only getting it right about the
6Indeed, the case of Billy could easily be converted into a fresh motivation for the Epistemic Thesis. All we’d
have to do is contrast the case of Billy with a corresponding bad case in which he is told by an ordinarily
reliable informant that Main Street boasts many coﬀee houses, where it happens to be the case that that’s
so, but where the informant doesn’t have an opinion on it either way.
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normative status of the relevant fact, but getting it right in a non-accidental way that is at
least analogous to the non-accidental way in which one ends up believing truly in cases
of knowledge. Of course, this point is easy to accommodate if taking p to be a normative
reason just is believing that p is a reason in favour of one’s -ing. But even if we remain
neutral on that issue, still it must be agreed that there is some sense in which the condition
can be exemplified knowledgeably by the subject.
Moreover, we have an intuitive grip on what that would amount to: knowledgeably
taking p to be a reason for one to  would be knowing it to have a certain normative status
so that one knows how to weigh it up properly against counterveiling reasons and how to
weigh it together with other considerations on the same side. But with that point in tow, I
suggest that it is at least initially plausible that one needs to knowledgeably take p to be a
reason for one to  if one is to count as -ing in response to the normative reason that p,
in the sense we’re interested in. Responding to the reason that p is a matter of responding
to p qua reason. This suggests that responding to the reason that p in the sense at issue
involves an appreciation of the normative status of p. I suggest that it is quite natural to
cash this out in terms of knowledgeably taking p to have the normative status it does.
This section has explored the issue of what it is to  in response to the normative reason
that p. I have argued for the following necessary conditions on responding to normative
reasons: (i) that one’s -ing is subject to a rationalising explanation which involves one’s
reason; (ii) that p is a normative reason for one to , so that p is true and p favours one’s
-ing; (iii) one knows that p; (iv) one knowledgeably takes p to be a reason in favour of
one’s -ing. Given (iii) and (iv) we can say that when one s in response to the normative
reason that p one’s -ing manifests one’s knowledge of one’s reason qua reason. (iii) and
(iv) should be taken to be developments of (DT) and (NT), described in Chapter One:
responding to the reason that p doesn’t just require believing that p and taking p to be a
reason, but knowing that p and knowing it to be a reason.
5.2 Williams’ Dictum
Having gotten somewhat clearer on what is involved in the success condition I now turn to
Williams’ claim that the form of explanation associatedwith -ing for reasons is unaﬀected
by the true/false distinction. This section oﬀers an interpretation of that claim, which I
believe to be at the core of Reductionist thinking about the success condition.
Let us return to Smith and his penchant for free coﬀee. Smith’s action is subject to
a rationalising explanation. Since Smith is in the good case, we can express the, or a,
rationalising explanation to which his action is subject by saying: ‘Smith walks to the
quad because there is free coﬀee available there’. Since Smith walks to the quad for a
reason, he must believe the proposition which constitutes his reason: Smith believes that
there is free coﬀee available in the quad. We can also provide a rationalising explanation
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of Smith’s action which makes explicit reference to Smith’s belief, if we like. We can do so
by saying: ‘Smith walks to the quad because he believes that there is free coﬀee available
there’. We can oﬀer a rationalising explanation using the latter form of words even if Smith
is wrong about whether there is free coﬀee available.
Williams suggests that whether or not Smith’s belief that there is free coﬀee available
in the quad is true, the form or type of explanation to which Smith’s action is subject
must remain the same. What does this mean? We can immediately rule out some initial
suggestions. Williams is not saying that the logical form of the explanation is the same
whether the belief is true or false. I know of no reason to deny that, and in any case
Williams seems to have in mind something more substantial. Williams is also not saying
that whether or not Smith’s belief is true there is a rationalising explanation of Smith’s
action available. That much is granted by everyone: rationalising explanations apply in
both good cases and bad cases, andWilliams is not asserting somethingwhich is a platitude
in this area. So what it is he saying?
Consider the following set of eﬃcient-causal explanations:
(i) The tree collapsed because it was hit by a strong wind.
(ii) The left side of the man’s face is numb because the dentist administered local anaes-
thetic to it.
(iii) The tree collapsed because it was struck by lightning.
(iv) The man cannot talk clearly because the dentist administered local anaesthetic to the
left side of his face.
Operating at the intuitive level, there is a clear sense in which we have four diﬀerent
explanations here. What makes them diﬀerent explanations is that none of them involve
the same pair of explananda and explanantia, even if some of them ((i) and (iii)) share
an explanandum and some of them ((ii) and (iv)) share an explanans. But there is also an
intuitive sense in which they are of the same form or type. All of the above explanations
belong to the type eﬃcient-causal explanation why. They make the relevant explanan-
dum intelligible by making it intelligible why, as opposed to how, when or where, it is
the case and by dint of appealing to a causal link between the entities corresponding to
explanandum and explanans.7
Now consider the following pair of constitutive explanations why:
(v) The wall is hard because it is made out of brick.
7Strictly speaking, we can distinguish between two types under which the explanations (i)-(iv) fall: expla-
nation why and causal explanation why, where the latter is more specific than the former. In order to keep
things simple I talk of the type to which an explanation belongs. That talk is really shorthand for talk of the
most specific type to which the explanation belongs. I leave open, despite the way I talk, the possibility of
there being more than one type under which an explanation falls.
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(vi) The statue is losing its beauty because the clay from which it is made is crumbling.
Again, there is a clear sense in which each of these explanation are diﬀerent explana-
tions: they have diﬀerent explananda and explanantia, after all. But there is also a clear
sense in which they are of the same type: they are constitutive explanations why. Like the
form associated with (i)-(iv), they make the relevant explanandum intelligible in the sense
of making it intelligible why it is the case. But unlike the form associated with (i)-(iv),
(v)-(vi) make the relevant explanandum intelligible by dint of appealing to a constitutive
link between the entities corresponding to the explanandum and explanans.
Finally, consider the following pair of teleological explanations why, which I assume
for the sake of the discussion here cannot be reduced to eﬃcient-causal or constitutive
explanations:
(vii) The plant grows towards the window in order to catch the light.
(viii) The spider weaves the web in order to catch its prey.
Once again, there is a clear sense in which these explanations are diﬀerent explanations
but are of the same form: they are teleological explanations why. Like the forms associated
with each of our other set of explanations, they are explanations why. But unlike the
members of each of the other two sets they make the relevant explanandum intelligible by
appealing to the fact that the occurrence which corresponds to the explanandum in some
sense contains or has the goal specified by the explanans.
For each set of explanations we can say this of its members: they are diﬀerent expla-
nations but they have the same form. It is by dint of belonging to the relevant form that
each distinct explanation in the set has certain properties that it shares with the others,
properties which are essential to the form or type in question. It is because each of (i)-(iv)
belong to the form they do that they require for their truth the obtaining of a causal relation;
it is because (v)-(vi) belong to the form they do that they require the obtaining of a con-
stitution relation; and it is because (vii)-(viii) have the form they do that they require the
exemplification of a having-a-goal property by the relevant event or process. Moreover,
it is because all of the explanations are explanations why, an aspect shared by each of the
explanatory forms examined, that they must have true explananda and, in the case of the
causal and constitutive relations, true explanantia.8
We can think of a form of explanation as a way of making something intelligible. One
way of making the fact that the tree collapsed intelligible is to make it intelligible why it
collapsed by appeal to the cause. This diﬀers from making it intelligible how it collapsed,
or when it collapsed. But it also diﬀers, as we have seen, from making it intelligible
why it collapsed by appeal to its constitution and why it collapsed by appeal to an end it
8I am not suggesting here that the exemplification of the form explains why the explanations have the prop-
erties in question. I leave it open that having the properties in question is constitutive of having the form.
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had. There are ways and ways of making something intelligible. The diﬀerent forms of
explanation correspond to these diﬀerent ways ofmaking things intelligible. The particular
explanations which fall under the types all make things intelligible in the same sort of way,
they just make diﬀerent explananda intelligible, by appeal to diﬀerent explanantia.
Forms of explanation are generic: they do not require, of any given exemplar, that it
has a particular explanans or explanandum. Nevertheless, forms of explanation require
that their exemplars have a certain kind of explanans and explanandum. For example, all
explanationswhy require that their explanantia and explananda are true, if they are capable
of truth and falsehood at all, and causal explanations why require that their explanantia
and explananda correspond to, or are, factors that stand in a causal relation to each other.
To think of a form of explanation as requiring explananda and explanantia of certain types
is to think that it is essential to the way that the explanation makes things intelligible that
an explananda or explanantia of that type is on the scene, even if the particular explanans
or explanandum appealed to is not required by the very form of intelligibility at issue.
We can think of rationalising explanation as a form of explanation. Rationalising ex-
planation why is a distinctive way of making thinks intelligible. (i)-(viii) are not rational-
ising explanations.9 Rationalising explanations are a form of explanation why, and so have
that in common with the explanations just considered, but we are to distinguish rational-
ising explanations from the sort of eﬃcient-causal explanations, constitutive explanations
and teleological explanations just considered nevertheless.
It is a good question what the form rationalising explanation amounts to. One thing
we can say is that for an explanation to be a rationalising explanation requires that it takes
a fact which records the obtaining or occurrence of a judgement sensitive phenomenon
as explanandum and appeals to some factor as explanans which involves what the subject
takes to be a reason in favour of their engaging in the judgement sensitive activity in ques-
tion. That’s part of what the form of intelligibility involved in rationalising explanation
requires. I will be adding to this conception of rationalising explanation as we go along.
With a rough characterisation of the notion of a form of explanation in play, we are
now in a position to understand Williams’ claim. When Williams says that the form of
explanation to which Smith’s action is subject is not aﬀected by whether Smith is believ-
ing truly or falsely the form that he is focusing on is the form rationalising explanation:
explanations why given in terms of what the agent takes to be the reasons in favour of
their -ing. What he is saying is that that form is not aﬀected by whether Smith’s belief is
true. As I have said, I do not think we should interpret this as the suggestion that whether
Smith’s action is subject to a rationalising explanation at all fails to depend on the cor-
9This is not to deny that rationalising explanations are eﬃcient-causal, nor that they are teleological. The
thought is that the most specific type to which rationalising explanations belong diﬀers from the most spe-
cific types to which (i)-(viii) belong. Consistently with that, rationalising explanation might still exemplify,
as a more generic type, the eﬃcient-causal and teleological forms exemplified as the most specific types by
(i)-(iv) and (vii)-(viii) respectively.
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rectness of Smith’s belief. Rather, Williams is agreeing that Smith’s action is subject to a
rationalising explanation across both cases, but he is intending to make a comment about
the nature of that way of making things intelligible.
What I want to suggest is that Williams’ claim can be read in two ways. On the one
hand, Williams could be read as saying that necessarily, for every explanation which ex-
emplifies the form rationalising explanation – a form of explanation the availability of
which depends on the agent taking p to be a reason in favour of their -ing – that very
explanation could be true if the subject’s belief is true or if it’s false. The truth of the
particular explanation doesn’t require the subject’s belief to have a particular truth-value.
All particular rationalising explanations are unaﬀected by the true/false distinction.
On the other hand, Williams could be read as saying that whenever an agent’s -ing
is subject to a rationalising explanation, it cannot be that the form of explanation which
it exemplifies requires the subject’s belief to be true. It cannot be that there is a way of
making the subject’s -ing rationally intelligible which requires that the subject gets their
reasons right. As we might put it: whenever an agent’s -ing is subject to a rationalising
explanation the way in which the judgement sensitive phenomenon in question is made
intelligible doesn’t require that the agent’s belief is true or false. There is one type of thing
being a rationalising explanation is, and it is neutral on whether or not p is true. On this
reading, Williams is denying that there can be an explanation which is rationalising but in
a way that requires that p has a particular truth-value: there is no such thing as the type
rationalising-explanation-in-terms-of-a-normative-reason.
These two readings are genuinely distinct. To say that the form to which all rational-
ising explanations belong is such that the truth of the explanation doesn’t require that the
subject’s belief has a particular truth-value, is consistent with the thought that the truth
of the particular explanation in question does require that the belief has a particular truth-
value. It’s just that, if it does, that will not be by dint of its exemplifying the form it does.
So Williams’ claim on the second reading does not entail the claim on the first. However,
the claim read in the first way does entail the claim read in the second. For if no rational-
ising explanation requires the truth of what the subject believes, then it cannot be that are
any rationalising explanations which do have that requirement by virtue of their form.
There is a way of generalising Williams’ claim and it is the claim in this generalised
form which I want to focus on. The way to generalise it is to have it focus not just on
whether p is true or false but on whether p is a normative reason for S to , so that the
claim is that rationalising explanation is independent of whether p is a genuine reason
for S to . That claim is more general than Williams’ original because if rationalising
explanation doesn’t require p to be a genuine reason for S to  then it cannot require p to
be true, for p must be a fact if it is to be a genuine reason.
Generalised in that way Williams’ claim is still ambiguous. First, it can be read as
the claim that all particular rationalising explanations do not require that p is a normative
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reason for S to  in order to be true; second, it can be read as the claim that the type to
which all rationalising explanations belong doesn’t require p to be a normative reason for
S to . The claim read in the first way is stronger than the claim read in the second: the
former entails the latter but not vice-versa. Thus, I will label the first Williams’ Dictums
and the second Williams’ Dictumw. Let us codify the two theses here:
Williams’ Dictums Necessarily, for any rationalising explanation, RE, RE can be true
whether or not p is a normative reason for S to .
Williams’ Dictumw Necessarily, for any rationalising explanation, RE, RE does not make
the agent’s -ing intelligible in a way that requires p to be a normative reason for S
to .
In the next section I will be examining what Davidson and Dancy could say about
the success condition and in so doing I will provide some illustrative examples of the
distinction between each of Williams’ Dicta. But before moving on to that, some initial
clarificatory comments are in order. The distinction between the two theses hinges on the
distinction between a particular explanation and the form exemplified by it. The thought is
that an explanation might exemplify a certain requirement by dint of its form, or it might
exemplify a certain requirement, but not by dint of its form. This seems to me to be a
perfectly good distinction to draw, as our investigation of the three sets of non-rationalising
explanations above can be relied upon to show. Take, for example, explanation (i). The
form of the explanation, that is: the way it makes its explanandum intelligible, is causal
explanation why. The truth of (i) requires that the particular fact to which it appeals – that
the tree was hit by a strong wind – obtains. The explanation would be false if that fact
didn’t obtain. But the form of (i) does not require that fact to obtain: it is not built into the
general way in which things are made intelligible by (i) that the particular fact about the
wind obtains. So an explanation might exemplify a requirement even though it does not
do so by dint of its form.
This should help us understand the distinction between Williams’ Dictums and Will-
iams’ Dictumw. The requirement at issue is that the explanation is true only if p is a
normative reason for S to . The former thesis says that this is not a requirement of any
particular rationalising explanation. The latter says that it is not a requirement built into
the form exemplified by any particular rationalising explanation. As should be clear, the
latter might be true whilst the former false.
5.3 Reductionism
I have advertised the main target in this chapter as Reductionism. But I have not talked
about Reductionism so far. This section argues that Reductionism is logically equivalent
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to Williams Dictumw: it is the picture of the good case delivered to us by that thesis. It
follows that underminingWilliams’ Dictumw is a way of undermining Reductionism. That
is the strategy to be pursued later on.
I want to begin by returning to the competing conceptions of rationalising explanation
oﬀered by Davidson and Dancy, each of which constitute versions of Reductionism. I want
to show that each account can be developed so as to accommodate the success conditions
discussed in §5.1. One point which will emerge is that although Davidson and Dancy must
acceptWilliams’ Dictumw, they needn’t acceptWilliams’ Dictums. After that, we’ll be in a
good position to appreciate precisely what Reductionism about the success case amounts to
and how it is connected to Williams’ Dicta. It should be noted before I continue, however,
that what I oﬀer in §§5.3.1-2 is not an interpretation of what Davidson and Dancy actually
commit to. Rather, what I oﬀer here is a sketch of how they could develop their theories
in order to accommodate the success case.
5.3.1 Success for Davidson
According to Davidson, we’re to think of the type to which rationalising explanations
belong as neutral on whether p is a genuine reason for the subject to : in so far as an
explanation is of that type, it doesn’t follow that p is a fact which favours their -ing. But
Davidson thinks of the rationalising type in a distinctive way. According to Davidson,
an explanation’s being a rationalising explanation requires it to take the agent’s -ing as
explanandum and the state of S’s believing that p as explanans, where the explanation is
underwritten by an eﬃcient-causal relation holding between the state and the -ing. An
explanation of that type holds in both the good case and the bad case.
Now let us ask Davidson the following question: what is it to  in response to the
normative reason that p? Since that condition constitutively involves the obtaining of a
rationalising explanation, Davidsonwill say that part of the answer is that -ing in response
to a normative reason involves the agent -ing because of their belief that p, where the
explanatory link is underwritten by a causal relation between the two. But Davidson cannot
rest content with that answer, because -ing in response to a normative reason requires that
p is true and is a normative reason, but -ing because of one’s belief that p doesn’t entail
that: the type of explanation present doesn’t guarantee that those features of the success
case obtain. So he will have to add: -ing in response to the normative reason that p
consists in -ing because of one’s true belief that p – where the explanation is causal and p
favours one’s -ing. But what about the Epistemic Thesis: that knowing that p is required
for -ing in response to a normative reason?10 Davidson can incorporate this point just
by dint of the fact that one’s knowledge in the good case is one’s belief. Thus, properly
developed, Davidson’s position on the good case is this: to  in response to the reason that
10I ignore the fourth condition identified in §5.1 in order to ease the discussion.
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p is to  because of one’s knowledge that p, where p favours one’s -ing and where the
explanation is eﬃcient-causal.
At this point, what the Davidsonian position amounts to exactly depends on how the
state of knowing is conceived. If, on the one hand, the state of knowing were thought of as
reducing to the state of believing, plus truth and warrant,11 Davidson would end up saying
that the explanans in the good case is identical to the explanans in the bad, and hence that
the two explanations would be the same explanation. The explanans would be the same
because the state the subject is in in the bad case would be token identical to the state they
are in in the good case. It’s just that the explanans in the good case would happen to have
certain properties which give it the status of knowledge. If, on the other hand, the state of
knowing were thought of as a primitive type of propositional attitude in its own right, as
Williamson (2000) would have us believe, then Davidson would be committed to saying
that the explanans in the good case is genuinely diﬀerent to the explanans in the bad. For
we would have a diﬀerent kind of state present in the good case than in the bad. Either
way, it’s worth emphasising, the type of explanation would be the same.12
So Davidson’s position needs to be developed so that he incorporates the point that
knowing is required for responding to a normative reason. This point is incorporated by
an identification of the state of believing with the state of knowing in the good case. This
position then divides into two sub-positions, each corresponding to the two diﬀerent ways
of conceiving of knowing. The first position, which utilises the standard conception of
knowledge as a special kind of believing, commits Davidson to the claim that particular
rationalising explanations are exactly the same in the good case and bad: both appeal to
a state of believing. The second position, which utilises the Williamsonian conception
of knowledge, generates the result that the particular explanations are diﬀerent, for they
appeal to diﬀerent kinds of state. Both explanations are of the same type: rationalising
explanation, thought of as a type which is neutral on whether the subject is in the good
case.
There are two points to highlight about the ways of developing the Davidsonian posi-
tion which have just been explored. First, each way of developing the position diﬀers with
respect to its relationship with Williams’ Dicta. The second way of developing the posi-
11Here I identify warrant with whatever factor converts true belief into knowledge.
12The initial way of incorporating the point that responding to a normative reason requires knowing was to
say that the explanans of the good-case rationalising explanation is the state of knowing. The ‘is’ there
can be an ‘is’ of identity, if the standard conception of knowledge is assumed. If the Williamsonian view is
assumed then the ‘is’ could still be the ‘is’ of identity, in which case a disjunctive conception of believing,
of the sort rejected by Williamson himself, will have to be operated with. That is the way I have tacitly
assumed things would go. However, it could be interpreted as an ‘is’ of constitution if the Williamsonian
conception of knowledge is assumed too. This raises the possibility that Davidson could incorporate the
epistemic point in a diﬀerent way, in order to avoid committing himself to the claim that the explanations
are diﬀerent across good cases and bad. What he could say is that the explanans is a belief in both cases,
it’s just that in the good case the belief is constituted by a state of knowing. That would be a third way of
developing Davidson’s position which I leave out of the text in order to not make the discussion even more
complicated than it already is.
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tion combines a rejection ofWilliams’ Dictums with an acceptance ofWilliams’ Dictumw.
It accepts the latter because it says that rationalising explanations do not belong to a type
which require that p is a normative reason for S to . But it rejects the former because it
says that explanations in the good case take as explanantia states of knowing, which just
are the states of believing that cause one’s -ing. So the particular explanation to which
one’s -ing is subject in the good case is not identical to the explanation to which one’s
-ing is subject in the bad case. On the first way of developing the position, however, both
of Williams’ Dicta are maintained. Williams’ Dictumw is maintained in the same way
and Williams’ Dictums is also accepted because the explanans is a state of mind identical
across the good case and bad.
Davidson’s position thinks of the form exemplified by all rationalising explanations
as neutral, so that if a particular rationalising explanation takes as its explanans an item
which can function as explanans only in the good case – for example, the fact that p or the
state of knowing that p – then that will be accidental from the point of view of the way in
which it makes the relevant explanandum intelligible – it will be accidental from the point
of view of the form of the explanation. This brings me to my second point. Although the
state of knowing can figure in Davidsonian rationalising explanations, as it does on each
development of the basic position, it cannot be that the agent’s -ing in the good case is
explained by a state of knowing qua knowing. The way in which rationalising explanations
make -ings intelligible, for Davidson, is simply by dint of connecting the -ings with the
relevant causally active state of mind that constitute the appearance of normative reasons
to the subject, not to those states of mind which constitute the subject’s awareness of such
reasons. So even though knowing can figure in rationalising explanations in the good
case, for Davidson, it is accidental to the way in which the explanation makes the relevant
judgement sensitive phenomenon intelligible that the state of knowing plays the role it
does. There might be a sense in which knowing does explanatory work for Davidson, but
we must not be misled into thinking that it is qua knowing that the agent s.
5.3.2 Success for Dancy
We’ve looked at how the Davidsonian position might cope with the good case and I’ve
put on the map two ways of developing the theory so as to cope with it. On each way
of coping with it, the explanans in the good case is a state of knowing, but only on one
way of developing it does that get us the result that Williams’ Dictums is true. But now
let’s move on to examining Dancy’s Reductionist position. We’ll find, again, that there
are two diﬀerent ways of developing Dancy’s position which diﬀer with respect to their
relationship with Williams’ Dicta.
According to Dancy, we’re to think of the type exemplified by all rationalising expla-
nations as neutral with respect to whether p is a normative reason for S to . The way in
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which things are made intelligible by rationalising explanations does not essentially in-
volve reference to a normative reason. The type of explanation is to be thought of as an
explanatory link between the agent’s -ing and what they take to be a normative reason:
p. The explanation is underwritten by a primitive type of non-causal relation which links
p with the agent’s -ing. The sort of relation holds even when p is false. This makes the
explanation non-factive: it can be true even if its explanans is false, or does not obtain.
The sort of explanation here is enabled by the subject believing that p and taking p to be
a normative reason for them to , even though neither of those conditions are part of the
explanans of the rationalising explanation.
Now let’s ask the following question: how should Dancy account for the success con-
dition of -ing in response to the normative reason that p? First, Dancy will say that it
involves the obtaining of an explanation that falls under the type rationalising explana-
tion. But since Dancy conceives of that type as failing to suﬃce for the subject to be in the
good case, his answer cannot stop there. He will have to say, in addition, that it involves p
being true and being a genuine reason in favour of the agent’s -ing. He will also have to
acknowledge the point that the success condition requires knowing that p. How should he
incorporate all of this into his account?
I suggest that the basic idea should be that the type of explanation which holds in the
good case doesn’t require p to be true, or be a normative reason or that one knows that
p. But the particular explanation does take the fact that p as explanans. Dancy can then
incorporate the epistemic point by saying that the belief which enables the explanation is a
state of knowing. So in the good case, the explanation which holds explains why the agent
s by appeal to a fact which favours the agent’s -ing, and the explanation is enabled by a
piece of knowledge on the agent’s part.
However, there are two ways of developing this conception of the good case which give
us diﬀerent results. The variation depends on how Dancy thinks of facts. If, on the one
hand, he thinks of facts as entities which exist across both good cases and bad, but which
only obtain – only are facts – in the good case, then he can agree that the explanans in the
good case is identical to the explanans in the bad case. If, on the other hand, Dancy thinks
that the fact that p does not exist in the bad case, so that whatever facts are they are facts
essentially, then he is committed to thinking of the explanans of rationalising explanations
in the good case as distinct from the explanans in bad cases and hence as the particular
explanations as being diﬀerent. In other words: if Dancy thinks that the identity of a fact
can be held fixed whilst varying whether or not it obtains, then Dancy will be committed
to saying that the particular explanation in the good case has the same explanans as in the
bad case, and hence that the particular explanations are the same. If, on the other hand,
Dancy were to say that the obtaining of a fact is an essential feature of it, then he will have
to say that the explanans in the good case is not the same as that in the bad case, and hence
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that the two explanations are diﬀerent.13;14
Again, there are two comments which need to be made about these possible devel-
opments of Dancy’s basic position. First, they diﬀer with respect to their relationship
with Williams’ Dicta. The second way of developing Dancy’s basic idea is committed to
Williams’ Dictumw but rejects Williams’ Dictums. It’s committed to the former because
it says that the form of explanation in each case is the same – a form which is neutral on
whether p is a reason for the subject to . It rejects the latter because it says that the ex-
planation in the good case has a diﬀerent explanans to the corresponding explanation in
the bad – an essentially obtaining fact in the former, and a distinct entity, or perhaps no
entity at all, in the latter. On the first way of developing the position, however, according to
which the explanans is a fact which obtains in the good case but the very same entity, just
non-obtaining, in the bad, the explanantia are identical and so the particular explanations
are identical too. Thus, both of Williams’ Dicta are accepted.
The second point to highlight is that, even though on both positions the normative
reason that p thought of as a fact with a distinctive normative profile is the explanans of the
rationalising explanation in the good case, it cannot be that the normative reason explains
qua fact or qua its normative status: the status of the normative reason as a fact is not an
explanatorily relevant feature of the explanans in the good case, and neither is its normative
character. Again, this is because the very way in which the explanation makes the agent’s
-ing intelligible makes no appeal to the status of p as a fact or as a normatively significant
item. The form of explanation ignores those properties of the explanans and hence those
properties don’t do explanatory work for Dancy, however the position is developed in order
to accommodate the good case. Rationalisers get to be rationalisers for Dancy just by dint
of being apparent normative reasons, not by dint of being the genuine article. That’s so
even if the genuine article is what happens to do the explaining in the good case.
5.3.3 Reductionism &Williams’ Dicta
We’ve seen, then, that there is flexibility with respect to how the good case is understood by
Davidson and by Dancy. Both can agree that a normative reason-involving condition can
explain why the agent s in the good case: a state of knowing, for Davidson, the normative
reason that p itself, for Dancy. Whether this requires the proponent of the theory to reject
Williams’ Dictums depends on how the suggestion is further developed. But both agree
that the type of explanation is neutral on whether the subject is in the good case and hence
13This metaphysical issue mirrors the metaphysical issue of whether we should think of knowing as consist-
ing in a state that can exist without enjoying the status of knowledge or whether we should conceive of
it as a state which is essentially knowledge. That issue in the metaphysics of mind is what the diﬀerence
between the two versions of the basic development of Davidson’s position turns on.
14Dancy’s preferred position on this matter, at least in Practical Reality, is that facts, and hence normative
reasons, are states of aﬀairs which obtain. States of aﬀairs are thought of as items which can exist without
obtaining (Dancy, 2000:114-118). His preferred view would thus be a variant of the first development of
his position.
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are committed to saying that it is not qua knowledge or qua normative reason that the
relevant explanans does its explanatory work. That aspect of the Williamsian picture must
be upheld.
I now wish to introduce my main target in this chapter: Reductionism about the condi-
tion of -ing in response to the normative reason that p. The basic idea of Reductionism
is this. We are to think of responding to the normative reason that p as consisting in the
holding of a rationalising explanation. But the Reductionist says that we are to think of the
type exemplified by all rationalising explanations as neutral: in so far as the rationalising
explanation belongs to the type it does, it fails to follow that p is a genuine reason for S
to . Making an agent’s -ing intelligible in the distinctively rationalising way can never
consist in making it intelligible by appeal to a normative reason, or else to the state of mind
which constitutes one’s awareness of a normative reason. Now, that an explanation of that
type holds cannot suﬃce for the subject to count as responding to a normative reason, for
an explanation of that type holds in the bad case. So it must be that responding to a nor-
mative reason cannot simply consist in the holding of an explanation of that type. It must
instead consist in an explanation of that type holding, but, in addition, a set of other factors
holding which are extra to the type of explanation in question. These factors will include
the truth of p and its normative status, as well as one’s knowledge of p and its normative
status. The extra factors will, as we have seen, been assigned an explanatory role: they
will either be the explanans of the particular explanation, be a part of that explanans, or
be an enabling condition for particular explanation.
In saying that the relevant factors are extra to the type of explanation in question I
intend to say two things. First, that they are not guaranteed to obtain just because there
is an explanation of that type on the scene. The truth of p, its normative status, one’s
knowledge of p and its normative status, and whatever other factors are involved in the
good case other than the type of explanation, are not guaranteed to be there just by dint of
there being an explanation of that type on the scene. Second, I intend to say that even if
those factors enter into the explanation in the ways at issue, the explanation doesn’t appeal
to them qua the conditions that they are: it is not qua true, or qua normative reason, or
qua knowledge that the relevant factors explain, if they do.
Reductionism is logically equivalent to Williams’ Dictumw. First, Reductionism en-
tails Williams’ Dictumw simply because it has a commitment to that thesis built into it.
The Reductionist precisely thinks that the type exemplified by all rationalising explana-
tions is neutral on the presence of normative reasons. But second, Williams’ Dictumw
entails Reductionism. That’s because if one subscribes to Williams’ Dictumw then one
will have to say that -ing in response to a normative reason constitutively involves a ra-
tionalising explanation, and since the type to which it belongs is neutral one will have to
say that, in addition to there being an explanation of that type present, also there are some
extra-explanatory factors present which guarantee, together with the explanation, success.
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So Reductionism just is the picture of the good case one ends up with if one subscribes
to Williams’ Dictumw and if one subscribes to that picture then one must subscribe to
Williams’ Dictumw. Refuting the latter, then, constitutes a refutation of Reductionism.
I now want to move on to present the conception of the good case I want to defend,
which involves a commitment to a thesis inconsistent with Williams’ Dictumw and hence
inconsistent with Reductionism. I will be arguing for that thesis later, and that is how my
refutation of Reductionism will work.
5.4 The Essential Normativity Thesis
My preferred way of rejecting Williams’ Dictumw can be brought out by considering the
following passage from Hyman’s Acting for Reasons: Reply to Dancy:
As we have seen, we have the idea of reasoning from a premise, which may be
known, or merely believed. . . andwhichmay be true or false. But as well as the
idea of reasoning from a premise, we also have the idea of being guided by a
fact. As noted earlier, if someone is said to have been guided by a certain fact,
this means that he took it into consideration when he modified his thought
or behaviour in some way, or decided what to think or what to do. This, I
suggest, is howwe should understand the idea of a fact being a person’s reason.
(Hyman, 2011:355-356)
In this paper at least, Hyman accepts, following Dancy and other proponents of the
Motivating Reasons Postulate, that the agent s for the reason that p in both the good
case and the bad case.15 With that in the background, we can understand what Hyman is
doing here in the following way. Hyman wants to draw a distinction between two kinds of
relations that might hold between the reason for which the subject s and their -ing, when
the subject s for the reason that p. The first relation he labels ‘reasoning from a premise’.
Reasoning from a premise is supposed to be a relation which holds whether or not p is
a bona fide normative reason for the subject to . The obtaining of that relation suﬃces
for the agent to  for the reason that p, as Hyman conceives of the latter condition.16 But
in addition to that normatively neutral relation, there is also the relation he labels ‘being
guided by a fact’. We can think of this second relation as a relation that is identical to what
15Hyman’s relationship with the Motivating Reasons Postulate is unclear. In How Knowledge Works, The
Road to Larissa, and Knowledge and Evidence he rejects the claim that S s for the reason that p in the
bad case, in which case in those papers we should rank him alongside Raz, Alvarez, Roessler and Stout in
rejecting the Postulate. But in Acting in Ignorance, as we have seen, he sides with Dancy and the rest in
accepting it, without flagging it up that he’s changed his mind.
16Concerning the relation of reasoning from a premise, Hyman points out that we’ll have to be careful to
distinguish it from the relation that holds between the subject’s -ing and p, when p is merely something
that has been supposed to be true, as opposed to believed to be true, during the course of reasoning which
led up to the subject’s -ing.
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I’ve been calling ‘responding to the normative reason that p’, so that the relation holds
between the subject’s -ing and their reason only in the good case. Being guided by the
fact that p is a relation which requires p to be a normative reason, and requires one to know
that p. Treating p as a premise requires neither of those things.
Importantly for my purposes, Hyman thinks that the relation of being guided by and
the relation of treating as a premise are explanatory relations. By that I mean that Hyman
intends the relations to be such that if they obtain, then the agent’s -ing is subject to a
certain explanation why, indeed a rationalising explanation why. But part of the purpose
of separating the two relations is to make the stronger point that the corresponding forms
of rationalising explanation are themselves diﬀerent. On the one hand, there is the form
of rationalising explanation which involves an explanatory link between the agent’s -ing
and the known fact that p, which is made available by the obtaining of the being guided by
relation. On the other hand, there is the form of rationalising which involves an explana-
tory link between the agent’s -ing and their belief that p, which is made available by the
obtaining of the treating as a premise relation.
The latter sort of rationalising explanation is neutral on whether p is a normative reason
for S to  and hence is a type which can obtain in both good cases and bad. It is a type of
explanation which requires, of the explanation which exemplifies it, a judgement sensitive
phenomenon – or else a fact which records the presence of one – as explanandum and the
state or fact of the subject’s belief that p as explanans. It also requires the obtaining of the
‘treating as a premise’ relation. The former type of rationalising explanation essentially
appeals to the fact that p as explanans. It requires, of the explanation which exemplifies it,
that it takes a judgement sensitive phenomenon – or the fact of one – as explanandum and
the fact that p as explanans. It also requires obtaining of the ‘being guided by’ relation
as well as requiring that the subject knows that p, for knowing that p enables the ‘being
guided by’ relation to obtain. It follows, given that the form of rationalising explanation
which corresponds to the ‘being guided by’ relation has this character, that it is a form of
rationalising explanation which is available only if the subject is responding to a norma-
tive reason. That’s because no explanation available in the bad case essentially involves
reference to what can be said in favour of the subject’s -ing, even if it is a bad case in
which p happens to be a normative reason.
It should be clear that Hyman’s position involves the rejection of Williams’ Dictumw.
The type rationalising explanation admits of two sub-types for Hyman: there’s the type
of rationalising explanation that involves an explanatory link individuated by the being
guided by relation, and there’s the kind which involves a link individuated by the treating
as a premise relation. Each of these types is a species of rationalising explanation: the
being guided by type of explanation and the treating as a premise type of explanation are
two diﬀerent ways in which a rationalising explanation can be constituted. As a result, if
Hyman is right then Williams’ Dictumw is false. That’s because Hyman’s view implies
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that the explanation to which Smith’s action is subject is of a type which requires p to be a
reason in favour of the subject’s -ing. This in turn implies that the particular explanation
to which Smith’s action is subject can be true only if p is a normative reason for S to . So
Williams’ Dictums is false too, if Hyman is right.
Putting all this together, Hyman’s view in Acting in Ignorance seems to be this. -
ing for the reason that p is a condition which obtains in both the good case and the bad.
Moreover, it is a condition which consists in the obtaining of a rationalising explanation.
However, rationalising explanations come in two forms: the being-guided-by-the-fact ex-
planations and the treating-p-as-a-premise explanations. -ing for the reason that p con-
sists in the former in the good case but in the bad case it consists in the latter.
I think that Hyman’s view is essentially right, but the view which I want to defend
departs from his in certain respects. Most significantly, I reject Hyman’s claim that -ing
for the reason that p is a condition which obtains in the bad case as well as the good. I have
argued that it obtains only in the good case. However, I agree that -ing for the reason that
p simply consists in the obtaining of a kind of rationalising explanation. And I agree that
rationalising explanation comes in two fundamentally diﬀerent forms. First, there’s the
neutral type which consists in an explanatory link between the fact of the subject’s -ing
and the fact of the subject’s belief that p. This type of explanation is the only type which
holds in the bad case and it does not suﬃce for one to count as -ing for a reason: one does
no such thing in the bad case. Second, there’s a type of rationalising explanation which
takes the fact that p qua normative reason as explanans and takes the fact of the subject’s
-ing as explanandum. This second type of rationalising explanation holds in the good
case only and the holding of it is indeed identical to what it is to respond to the normative
reason that p. The former type requires that one believes that p and that one takes p to be a
normative reason. In keeping with the account of the good case developed in §5.1, I want
to say that the latter type of explanation is enabled by one’s knowing that p and by one’s
knowledgeably taking p to be a normative reason for one to .
Unlike Hyman, I remain neutral on the nature of the concrete relations which ground
the availability of each type of rationalising explanation. Moreover, unlike Hyman I make
the claim that the good case explanation takes the fact that p as explanans qua normative
reason. The thought is that the type of explanation which holds in the good case requires
of its exemplars that they take the fact that p as explanans, but also that that fact is doing
its explanatory work in so far as it is a normative reason. It is that feature of the fact
that p which is its explanatory relevant property, when it comes to the sorts of good case
rationalising explanations of which it is a part. Finally, like Hyman I build it into my
position that the good case explanation is enabled partly by a state of knowing that p. But
unlike Hyman I add to that that it is enabled also by a state of knowledgeably taking p to
be a reason in favour of one’s -ing as well.
The centre-piece of this Hyman-inspired position is the following thesis:
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The Essential Normativity Thesis. There is a type of rationalising explanation which
involves S’s -ing being explained by the fact that p qua normative reason for S to
, is enabled by S’s knowledge that p and is enabled by S knowledgeably taking p
to be reason for them to .
This encapsulates the thought that there is a special species of rationalising explanation
available which takes the shape of a type of rationalising explanation that has the fact that
p qua normative reason as explanans, enabled by one’s knowledge. Explanations of this
type require the presence of genuine normative reasons for the -ing in question, by dint
of the very form of intelligibility they operate with.17 I’ll refer to this thesis in abbreviated
form as (ENT). (ENT) is my way of rejecting Williams’s Dicta and hence Reductionism.
It is worth emphasising that what has been presented here is a certain thesis about ra-
tionalising explanation, (ENT), but, on top of that, I have also oﬀered a positive conception
of rationalising explanation which is made available by (ENT). I will be primarily focused
on (ENT) itself in what follows. But in order to clarify my position, I want to make some
points about (ENT) and its relation to the other elements of my positive picture.
The claim I make is that there is a special form of rationalising explanation to which
the agent’s -ing can be subject. The form in question places a restriction on the explanans
of the explanations which exemplify it: that it must be a normative reason for the subject
to  which functions as the explanans, and it does so qua normative reason for them to
. That is (ENT). I also suggest a number of other things. Chief amongst them is an
account of the success condition of responding to the normative reason that p: that we
should identify -ing in response to the normative reason that p with -ing subject to a
rationalising explanation of the special sort described. What is the relation between (ENT)
and that account of -ing in response to a normative reason?
(ENT) implies that there is a type of explanation which is present if, and only if, the
subject is in the good case. The identity claim is a positive element of the overall position
I argue for, which is made available by (ENT) given that it entails the bi-conditional just
specified. Why does (ENT) entail that bi-conditional? That is: supposing there is a type of
explanationwhichmakes judgement sensitive phenomena intelligible essentially by appeal
to normative reasons as such, why should it be that explanations of that type hold when,
and only when, the subject is in the good case? Well, there are bad cases in which p is not
a reason for the subject to . In those cases, the type of explanation envisaged by (ENT)
doesn’t hold, trivially. With respect to bad cases in which p happens to be a normative
17It is worth oﬀering the reminder that I am not here suggesting that a complete rationalising explanation
is one which takes the fact that p qua reason as explanans. Nor do I suggest that a complete neutral type
of rationalising explanation takes the fact that one believes that p as explanans. Where -ing is an action,
for example, what one represents to be the good in the action one is pursuing might also be a part of the
former, and the state which represents that good might be a part of the latter, as might many other elements,
for all I’ve said. I’m here bracketing oﬀ all elements of the explanation which are not contributed by the
agent’s cognitive life.
129
reason for the subject to , the subject still blamelessly fails to respond to a normative
reason. I do not see how this is compatible with them -ing subject to a rationalising
explanation of a form which makes their -ing intelligible by appeal to the normative
reason as such. The point of saying that the agent fails to respond to what so happens to be
a reason for them to  is precisely that the reason doesn’t figure in the explanation of their
-ing, or if it does so then that is an accident. The upshot is that the sort of explanation
described by (ENT) applies to the subject’s -ing only if the subject is in the good case.
But if (ENT) is true, then presumably the type of explanation is instanced somewhere, and
where else could be instanced other than in good cases, given what has been said about the
impossibility of it holding in bad cases. Thus, if (ENT) is right, then S s in response to
the normative reason that p if, and only if S’s -ing is subject to a rationalising explanation
of the form envisaged by (ENT). This puts me in a position to endorse the identity claim:
-ing in response to a normative reason consists in the obtaining of an explanation type
envisaged by (ENT).
In addition to the account of the good case which is made available by (ENT), a further
element of my positive position is the claim that there is a type of rationalising explanation
available that is neutral in the way Williams’ describes. My view is not that the only type
of rationalising explanation there is is the special type described by (ENT). I agree full
well that the agent’s -ing is subject to a rationalising explanation in the bad case, where
that bad case explanation is also present in the good case, on top of the special explanation
envisaged by (ENT). My view about the neutral explanation is that it takes the fact that
one believes that p as explanans. It does not, contra Dancy, take what one believes as
explanans, for that would involve denying the factivity of explanation why.
So we have two sorts of rationalising explanation: a neutral sort and an essentially
successful sort. My account of rationalising explanation can thus be stated like this: ratio-
nalising explanation consists either in -ing because p qua normative reason, so that one
s in response to the normative reason that p, or it consists in -ing because one believes
that p, so that one s in a way that manifests one’s taking p to be a normative reason.
The account I oﬀer is thus a disjunctive or pluralistic account of the form rationalising
explanation. Non-psychologistic rationalising statements report the essentially successful
explanations, psychologistic rationalising statements report the neutral explanations.
I want to end this section by exploring a way of attacking Williams’ Dictumw which
is distinct from my own. My way of rejecting Williams’ Dicta involves first, rejecting
Williams’ Dictumw, which in turn motivates a rejection of Williams’ Dictums. Rejecting
Williams’ Dictumw involves arguing that there is a kind of rationalising explanation which
requires the presence of a genuine normative reason. During a discussion in which he
rightly accuses Dancy of subscribing to the claim that rationalising explanations are of a
type which is neutral on the truth of p, McDowell protests that in addition to such a form of
rationalising explanation there is also a form to which the fact that p is essential. That is the
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generic idea associated with the rejection of Williams’ Dictumw. Here is how McDowell
sums up his objection to Dancy:
There is no need to deny that an explanation in one of the forms Dancy coun-
tenances can provide some understanding of an action. But if we have only
that understanding, we do not yet know an answer to a question that should
concern us if we are interested in how the action manifests the agent’s practi-
cal rationality at work. We do not yet know, and we ought to want to know,
whether the action can be understood as a rational response to the fact in ques-
tion. If it can, we can have an understanding of the action to which its being
a fact that the agent is acting in the light of is integral. That is the idea of act-
ing in the light of a fact that is missing from Dancy’s thinking. (McDowell,
2013a:19)
I reject Williams’ Dicta and hence agree that there is a kind of intelligibility special to
the good case, to which the truth (and indeed normative status) of p is integral. McDowell
is quite right that that sort of intelligibility is available in the good case on top of the sort of
neutral intelligibility Dancy countenances. But that is a generic idea. What is distinctive
about the way in which I reject Williams’ Dictumw is the way in which I cash out the
generic idea McDowell expresses. In my view, the special explanation is an explanation
which appeals to the fact that p qua normative reason. Its explanans is p and p functions
as the explanans by dint of its being a normative reason. It is enabled by one’s knowledge
that p and by one’s knowledge of its normative status. Those features are integral to the
type of rationalising explanation special to the good case.
However, there are other ways of conceiving of the sort of explanation special to the
good case – there are other ways of making sense of the generic idea of the special kind
of intelligibility to which McDowell refers. One alternative way of conceiving of it can be
extracted from the work of Hornsby. Hornsby thinks that if one is married to a conception
of rationalising explanation according to which rationalising explanation always takes the
form of -ing because one believes that p, then one will not be able to make sense of the
idea that an agent s in response to a normative reason. Instead, Hornsby recommends the
following view:
(DisA) If X -d because X believed that p, then
EITHER X -d because X knew that p, so that X -d because p
OR X -d because X merely believed that p
(Hornsby, 2008:252)
Here is how I think we should read Hornsby. Hornsby takes it that -ing for a reason
consists in -ing in a way that is subject to a rationalising explanation. One s in a way
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that is subject to a rationalising explanation just in case one s because one believes that
p. But -ing because one believes that p is a form of explanation which admits of two
sub-forms. On the one hand, it can consist in -ing because one knows that p, which is
equivalent to -ing because p. On the other hand it can consist in -ing merely because
one believes that p: the explanans of the explanation could simply be one’s belief that
p, not one’s knowledge or the fact that p. The first form of explanation is what -ing in
response to a normative reason consists in.
One interpretive issue here is how Hornsby conceives of the explanation in the good
case. She thinks that the explanations in terms of the agent’s knowing that p are equivalent
in some sense to the explanations in terms of the fact that p. Both explanations are non-
neutral: they both require that p is true and hence that the subject is in the good case. But
the former achieves that result partly by dint of taking a certain state of mind as explanans,
a state of mind which guarantees that p is true. The second achieves that result partly by
dint of taking the fact that p itself as explanans, although it is still an explanation that
requires the subject to know that p. The second picture ascribes to the state of knowing
that p the role of enabling condition for the special kind of good-case explanation. The
first picture says that it is the explanans of the explanation of the special kind.
I do not propose to resolve the interpretive issue.18 All I want to point out is that
there is an alternative to my proposal as to how to cash out the generic idea of a kind of
rational intelligibility that is special to the good case which can at least be extracted from
Hornsby’s work, even if it cannot be attributed to her with confidence. When attempting
to prove (ENT), I shall have to be careful, then, to show that my argument really does
establish (ENT) and not the Hornsby-style alternative.
Having put on the table my favoured interpretation of Williams’ Dictum, what its re-
lationship is with Reductionism, and my way of resisting it – (ENT) – I now want to turn
to the task of arguing for (ENT). The next section explores and rejects two extant attempts
to undermine Williams’ Dictumw. This generates a need for a fresh argument, which I go
on to supply.
5.5 Two Arguments against Williams’ Dicta Rejected
This section examines two arguments which are supposed to tell against Williams’ Dict-
umw and finds those arguments lacking. §5.5.1 focuses on an argument from the Epistemic
Thesis which is endorsed byHornsby (2007a, 2007b, 2008) andMcDowell (2013a). §5.5.2
focuses on an argument from Roessler (2014). These are the central arguments in the liter-
18I suspect Hornsby is happy to allow that instances of ‘S s because they know that p’ and corresponding
instances of ‘S s because p’ express the same explanation and indeed an explanation of the same type,
but she sees no need to decide whether the explanans is p or that one knows that p. The important point
is just that there is a type rationalising explanation which essentially requires knowing. If that is her view
then the arguments for (ENT) to come later do show that the issue needs settling.
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ature for the abandonment of the Williamsian picture. Given that they fail, that constitutes
something of a problem for those wishing to abandon the picture. In the end, I will at-
tempt to remedy the problem by supplying some fresh considerations for its abandonment
in favour of (ENT).19
5.5.1 The Appeal to the Epistemic Thesis
There is a generic idea associated with the rejection of Williams’ Dictumw and then there
is my specific way of cashing it out. The generic idea is that there is a form of explanation
which being a rationalising explanation can consist in that makes essential reference to
a condition that obtains only if p is a normative reason for S to . The specific idea is
(ENT): that there is a form of rationalising explanation which appeals to the fact that p
qua normative reason. An alternative way of cashing out the generic idea, inspired by
Hornsby but not attributable to her with confidence, is that there is a form of explanation
which essentially takes the agent’s knowing that p as explanans.
Hornsby (2007a, 2007b, 2008) develops an argument in favour of her preferred con-
ception of rationalising explanation, encapsulated in the quote from her supplied in §5.4,
which appeals to the Epistemic Thesis. Her preferred conception of rationalising expla-
nation is intended by her to simply fall out of the Epistemic Thesis: she moves, in her
writings on the matter, directly from a, in my view successful, proof of the Epistemic
Thesis20 to her favoured conception of rationalising explanation. However we interpret
Hornsby’s view – whether we read it as a commitment to (ENT), a commitment to the
knowledge-based alternative to (ENT) which can be extracted from Hornsby’s work itself,
or as neutral on which of those is correct – it is surely intended to constitute a rejection of
Williams’ Dictumw in favour of the generic idea that there is a form of rationalising expla-
nation which is essentially normative reason-involving. What Hornsby commits herself
to, even if she doesn’t conceive of things in this way, is thus the soundness of an inference
from the Epistemic Thesis to the generic idea that encapsulates a rejection of Williams’
Dictumw. Is that inference sound?
I accept the Epistemic Thesis. So if there is some fault with the inference it must
lie with its validity, given that the sole premise of the inference is the Epistemic Thesis.
Indeed, I think the argument is a non sequitur: just because -ing in response to the nor-
mative reason that p requires knowing that p it does not follow that there is a form of
rationalising explanation which consists in making the agent’s -ing intelligible by appeal
to the agent’s knowledge (whether the state of knowledge or what’s known).
19There is, I think, a further argument to be found in Roessler’s paper against Williams’ Dictumw which
appeals to the plausible thought that the agent can always tell why a certain rationalising explanation
holds, whenever they know the explanation to be true in the first place. I do not have space to discuss that
argument here, but, like the two arguments I do discuss, I do not think it is eﬀective.
20Or strictly speaking, the instance of it applied to bodily action.
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To see why we can look again at the Davidsonian position. Davidson should acknowl-
edge that knowing that p is required for -ing in response to the normative reason that p.
Also, he can acknowledge it, consistently with his claim that the form of rationalising ex-
planation always involves appealing to the agent’s causally active state of believing. For he
can just say that even though the form of explanation to which rationalising explanations
belong takes the shape just described, still, in the good case particular explanations appeal
to states of belief which just are states of knowing. The agent’s knowledge that p thus is
the explanans in the good case, even though the form of explanation doesn’t require it to
be, so that it is not the explanans qua knowing. That is how Davidson might acknowledge
the Epistemic Thesis consistently with his acceptance of Williams’ Dictumw, and indeed
Williams’ Dictums, depending on how he thinks of knowledge.21
The coherence of this position proves that the Epistemic Thesis all by itself does not
entail the falsehood of Williams’ Dictumw. To think that it does is to confuse the claim
that a certain condition is required for the success state of responding to the normative
reason that p with the stronger claim that it is part of the way in which the explanation
makes things intelligible that it appeals to that condition – that the condition in question
is part of the form of the explanation. The inference to which Hornsby is committed to
thinking sound is thus invalid.
There is a possible response to this on Hornsby’s part which I now want to address.
Davidson can pull oﬀ the trick of allowing the state of knowing an explanatory role in the
good case because he identifies explanantia of rationalising explanations with states of
mind.22 But, it might be pretested, this not the right thing to say about the ontology of ex-
planantia – a topic which I have been remaining neutral on so far. The correct thing to say
is that explanantia (and indeed explananda) are truths: true propositions which constitute
modes of presentation of the concrete particulars the explanation concerns.23 With this
thesis about explanation in tow, it will be suggested that the Davidsonian will need to drop
their claim that causally active states of mind are the explanantia of rationalising explana-
tions in favour of the claim that truths which record the presence of such causally active
states of mind are the relevant explanantia. Thus, it is not Smith’s state of believing that
there is free coﬀee available in the quad which strictly speaking explains why he walks to
the quad but that he believes that there is free coﬀee available in the quad which does so.
But with that conception of rationalising explanation in place, it is no longer possible for
21The same point could’ve been made by appeal to the development of Dancy’s theory described above.
22Again, it is worth emphasising that I am following the orthodox interpretation of Davidson’s position here.
It must be acknowledged, however, that Davidson himself distinguishes between the causes of an event
– which are thought of as concrete particulars – from statements about such causes (Davidson, 1967).
It is the latter which are identified by him with the explanantia of explanations. Thus, the conception
of explanation which I’m about to describe and which enables Hornsby to sidestep the worry is actually
more authentically Davidsonian than the conception of explanation operated with by the thesis I’ve labelled
‘Davidsonian’ here.
23This is the conception of explanation operated with by Strawson (1985).
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the Davidsonian to incorporate the Epistemic Thesis by making the move of identifying
the explanans of rationalising explanations in the good case with a state of knowing, for
the explanans is no longer thought of as a state in the first place.
The problem with this response is that the proponent of the Davidsonian position can
accept the claim in the ontology of explanation and accept the thought that that claim
precludes them absorbing the truth of the Epistemic Thesis in the way described above,
without accepting that it disables them from absorbing the thesis altogether. For they can
just incorporate the Epistemic Thesis, within the new ontological framework, by accepting
that the explanans of the particular rationalising explanations in the good case is the truth
that the agent knows that p. It’s just that they will have to say that it is not built into the
very form of explanation that it takes truths about the agent’s knowledge as explanantia,
so that they will have to accept that the truth that the agent knows that p does not explain
why the agent s in so far as it is a truth which records the presence of a state of knowing,
but in so far as it records the presence of a mental state which constitutes the appearance
of normative reasons to the subject. Hornsby’s inference from the Epistemic Thesis to the
denial of Williams’ Dictumw still fails, then.
5.5.2 The Anscombean Argument
I now move on to studying an argument from Roessler (2014), which I call The Anscomb-
ean Argument. The Anscombean Argument is concerned with what sense the proponent
of Williams’ Dictumw can make of a certain sort of conversational exchange involving the
asking and answering of the sort of ‘why did you ?’ question that is a topic of discussion
in Anscombe (1957). Consider Roessler’s example of such an exchange: a case in which
a photographer is setting up his camera on the side of the pavement in order to take a
photograph of Marilyn Monroe. The photographer is asked ‘why are you setting up your
camera here?’ and he replies: ‘because Marilyn Monroe is going to come this way’. Here
is what Roessler wants to say about the relevant sort of conversational exchanges:
To locate the disagreement [with Williams’ Dictumw], it is useful to distin-
guish three elements of Anscombe’s view of the reason-seeking question ‘why?’:
(a) We ordinarily take it that a good way to answer the question ‘Why are
you doing A?’ is to answer the question ‘What’s the point (or: What’s
the good) of doing A?’
(b) While there is more than one style of answering the latter question, the
most basic way to do so is this: we set out the considerations in the light
of which our doing A can be seen to be an eﬀective way to promote some
(in some way) desirable outcome.
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(c) Such explanations are often meant to be taken at face value. For ex-
ample, accepting the reason given by the photographer for positioning
his camera on that pavement would involve accepting (i) that Marilyn
Monroe is going to pass by, and (ii) that this (plus the desirability of his
taking a picture of her) gives him good reason for acting, and (iii) that
he is acting because these considerations give him good reason.
(Roessler, 2014:5)
Anscombe claims, in other words, that one way of successfully answering her ‘Why?’
question is to oﬀer an explanatory sentence which provides an answer to the question:
‘What’s the point of doing A?’, where that in turn consists in citing the normative reasons
one is committed to their being as explanantia. The result is a non-psychologistic ratio-
nalising statement associated with the good case: S is -ing because p. Moreover, she
thinks that we often intend such non-psychologistic rationalising statements to be taken as
they appear: as purporting to explain just by appeal to the normative facts. Ways of doubt-
ing the explanation, then, would include doubting that p is true, that it has the normative
significance being attributed to it, and that it is the factor doing the explanatory work –
instead of some other, perhaps non-rational factor.
The problems for Williams Dictumw are supposed to begin to emerge once it’s pointed
out that its proponent is committed to a certain sort of interpretation of such conversational
exchanges. The proponent of that view must, it seems, deny (c), on pain of convicting
ordinary thought and judgement about reasons explanations of systematic error. To unpack
this thought somewhat, the idea is that the proponent of Williams’ Dictumw is committed
to denying that rationalising explanations can take normative reasons as explanantia. But
if (c) is correct, then we are pre-philosophically committed to the thought that they can. So
if (c) is correct then the proponent of Williams’ Dictumw would be committed to saddling
ordinary thought and talk about reasons with systematic error. That would serve to shift
the burden of proof onto the proponent of Williams’ Dictumw, which is a result that they
will presumably wish to avoid (wisely, given that, as we will see, there aren’t any good
arguments for the thesis). So the proponent of Williams’ Dictumw must resist (c): we
are not pre-philosophically committed to the possibility of rationalising explanations that
appeal to normative reasons, they must say.
The next stage of Roessler’s argument purports to establish that (c) is true. This is what
Roessler has to say about the matter:
The case for (c) turns on the thought that practical reasoning has two aims that
are intelligibly and, for the deliberator, essentially connected. One aim is to
get right what one has most reason to do. The other aim is to determine or
control what one will be (or is) doing. (Ibid.)
136
I think the correct way to understand what’s going on here is as follows. Reasoning or
deliberation which characteristically results in one’s -ing for a reason involves two aims.
The first is to bring to mind the set of facts which are reasons for and against one’s -ing
and to settle the issue of whether those facts, all things considered, speak in favour of one’s
-ing or not: this is a matter of working out what one has most reason to do. The second
is to result in a -ing which is in some way controlled or determined by one’s episode of
reasoning. To say that these are aims of reasoning is to say there the episode of reasoning
counts as defective to the extent that it fails to achieve either of them. Moreover, they are
aims of reasoning from the subject’s own point of view: from the subject’s point of view,
what they are doing is attempting to settle the matter about whether or not to  and then
to  in a way that is in some sense controlled by their episode of deliberation.
The key thought is that from the subject’s own point of view, the two aims are con-
nected:
The two things are evidently connected. What is essential for success in prac-
tical reasoning is not just that it should get things right and that it should
somehow make a diﬀerence to what one will eventually be doing, but that the
facts (which one needs to get right) will make a diﬀerence to what one will be
doing. (Roessler, 2014:5)
The thought is that one doesn’t simply aim to get right whether one ought to  and in
addition, or over and above that, aim at a -ing controlled by one’s deliberation. Rather,
there is a single aim of reasoning which subsumes both aims already mentioned and links
them: reasoning which characteristically results in a -ing for reasons is reasoning aimed
at one’s -ing in a way that is explained by the reasons which settle the issue. And this
thought about what links the aim of determining what can be said in favour of one’s -ing
with the aim of determining what one does is supposed to tell in favour of (c):
To insist that the correct explanation of the agent’s doing A lies in her ‘mo-
tivating reasons’ (her non-factive attitudes). . .One would have to think about
one’s action from a standpoint that is neutral on whether one is getting things
right in one’s practical reasoning. . . It may not be impossible for an agent to
adopt that kind of perspective even in the midst of deliberating and acting,
but doing so would certainly go against the grain. It is hard to stop caring
about the distinction between discovery and delusion while being engaged in
a project of practical reasoning, the success of which turns on that distinction.
(Ibid.:6-7)
In a word, we don’t pre-philosophically conceive of the episodes of reasoning which
result in our -ing for reasons as episodes which aim to deliver us -ings that are explained
by the appearance of normative reasons, but -ings that are explained by the normative
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reasons themselves. That is the point of the thought about what reasoning aims at from
the agent’s own point of view described above: the two aims described are united and
subsumed by a more general aim, which is part of the subject’s own point of view on their
reasoning, that one’s -ing is explained by the normative reasons one has surmised during
the course of the reasoning.
The Anscombean Argument has two steps. The first aims to establish that (c) generates
a problem for the proponent of Williams’ Dictumw. The second aims to establish that
(c) is true. The problem, it seems to me, lies with the first step. The argument that (c)
is incompatible with Williams’ Dictumw appeals to the idea that the proponent of it is
committed to saying that rationalising explanations never take normative reason-involving
explanantia. But, as we have seen, that is false: Davidson and Dancy can perfectly well
agree that the explanans in the good case is either a state of knowing or the fact that p. So
even if we are pre-philosophically committed to the claim that normative reasons explain
why we , that’s consistent with Williams’ Dictumw. It might even be consistent with
Williams’ Dictums, depending on how the particular Reductionist theory is developed.
5.6 Against Normative Epiphenomenalism
The state of play, dialectically speaking, is this. I’ve distinguished particular explanations
from the form or type they exemplify. This helped us to distinguish between two ways of
understanding Williams’ Dictum. On one understanding of that thesis, it is equivalent to
my target: Reductionism about -ing for the reason that p. My tactic is to refute Reduc-
tionism by refuting Williams’ Dictum on that reading. I’ve surveyed some of the existent
arguments against it and they have been found wanting, in light of the distinction between
particular explanations and forms of explanation. This generates the need for some fresh
considerations. That is what I attempt to provide here. In §5.6.1 I attempt to demonstrate
that (ENT) should be our default view in this area. In §5.6.2 I attempt to show that there
are no good arguments for Williams’ Dictumw. I conclude that we should adopt (ENT).
5.6.1 Shifting the Burden of Proof
It is a fundamental commitment of the proponent of Williams’ Dictumw, however their
favoured theory is developed, that rationalising explanations which appeal to normative
reasons or our knowledge of them never appeal to them qua normative reasons or qua
knowledge. It is not by dint of p being a normative reason that it explains why one s,
if it does, and likewise it is not by dint of its being a state of knowledge that a state of
knowledge explains why one s either. In the first case, it is the fact that the reason is an
apparent normative reason that does the explanatory work. In the second case it will be
because the state in question constitutes the appearance of normativity to one that it does
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the explanatory work. Whatever the positive story, the fact remains: if a normative reason-
involving condition does explanatory work, for the proponent of Williams’ Dictumw, it is
not by dint of being a normative reason-involving condition in the way it is that it does
so. That is a result of Williams’ Dictumw because according to it the way in which ex-
planations of the rationalising form make things intelligible is not by appeal to conditions
that are normative-reason involving, but only by appeal to conditions which involve the
appearance of normativity. If a normative reason-involving condition plays the role of a
rationaliser, then, that will be accidental from the way in which the explanation makes
things intelligible.
Contrast that with (ENT). It is precisely by dint of being a normative reason that a
given normative reason gets to do the explanatory work it does, for that is part of the way
inwhich rationalising explanations of the form posited by (ENT)make judgement sensitive
phenomena intelligible. We would not have an explanation of the same form on our hands
– things would not be made intelligible for us in that very way – if the explanans of such
an explanation were traded for a condition which doesn’t involve normative reasons.
I think this is a problematic commitment of Williams’ Dictumw – it commits it eﬀec-
tively to the thought that the normativity of normative reasons is an explanatorily epiphe-
nomenal feature of them. But why is that problematic?
In Chapter One, I brought the phenomenon of responding to the normative reason that
p into focus by presenting it as an analogue of the Kantian notion of -ing in the light of
duty. One of the hallmarks of -ing in the light of duty is that it is a matter of -ing in
response to a duty conferring feature as such or qua dutymaking feature. The phenomenon
of responding to a reason displays a similar aspect: it is responding to a normative reason
as such or qua normative reason.
This as such aspect of -ing in response to the normative reason that p is what distin-
guishes the sense of responding to reasons I’m interested in from the sense in which, for
example, someone who is on a diet can be said to be responding to a normative reason
in eating a slice of birthday cake they know they shouldn’t. That it is their birthday is a
reason for them to eat a slice and they are acting in a way that can be said to be a response
to that fact when they engage in their akratic action. This is so even though they know
full-well that they have decisive reason not to take a slice. This, I think, is not an example
of the sort of phenomenon I’m interested in because the akratic agent is not responding to
the fact that it is their birthday in so far as it is a reason, for they precisely acknowledge
that the normative force of the reason fails to make a decisive case for action.
Now, this as such aspect of the success notion raises a challenge to the proponent of
Williams’ Dictumw. For let us ask the question: what does it amount to other than the fact
that the normative dimension of the normative reason towhich the agent is responding does
explanatory work with respect to the agent’s -ing? What, that is, can -ing in response to
a reason qua reason be, other than -ing in a way that is subject to an explanation which
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depends on the normative dimension of the reason in question? Without a convincing
response to this challenge we will have to conclude that normative reasons do explanatory
work in so far as they are normative reasons, contraWilliams’ Dictumw.
However, the proponent of Williams’ Dictumw does seem to have a response to this
challenge, for there is a sense in which the agent in the bad case s because of their belief
that p in so far as p is a reason. We need to acknowledge that there is a sense in which that’s
so in order to get the desired contrast between bad cases and cases of non-rational -ing,
including cases of weakness of will, on the one hand, and the desired similarity with good
cases of -ing for reasons, on the other hand. But it is agreed on all sides that the subject
does not  because p qua normative reason in the bad case. So the proponent of Williams’
Dictumw can say, in response to the challenge, that whatever -ing for a reason qua reason
amounts to, it cannot amount to -ing in a way that is explained by a normative reason as
such, for the qua reason aspect appears in the bad case too, where no such explanation is
possible.
In response to this challenge I want to suggest that the qua reason aspect surfaces at
the level of the subject’s own point of view in a way that suﬃces for the subject to be
committed to thinking of their -ing as explained by a normative reason qua normative
reason. So even if the qua reason aspect at issue is present across good cases and bad, it
can still be appealed to in order to shift the burden of proof onto the proponent ofWilliams’
Dictumw.
Contrast the subject who eats a slice of birthday cake in an akratic way with the subject
who eats a slice in a non-akratic way. The first eats a slice in response to the fact that it is
their birthday, but not qua reason, for they are on a diet and so are committed to thinking
that the fact that it is their birthday is not a suﬃcient reason to eat the slice. The second
eats a slice in response to the fact that it is their birthday qua reason. They are not on
diet, and so that fact can function as a decisive reason for them. I submit that there is
a diﬀerence between the way in which each subject conceives of their action: there is a
diﬀerence between each action from the point of view of the agent who performs it. This
diﬀerence is manifested in what the subject would be willing to say about their action.
The akratic agent would be prepared to say things like: ‘I know I shouldn’t, but I don’t
care what’s good for me: it’s my birthday so I’ll eat a slice of cake anyway!’ whereas the
non-akratic agent wouldn’t be prepared to say such things.
What I want to suggest is that we should interpret the diﬀerence as partly a diﬀerence,
from each agent’s point of view, in how their respective actions are to be explained. The
non-akratic agent thinks of their -ing as being explained by the normative reason that it is
their birthday qua reason, whereas the akratic agent doesn’t think of their action as being
explained in that way. That is at least part of what the diﬀerence between an agent who
s because p qua reason and an agent who doesn’t but still counts as (non-rationally) re-
sponding to p consists in. The qua reason dimension of responding to normative reasons is
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present from the point of view of the subject on their -ing as an explanatory phenomenon.
It is the qua reason dimension which sets akratic -ings apart from -ings which are re-
sponses to reasons, and part of what the diﬀerence involves is a diﬀerence in how the -ing
is to be explained from the point of view of the subject themselves.24
It should now be clear that we can acknowledge the thought, if we like, that the qua
reason dimension is exemplified in both good cases and bad, whilst also thinking that it
causes problems for the proponent of Williams’ Dictumw. For even if that is so, and I
haven’t doubted it here, still: the qua reason dimension suﬃces for it to be the case that
from the subject’s own point of view (if not in fact), the subject’s -ing is to be explained
by p qua normative reason. The proponent of Williams’ Dictumw is thus committed to
an error theory of our ordinary conception of -ing for reasons. This suﬃces to shift the
burden of proof onto them.
I’ve raised a challenge to the proponent of Williams’ Dictumw that appeals to the as
such dimension of responding to a normative reason. But the same challenge can be posed
to the knowledge-based alternative to (ENT). According to that view, we should indeed
reject Williams’ Dictumw, but we should not identify the explanantia of rationalising ex-
planations with the fact that p. Instead, we should identify them with the state or fact of
the agent’s knowing that p. The problem for this view is that it too cannot, on the face of it,
handle the as such dimension of responding to the normative reason that p. As I have said,
that feature of the phenomenon we’re interested in surfaces at the level of the subject’s
own point of view in a way that involves the subject being committed to their -ing being
explained by the normative reason that p in so far as p is a normative reason. But according
to the knowledge-based alternative to (ENT), the explanans isn’t something which exem-
plifies the normative status of p, simply because the explanans isn’t p but rather the agent’s
knowledge. So the way in which the as such dimension of the phenomenon we’re inter-
ested in surfaces for the subject themselves also poses a diﬃculty for the knowledge-based
alternative. The upshot of all of this is that (ENT) should be our default view.
5.6.2 Williams’ Dicta are Undermotivated
Why might one endorse Williams’ Dicta? I suspect that those who explicitly endorse
them, like Dancy (2000) and Williams himself, take them to be obvious and not in need of
argument. They are not obvious, however, and do need argument. In this section I examine
and reject the best ways of arguing for them. Given that (ENT) should be our default view,
the upshot will be that we are licensed in accepting it, as I will go on to detail.
I’ll begin with what can be said in favour ofWilliams’ Dictums. In fact, the Motivating
24In Chapter One I contrasted responding to normative reasons, as well as bad cases thereof, not just with
akratic -ings but with other sorts of non-rational -ings which could be described using similar language.
Each of those non-rational phenomena fail to display the qua reason aspect, just as the akratic phenomena
do. As a result, I could’ve just as easily relied on these other non-rational phenomena for making my point.
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Reasons Postulate can be relied upon to motivate Williams’ Dictums. It follows that every
argument for the Motivating Reasons Postulate helps in the case for Williams’ Dictums,
and indeed arguing for the Postulate seems to me to be the only way to motivate Williams’
Dictums. Chapter Three undermined the strongest arguments for the Postulate. Thus, the
only way of arguing for Williams’ Dictums has been undermined too.
This attempt at undermining what can be said in favour of Williams’ Dictums hinges
on the thought that the Motivating Reasons Postulate can be used to motivate it. But why
should we think that? Well theMotivating Reasons Postulate identifies our ordinary notion
of the reason which motivates the agent to  with an item which either is, or is a part of,
the explanans of the particular rationalising explanation to which one’s -ing is subject
just in case one s motivated by a reason. It then says that that very explanation holds in
the bad case, thus delivering us the result that the agent s for the reason that p in the bad
case too. Now if we add to this the premise that the only rationalising explanation which
holds in the good case is the explanation which constitutes one’s -ing for the reason that
p, we get the result that the only rationalising explanations there are are normative-reason
neutral, which is Williams’ Dictums.
Of course, one might respond to this by saying that there are good reasons to think that
there are rationalising explanations which apply in the good case which are not identical to
the subject -ing for the reason that p.25 However, what has emerged is that the argument
goes wrong anyway, because the Postulate is undermotivated. The five arguments I have
examined for the claim that S s for the reason that p in the bad case – Dancy’s Master
Argument, The Argument from Rationality, The Argument from Incredulity, The Argu-
ment from Transparency, and The Argument from Doubt – are supposed to be arguments
for the Motivating Reasons Postulate. I rejected those arguments earlier. The refutation
of the Motivating Reasons Postulate is thus revealed to be significant not just because it
helps us to settle the Question of Psychologism but because it helps to settle the question
of whether we should endorse Williams’ Dictums.
I nowmove on to examiningwhat can be said in favour ofWilliams’ Dictumw. Oneway
of arguing for it is by appeal to Williams’ Dictums, which entails it. This strategy, how-
ever, is no good because, as we have just seen, there are no good arguments for Williams’
Dictums. The only other strategy for motivating Williams’ Dictumw that I know of con-
sists in motivating Reductionism, and from that inferring Williams’ Dictumw, which is
entailed by it. This, in turn, raises the question of how we might motivate Reductionism,
independently of Williams’ Dictumw. I know of only one way of doing that, which I now
want to detail and, in the end, undermine.
I’ve identified Reductionism with a certain identity claim. The claim is that -ing in
response to the normative reason that p is identical to -ing subject to a rationalising ex-
planation thought of as belonging to a type which is normative-reason neutral, in addition
25This, I think, is what Hornsby would say.
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to the obtaining of the set of extra-explanatory factors such as truth, normative status and
knowledge which are individually necessary and, together with the holding of the partic-
ular explanation, suﬃcient for one to  in response to the normative reason that p. Those
factors, although extra to the type of explanation in question, will play a certain sort of
explanatory role, as we have seen.
It is not built into the Reductionist’s position that we can give a non-circular analysis of
the concept of -ing in response to the normative reason that p. It might be that that notion
can only be satisfactorily accounted for, ultimately, by appeal to some factor our concept
of which can itself only be analysed partly by appeal to the concept of -ing in response
to the normative reason that p. That would be consistent with Reductionism, which just
says that the condition we have in mind when we think of an agent as -ing in response
to the normative reason that p is identical to a condition that factors into -ing subject to
a rationalising thought of in the way Williams’ Dictumw recommends, in addition to the
relevant further factors. That metaphysical thesis is entirely consistent with the conceptual
thesis that our analysis of the concept of -ing in response to the normative reason that p
must ultimately be circular.
However, the thought that there is a satisfactory non-circular analysis of the concept
of -ing in response to the normative reason that p can be appealed to in order to motivate
Reductionism. For let’s suppose that such an analysis is possible. Then it would follow
that the concept of -ing in response to the normative reason that p is to be identified
with a certain conjunctive concept: the concept that is the conjunction of the concepts
corresponding to each of the conditions in the Reductionist analysis. Moreover, each of
the concepts which compose the conjunctive concept would themselves be graspable in-
dependently of the concept of -ing in response to the normative reason that p. That is the
shape that the non-circular analysis of the concept of -ing in response to the normative
reason that p would have to take. But if that’s so, then Reductionism would follow, for it
would follow that what we have in mind when we think of an agent as -ing in response
to the normative reason that p just is those set of conditions with which the Reductionist
identifies -ing in response to a normative reason.
So the question now is this: what can be said in favour of a non-circular analysis of
the concept of -ing in response to the normative reason that p? I don’t think there is any
decisive reason to expect that such a thing is possible at the outset of inquiry. However, it
might be thought plausible that the expectation that we can find a non-circular analysis of
any given concept is something that we are justified in holding until it is proven that the
concept needs to be taken as not admitting of one. Thus, we might reasonably expect to
be able to find a non-circular analysis of the concept of -ing in response to the normative
reason that p, until it is proven that such a project is impossible to complete. But with that
point settled, we get a motivation for Reductionism and hence Williams’ Dictumw. For if
we are entitled to expect a non-circular analysis of the concept of -ing in response to the
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normative reason that p until it is proven that such a thing is impossible then, given that the
possibility of such an analysis entails Reductionism and Reductionism entails Williams’
Dictumw, we are also entitled to take Williams’ Dictumw to be true until it is proven that
a non-circular analysis of the success notion is not possible.
I do not think this argument is eﬀective, for there are indeed decisive reasons to think
that a non-circular analysis of the success notion is impossible. To see why, I want to begin
with a feature of the type rationalising explanation to which Dancy (2004b) draws atten-
tion. We can start with what he says in the following passage, in which he is commenting
on what he labels a ‘Humean’ conception of rationalising explanation – a conception of
rationalising explanation which, we can take it, is the conception I’ve been associating
with Davidson:
An intentional action, we are told, cannot occur in the absence of a pair of
distinct states in the agent, one a belief one a desire, which states are to func-
tion as causes. But not just this: there is the further requirement that the belief
and the desire be somehow ‘appropriate’ to each other; we must have an ‘ap-
propriate’ pairing if we are to have the sort of explanation of action that the
Humeans conceive themselves to be talking about. What this means is that
an explanation of someone’s taking the bus that appeals to his wanting to get
to the market and believing that the bus is a convenient way of getting there
is a good explanation of the Humean sort. A bad explanation of the Humean
sort would be one that explained an action of putting on one’s hat because
one believes that it is raining and wants to wear a hat if it is not raining. The
latter, we are told, is no explanation, because the belief and the desire are not
appropriately related. (Ibid.:30-31)
What Dancy is drawing attention to here is an essential feature of rationalising ex-
planations as such. The feature is that in order for a rationalising explanation to count as
making things intelligible in the distinctive way it does, it must be that the explanans of the
rationalising explanation links up with the judgement sensitive phenomenon in the right
sort of way. It must be that the explanans, or its content, counts intelligibly as a reason
in favour of the agent’s -ing from their own point of view so that there is, in principle at
least, a course of reasoning or deliberation open to them which would take them from the
explanans, or its content, to the conclusion to . This is why, in Dancy’s example, a belief
that it is raining and a desire to wear a hat if it is not raining cannot be invoked in principle
to explain in the rationalising way why the subject is wearing a hat: an agent being in those
states does not intelligibly add up the agent seeing the action in a positive light.
The claim is not that states of mind such as those Dancy cites are incapable of explain-
ing why the agent s at all. Rather, the point is that they are not capable of explaining if
the explanation is supposed to be a rationalising explanation. That isn’t merely a gener-
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alisation about all rationalising explanations, but a point about the nature of the kind of
intelligibility we seek when we seek rationalising explanations – it is a comment about the
form of rationalising explanations.
This point about the link between explanantia and explananda in rationalising ex-
planations itself calls out for explanation. What calls for explanation is the thought that
rationalising explanations which take explanantia that link in the appropriate way to the
relevant judgement sensitive phenomenon can be correct, whereas those which don’t can-
not be correct if they are supposed to be rationalising explanations at all. Dancy labels
the first type of explanation ‘A’, the second ‘B’, and supplies what I think is a plausible
explanation of the constraint on rationalising explanations at issue:
It seems to me that the obvious suggestion here is that our a priori preference
for A-type explanations is grounded in. . . the fact that in ‘making sense’ of the
agent they portray him as rational, as responding to rational norms, in a way
that B-style explanations do not. (Dancy, 2004b:31-32)
The thought here is that -ing in a way that is subject to a rationalising explanation is
constitutive of -ing in a way that counts as following a ‘rational norm’, and this is why an
explanation is rationalising only if the explanans is connected to the relevant judgement
sensitive phenomenon in the appropriate way. For this explanation to work, it must be that
-ing in a way that constitutes following a rational norm suﬃces for the explanans of the
explanation to stand in the appropriate link to the agent’s -ing. This, of course, raises the
questions: what is a rational norm and what is the rational norm which one is following
when one s subject to a rationalising explanation?
A rational norm is a general principle which tells us under what conditions one ought
to . We have already come across examples of rational norms before: the principles of
structural rationality described in Chapter Three. Those principles in particular tell us that
when the agent has a certain set of attitudes, they ought to , for example:
(RN1) If S believes that p and takes p to be an undefeated reason in favour of their -ing,
then S ought to 
This rational norm – a norm of structural rationality – tells us that the agent should 
if they believe they have an undefeated reason to do so. But rational norms needn’t always
take the shape of specifying attitudes and then telling us that the agent ought to , given
those attitudes. Instead, the rational norms at issue might operate the other way round:
(RN2) If S s, then S ought to believe that p and take p to be an undefeated reason in
favour of their -ing
This norm tells us, roughly, that an agent ought only ever  if they take something to
be an undefeated reason for them to do so.
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Now, the rational norms we’ve just come across are, in a certain sense, subjective.
They are subjective in the sense that they link claims about the agent’s -ing with claims
about the agents attitudes, specifically: those attitudes which constitute the appearance
of undefeated normative reasons to the subject. But, as Dancy points out, there are such
things as objective rational norms. These norms are general principles which link the
agent’s -ing not with apparent normative reasons but with genuine normative reasons.
Consider the following principle:
(RN3) If p is an undefeated reason for S to , then S ought to 26
So we have a distinction between subjective and objective rational norms and the sug-
gestion that in order to explain why the explanantia of rationalising explanations must be
appropriately linked to the agent’s -ing in the way described we have to think of ratio-
nalising explanations as constitutively involving the agent responding to rational norms:
general principles which tell the agent what, from the point of view of rationality, to do.
The question now is: should we identify the relevant rational norm with a subjective norm
like (RN1) or (RN2) or with an objective norm such as (RN3)? Dancy himself argues for
the latter and indeed suggests that (RN3) is itself the norm at issue:
I suggested above that in oﬀering A-type explanations we portray our agent
as responding to a norm of rationality. The first question should then be: if
so, to which sort of norm is the agent to be thought of as responding, the
objective sort or the subjective sort? But to this question, the answer seems
clear. Agents who deliberate and act in the light of deliberations do not say to
themselves ‘Well, I believe that p and desire to  if p; so even if I am wrong
in believing that p and wrong to desire to  if p, still I should . . . ’. That is,
agents do not deliberate on their own states of mind as input; they deliberate
on and act in the light of how (as they see it) things are. So if the agent is
responding to any principle or norm of rationality, it will be to an objective
norm which tells him what he has reason to do in which situations, not to a
subjective one at all. (Dancy, 2004b:33)
26Dancy himself does not formulate principles (RN1)-(RN3) in the way I have. In my formulation, the
‘ought’ is, on the surface at least, attached to the consequent of the conditional. In the way Dancy formu-
lates them, the ‘ought’ has scope over the whole conditional, so that (RN1) becomes: S ought:(if S takes
p to be an undefeated reason for them to  then S s) and (RN3) becomes: S ought:(if p is an undefeated
reason for S to , then S s). I take it that this reflects Dancy’s view that oughts of subjective rational-
ity have wide-scope, given that they just are oughts of normative reason-hood and that he needs to avoid
bootstrapping worries. But reading Dancy in that way is not straightforwardly correct, given that there is
no such motivation for thinking that the ‘ought’ of (RN3) has wide-scope. Whatever Dancy’s reason for
ascribing wide-scope to the ‘oughts’ which appear in his formulations of the relevant principles of ratio-
nality, it would make no diﬀerence to the discussion here if we were to follow Dancy in formulating the
principles in that way.
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The thought here is that an agent cannot count as following (RN1) in so far as a rational-
ising explanation applies to them. That would require that the agent takes the facts about
their states of mind involved in the antecedent of the instance of the norm in question into
account during the episode of deliberation which leads to their -ing, and this is not some-
thing which agents who  subject to a rationalising explanation always, or even typically,
do. Typically the agent’s eye is directed outwards onto the normative reasons in the world
when they engage in reasoning or deliberation which leads up to their -ing. This means
that the agent who s subject to a rationalising explanation must be -ing in a way that is
guided by (RN3), our objective principle. The principle which guides the agent’s -ing
when they  for a reason is that they ought to , if there is an undefeated normative reason
present. Following (RN3) is part of what it is for a rationalising explanation to apply to
one, for that is what explains why rationalising explanations essentially take explanantia
which are appropriately linked to the relevant judgement sensitive phenomenon.
It is worth emphasising that this point about rationalising explanation is supposed to
hold whatever one’s views about rationalising explanations are. Even if one thinks that the
only rationalising explanations there are are ones which are normative reason-neutral, it
would still be the case that those rationalising explanations essentially involve the subject
following (RN3), and that this is why those explanations make things intelligible only if
an explanans is appealed to which is appropriately connected with the relevant judgement
sensitive phenomenon. One point that that brings out is that even the rationalising expla-
nations which hold in the bad case will be ones the holding of which constitutes the agent
-ing in a way that constitutively involves them following (RN3). In some bad cases, of
course, p isn’t really a reason for S to , in which case the subject will not count as suc-
cessfully adhering to the norm in question. But, as Dancy himself points out, that doesn’t
mean that S thereby counts as successfully following a diﬀerent norm, for example, (RN1).
Even in the bad case, the subject is still following (RN3), just unsuccessfully.
I think Dancy is right about all of this. However, I also think that it reveals that it is not
possible to provide a non-circular analysis of the concept of responding to the normative
reason that p. To see this, we can ask the question: what is it to follow (RN3)? We have a
principle of rationality which tells one to , if there is undefeated reason for one to . It
has been claimed that when an agent s subject to a rationalising explanation, they stand
in a certain relation to that principle: that of following it or adhering to it. What is that
relation?
Well, rational agent’s are not, in general, concerned merely with -ing in line with
the reasons there are, but are concerned with -ing in response to those reasons: they are
concerned with -ing in the light of reasons as such. It is not as if we lead our normative
lives attempting to perform actions or adopt attitudes which are, as it happens, acts and
attitudes for which there are undefeated reasons, perhaps recognised as such by us. Rather,
at least sometimes we show a concern for -ing in a way that stands in a certain relationship
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with those reasons recognised as such: the responding to a normative reason relation.
Responding to normative reasons, just like acting in the light of duty, is a status which
rational agents as such manifest a concern for.
But now let us ask: what could it be say that an agent is following or adhering to (RN3)
other than to say that they are manifesting their concern to respond to normative reasons as
such? To say that an agent is following or adhering to the principle: if p is an undefeated
reason for one to , then , just seems to be another way of saying: the agent is purporting
to respond to a normative reason, or, alternatively put: the agent is manifesting a concern
for making sure that they respond to reasons.
There is, of course, a further question about what this amounts to. But I do not need
to go into that here. All I need to make my point is that the concept of responding to a
normative reason needs to enter into our account of what it is to follow (RN3), and hence
needs to enter into our account of rationalising explanation.
Properly developed, then, Dancy’s point about rationalising explanation is that the ‘be-
cause’ of rationalising explanations requires the agent to count as following the objective
norm (RN3). That is part of our understanding of what making things intelligible in the
rationalising way is. But this should show us that it is not possible to provide a non-
circular analysis of the concept of -ing in response to the normative reason that p. For
let’s suppose that we can give such an analysis. Then the analysis would have to appeal
to our concept of -ing subject to a rationalising explanation. But what has emerged is
that the concept of responding to the normative reason that p is one which we must invoke
in order to understand the concept of rationalising explanation: our concept of rationalis-
ing explanation is a concept of a type of explanation which applies to agents only if they
are following an objective norm, where following the norm in question is itself something
that is itself a matter of manifesting a concern for -ing in response to normative reasons.
The very concept of rationalising explanation is parasitic on the success notion. Thus, no
non-circular analysis of the success notion is possible.
We can conclude then that the way of motivating Reductionism and hence Williams’
Dictumw which appeals to the possibility of a non-circular analysis of the concept of re-
sponding to the normative reason that p, fails. Since that is the only way of motivating
Williams’ Dictumw other than by appeal to (the itself undermotivated)Williams’ Dictums,
we can conclude that Williams’ Dictumw is undermotivated.
I’ve already established that (ENT) should be our default view. So all I need to do in
order to justify acceptance of (ENT) is to show that its opponents are undermotivated. I’ve
just shown that its main opponents, Williams’ Dicta, are undermotivated. That just leaves
the knowledge-based alternative to (ENT), and with respect to that thesis it is not clear to
me at all how one might motivate it, other than by appeal to the thought, already proven
to be false, that it represents the only way to reject Williams’ Dictumw. We can conclude,
then, that we’re justified in accepting (ENT).
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5.7 The Primacy of the Good Case
I have argued for a pluralistic account of rationalising explanation. Rationalising explana-
tion can consist in a form of explanation which essentially appeals to normative reasons
as such or it can consist in a form of explanation which appeals to the fact that the sub-
ject believes that p. The former type of explanation is present in the good case only, the
latter across both good cases and bad. But putting it like this makes it explicit that in my
view the subject’s -ing in the good case is subject to two explanations, each of a diﬀerent
form: an explanation in terms of the normative reason to which they are responding and
an explanation which appeals to their belief that p. This raises the question: what is the
relationship between the two forms of explanation which each have instances in the good
case?
Roessler and Hornsby both suggest that the neutral explanation is in a certain sense
parasitic on the good case explanation. Here is how Roessler sums up the idea:
. . . it is not just that there is more than one way to explain intentional action
‘as such’, but we must acknowledge what is sometimes called the ‘primacy of
the good case’. The ability to make sense of actions in terms of non-factive
rationalizing attitudes depends on the more basic ability to find action intel-
ligible as something the agent has a normative reason to do (and is doing for
that reason). (Roessler, 2014:8)
To say that the good case explanations are primary is to say that we are to understand
what it is to provide a normative reason-independent explanation in terms of what it is
to provide a normative reason-involving explanation. Our understanding of what it is to
provide the first sort of explanation is parasitic on our understanding of what it is to provide
an explanation of the second sort. Given the conception of rationalising explanation I have
argued is correct here, the thought would be that giving a rationalising explanation in terms
of the subject’s believing that p needs to be understood by appeal to giving a rationalising
explanation in terms of the normative reasons as such.
Hornsby and Roessler each oﬀer what we might call counterfactual theories of the pri-
macy of the good case. On this sort of account, the primacy of the good case is achieved
via an analysis of the rationalising character of beliefs which appeals to some counterfac-
tual that makes reference to the good case. Hornsby’s thought is that we are to understand
what it is to provide an explanation of an action in terms of belief by appeal to the idea that
were what’s believed true, it would be a normative reason for the agent’s action. We then
say, along with deniers of Williams’ Dictumw, that normative reasons as such have the
power to rationalise -ings, and this gets us the result that explanatory potential of beliefs
depends on that of normative reasons: it is because normative reasons have the power to
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rationalise and the belief satisfies the counterfactual at issue that it in turn has the power
to rationalise.27
But as Roessler complains ‘why should counterfactual reasons be relevant to under-
standing the actual explanatory connection between beliefs and actions?’. The worry here
is that although the explanatory potential of beliefs might be parasitic on that of normative
reasons, it is not clear how this delivers what we want: that the neutral explanations cast in
terms of belief are themselves parasitic on the normative reason-involving explanations.
Roessler has an alternative counterfactual account which is supposed to fill in this lacuna:
We understand the explanatory role of mere beliefs on the model of that of
knowledge. What merely believing the chocolate to be in the cupboard makes
excusable is to act in ways that may in fact be pointless but that, if one’s belief
were knowledge, would be intelligible in terms of a normative reason pro-
vided, in part, by the fact that the chocolate is in the cupboard. (Roessler,
2014:9)
The thought seems to be that to explain why the agent s by appeal to their belief that p
is to provide an explanation which is true only if the following counterfactual holds: were
S to know that p, they would  in a way that is explained by the normative reason that p.
Satisfying that counterfactual is part of what it is to be subject to a neutral rationalising
explanation in terms of belief. Thus we get a parasiticness of the neutral explanation on
the essentially successful explanation.
It seems to me, however, that Roessler’s account of the primacy of the good case is
problematic. The problem is that there are possible cases in which the subject s because
they believe that p, but where they don’t satisfy Roessler’s counterfactual. The cases in
question are cases in which the subject comes to know that p in a way that would cause
them to no longer  in light of the apparent reason that p. Consider a case in which the
subject s because they believe that p, but were the subject to come to know that p they
would come to know it oﬀ the back of an informant who tells them that p is a good reason
for them to . But let’s suppose further that our subject has a desire, for whatever reason,
to rebel against the informant in question: what the informant recommends that they do,
the agent will precisely not do. So the agent doesn’t satisfy the counterfactual: were S to
know that p, they would  in a way that’s made intelligible by their knowledge that p. Still,
in the actual case where no informant is present, they  because they believe that p.
At this point it might be possible for Roessler to finesse the counterfactual to which
he appeals so as to avoid the worry. We would then have to check the fresh counterfactual
for further counterexamples. I do not want to suggest that accounting for the primacy
of the good case in counterfactual terms is doomed to fail. But I do want to point out
that there is an alternative way of delivering the primacy of the good case. In fact, the
27See Hornsby (2008:258-259).
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materials for constructing the alternative are already in place, for I argued earlier that part
of what it is for an explanation to be a rationalising explanation is for it to involve the
subject following the objective norm (RN3), where our account of what it is to follow that
norm essentially makes reference to the notion of responding to a normative reason. I have
also argued that the latter notion should be identified with the notion of -ing subject to
a rationalising explanation of the essentially successful variety posited by (ENT). So we
get the result that neutral rationalising explanations are to be understood in terms of the
good case rationalising explanations. To say that S s because S believes that p is to say,
partly, that in -ing, S is following the general principle: if p is an undefeated reason for
one to , then , where following the latter needs to be understood in terms manifesting a
concern to  in a way that is subject to a type of explanation which requires the presence
of normative reasons.
One question I have not addressed is what motivation there is for subscribing to the
primacy thesis at issue in the first place. Its truth has indeed fallen out of the arguments
of this chapter, and I’ve suggested that Roessler’s way of cashing it out will at least need
modifying, but none of this is particularly interesting if there is no reason to subscribe
to the primacy of the good case in the first place. I do not want to settle the question of
whether there is any need to subscribe to the primacy of the good case here. I rest content
with the thought that if there is a good reason to subscribe to it, then that is no problem
for my account, for it is easily accommodated.
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Conclusion
Dancy thinks of his work in this area as constituting a response to Davidson and his follow-
ers. In particular, he thinks of it as a response to the psychologistic excesses of Davidson’s
view. The present work can be advertised as a response to both Davidson and Dancy (and
indeed to the Neo-Davidsonians). In particular, it is a response to two excesses common to
both Davidson and Dancy. We have the success case of responding to a normative reason
as such. We also have bad cases of -ing in a way that would seem to one, were one to
reflect on the matter, to be a case of responding to reasons but in which one blamelessly
fails to achieve success. The first excess is a commitment to the claim that the subject s
for the reason that p across good cases and bad, so that in so far as they count as -ing for
the reason that p, they do not count as -ing in response to the normative reason that p.
The second excess is a commitment to the claim that success is a matter of -ing motivated
by a reason (in that special sense of ‘reason’), plus additional further factors that hold over
and above -ing motivated by a reason. Those excesses together constitute the Motivating
Reasons View.
This view was introduced in Chapter Two, against the background of the basic material
introduced in Chapter One. I argued against the Motivating Reasons View in Chapter
Three by appeal to the suggestion that it should be our default view in this area that -ing
for a reason just is the success phenomenon of responding to a normative reason. It was
then argued that there are no good reasons to think that the subject s for a reason in bad
cases, thus justifying our denial of the existence of motivating reasons in favour of the
alternative just advertised.
Now, although this requires us to reject the thought that there are such things as moti-
vating reasons in the special sense utilised by the Motivating Reasons View, it still leaves
us with two issues: what position to take with respect to the Dialectic of Psychologism and
whether we should agree that there is only one type of rationalising explanation, in terms
of which we would need to oﬀer a Reductionist account of success. Those issues are still
live, it is just that they need to be re-formulated so that they don’t involve a commitment
to motivating reasons in the special sense.
I argued in Chapter Four that we should opt for an Anti-Psychologist view about the
reasons for which we , and the refutation of the Motivating Reasons View has helped
us undermine a powerful argument for it. Finally, I argued in Chapter Five that we must
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acknowledge a special sort of rationalising explanation which essentially appeals to nor-
mative reasons and in terms of which we should account for our success notion. The theory
which emerged in Chapter Five enables us to completely resolve the Dialectic of Psycholo-
gism by delivering us the result that when one s for a reason, the reason for which one s
is identical to the explanans of the (or rather: a) rationalising explanation of one’s -ing.
The positive position argued for here is a position which I advertised as minimalist in
the introduction, for it relies, at most, only on two concepts of a reason: the concept of a
normative reason and the concept of a reason why. It should now be clear what that view
amounts to, and how it diﬀers from the Motivating Reasons View. About the success case,
I argue that we should identify it with -ing in a way that is subject to a special kind of
explanation: an explanation the form of which requires the presence of normative reasons,
which do their explanatory work qua normative reasons. The explanation is enabled by
one’s knowledge of one’s reason and its normative status, so that one’s -ing can be said
to manifest such knowledge. About the latter, I say that it consists in -ing because one
believes that p, in the rationalising sense of ‘because’. That explanation is in play in the
good case, but it is not the only explanation in play. Furthermore, it is parasitic on the
essentially normative reason-involving explanation, for all rationalising explanations in-
volve adhering to a rational norm which tell one to , if there is undefeated reason to do so,
and adhering to such a norm is a matter of purporting to respond to a normative reason. I
have also said that we should identify our ordinary talk of -ing for reasons with talk that
reports the success phenomenon. It should be acknowledged, however, that there is some
talk – ‘S’s reason’ talk and Dancy’s ‘in the light of’ talk – which, on closer inspection, can
be read as recording the neutral condition.
There are a number of issues which would need to be explored in order to give a fuller
treatment of the phenomena here. I haven’t said anything, for example, about what it
is to act in the pursuit of a goal, and how this relates to acting for reasons. I haven’t
said very much about what -ing in a way that is guided by a principle, for example a
moral principle, is and how that relates to -ing for reasons. I haven’t talked much about
what the relationship is between -ing for reasons and the episodes of deliberation and
reasoning which in some sense lead to one being in such states. I haven’t said anything
about the debate between internal and external reasons theorists and how this might aﬀect
our account of responding to reasons. I haven’t investigated whether perceptual beliefs
can be said to be held for reasons, in so far as they are based on perception. And a further
vexed issue which has been unexplored is whether the rationalising ‘because’ is a causal
‘because’. I intend to pursue these questions in future work. What has been provided here,
I hope, is a framework within which those questions can be explored: a framework which
diﬀers markedly from that in which Davidson, Dancy and the Neo-Davidsonians operate.
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